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Abstract
CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: TOWARDS THE PRODUCTION OF
SPACE FROM BELOW
by
Mehmet Barış Kuymulu

Advisors: Professor David Harvey and Professor Neil Smith
This dissertation examines the theoretical and political contradictions surrounding the
notion of the right to the city. The right to the city concept has lately attracted a great deal
of attention, both from academics who have long engaged with urban theory and politics,
and from grassroots activists around the globe who have been fighting on the ground for
an alternative just urbanism. In addition to urbanists and grassroots urban justice activists,
the right to the city concept has also drawn considerable attention from the United
Nations (UN) agencies such as UN-HABITAT and UNESCO, which have organized
meetings and outlined policies to absorb the notion into their own political agendas. This
wide-ranging interest has created a conceptual vortex that has pulled discordant political
projects behind the banner of the right to the city. By reframing the notion of the right to
the city to foreground its roots in Marxian labor theory of value, this dissertation offers a
theoretical framework to analyze diverse and often contradictory struggles for realizing
the right to the city. Based on two years of ethnographic fieldwork in New York, Boston
and Istanbul, the dissertation is organized around the three pillars of the labor theory of
value, namely, use value, exchange value and value. It begins with an examination of the
political struggles that are mobilized for accessing use values in the city. This is followed
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by an examination of the UN agencies’ claim over the right to the city that is primarily
for realizing exchange values in the city. Although this dissertation acknowledges the
usefulness of the analyses of urban political struggles based on the contradiction between
use value and exchange value, it concludes with the shortcomings of such analyses and
argues for a politics of value, which aims to cast labor in the epicenter of struggles for the
right to the city.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE USE OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

Political struggles in the twenty-first century are marked by a curious homogenization of
political lexicon. Ostensibly opposing sides of political engagement seem to express their
political aims in identical terms, most notably through the language of freedom, human
rights and democracy. Perhaps this is not very bewildering, since these idealized political
notions—the constant variation and evolution of their meaning with regard to spatiotemporal contexts notwithstanding—have long been at the center of political grammar,
ever since the eighteenth century European enlightenment, at least. They have been so,
argues David Harvey, by shaping and appealing to “our values and our desires, as well as
to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit.” Consequently, these concepts
have become “so embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to
discussion” (Harvey, 2005: 5). It is nevertheless a perplexing situation when, for instance,
both support for and opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of
the twenty-first century were, to a large extent, framed through the language of freedom,
democracy and human rights (Çubukçu, 2011a). It appears as though it is not currently
possible to articulate political projects without engaging with the questions of human
rights and democracy, even though many political projects mobilized around these
notions may entail contradictory and incompatible ends. Such concepts as human rights,
democracy and freedom, in short, create a conceptual vortex, which pulls even discordant
political agendas towards itself, for an already-justified shortcut to legitimacy.
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Such a vortex effect can be observed in the notion of the right to the city, albeit it is much
more recent in its origins than democracy, human rights, or freedom. The right to the city
concept was first introduced by Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1996) in the
tumultuous political atmosphere of the late 1960s in Paris. It has lately attracted a great
deal of attention, both from academics (Purcell, 2002; Mitchell, 2003; Harvey, 2003;
2008; Dikec, 2007; Busà, 2009; Leavitt, Samara, & Brady, 2009; Marcuse, 2009; Attoh,
2011; Mayer, 2012), who have long engaged with urban theory and politics, and from
grassroots activists around the globe—from Rio de Janeiro to Hamburg, Istanbul and
Johannesburg—who have been fighting on the ground for an alternative just urbanism
(Fernandes, 2007; Right to the City Alliance, 2009; Caruso, 2010; Kuymulu, 2013a). In
addition to urbanists and grassroots urban justice activists, the right to the city concept
has also drawn considerable attention from a less anticipated mix of organizations.
United Nations (UN) agencies such as United Nations Human Settlement Programme
(UN-HABITAT), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have been quick to
organize meetings—with the occasional participation of delegates from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—and have outlined policies to absorb the
notion of the right to the city into their own political agendas. Any notion that embodies
myriad political projects—ranging from grassroots politics of occupying vacant buildings
or central squares of cities, to market-based prescriptions such as microfinancing the
urban poor—begs close scrutiny. It is the aim of this dissertation to provide a theoretical
framework in chapter II to delineate and analyze urban political struggles that are pulled
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into the vortex of the right to the city by mainly conceptualizing them as struggles around
use value, exchange value and value.

My interest in the political contradictions surrounding the notion of the right to the city
goes back to 2007, when the Right to the City Alliance in the United States (RTTC-US)
was founded as a national alliance of community-based organizations from nine cities
across the country (RTTC-NYC, 2009; Leavitt, Samara, & Brady, 2009; Caruso, 2010).
The RTTC-US was primarily formed to build a united response to gentrification,
displacement and lack of affordable housing in US cities. Its aims, moreover, included
offering a vision for an urbanism “that meets the needs of working class people,”
building alliances among social movements against gentrification and displacement, as
well as connecting these movements to “other local and international struggles for human
rights, land, and democracy” (RTTC-NYC, 2009: 3).

The emphasis of the RTTC-US on building alliances among local community
organizations was one of its two striking characteristics that grabbed my attention at the
time. The RTTC-US seemed to be convinced that the housing problem they set to fight
against could not be sufficiently addressed at the local neighborhood level. Therefore, in
addition to the work that has been done at the neighborhood level by its member
organizations for years, the alliance got organized to confront urban problems at the
urban and the national scales, aiming as well to connect with other such organizations
beyond the United States. I found this move politically very exciting since, as an alliance
which set to confront gentrification and displacement in particular and the housing
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problem in general, the attempt of RTTC-US to scale-up was timely at the wake of the
collapse of the housing market in the United States, the shock waves of which were felt
across the globe.

The second salient characteristic of the alliance that grabbed my attention was its
emphasis on and political struggle around use values embedded in the urban space in
major US cities, in which these use values were almost completely dominated by their
exchange values. Take housing, for instance. It satisfies one of the most primary needs of
human beings and its use value is defined primarily by its function as a shelter. However,
the access to the use value of housing is only possible, especially in the US but
increasingly so around the world, by paying its exchange value. This leads to lack of
affordable housing and homelessness, the two of the major problems the RTTC-US was
set to confront.

The RTTC-US’ emphasis on confronting urban problems at the urban scale by building
alliances among community organizations working at more local scales and its struggle
around use values in the city became even more intriguing for me as my earlier readings
on the notion of the right to the city—as a conceptual apparatus to understand
contemporary urbanism and as a tenet for political struggle to solve its problems—were
guided by Henri Lefebvre’s writings, who introduced the concept in late 1960s (Lefebvre,
1996). The crux of Lefebvre’s argument was that the generalized domination of exchange
value over use value under capitalism undermined urban life, by turning the potential of
the city as oeuvre, the collective artwork of urban inhabitants, into an actual product. The
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generalization of exchange value relation and subsequent transformation of oeuvre into
product, he argued, necessarily overwhelm the user, the simple inhabitant who relies on
use values embedded in the city. Thus he formulated a right to the city, a claim over the
city as a totality, for use value against the domination of exchange value.

My interest in the right to the city struggles around use value got amplified as I took part
in one of the political campaigns of the New York City branch of the RTTC (RTTCNYC) in 2009. The aim of the campaign was to count the number of vacant properties in
New York’s five boroughs in order to propose a plan for their conversion into affordable
housing. After the research phase that took six months, the RTTC-NYC shared its
findings with the public by publishing a report, People without Homes and Homes
without People: A Count of Vacant Condos in Select NYC Neighborhoods (RTTC-NYC,
2010a).

The report revealed the extent of the housing crises in New York City: There were 264
residential buildings that were completely constructed, and either entirely or partially
sitting vacant in the city. The report also estimated that the number of vacant housing
units exceeded 4,000 in these buildings, while the average number of days these units had
been on the market was 418, well over a year. In a city, where the number of homeless
individuals who live in the shelters of the city administration fluctuates around 40,000
(Marcuse, 2010a: II; Bosman, 2010), the report revealed that the real estate market was
not exactly there to bring together the homes without people and the people without
homes. The stunning number of existing vacant housing units notwithstanding, moreover,
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the research report also noted that more than 3,200 housing units were still under
construction, which would eventually increase the number of vacant units under the
existing crises-ridden conditions of the real estate market in New York City (RTTCNYC, 2010a: 5-7).

People without Homes does not limit its scope to demonstrating the extent of the housing
crises by simply displaying the number of vacant residential units in the city. “It’s a
scandal” proclaims Peter Marcuse, one of the most prominent theorists of radical
urbanism and the author of the foreword to the report, “that there is housing that could
easily be available for occupancy and it is held empty only for speculative purposes,
while whole families are in desperate need of housing that they can afford” (2010a: II). In
this spirit, the condo count report identifies both new and existing mechanisms to convert
these vacant condominiums into low income housing in order to bring together the homes
without people with the people without homes.

According to the RTTC-NYC, the conversion process required the active involvement of
state agencies, both at the city and state levels in New York. Two distinct methods were
identified in the report, by which vacant condominiums could be appropriated by the state
institutions (RTTC-NYC, 2010a: 49): The municipal government could mobilize the tax
foreclosure mechanism, since, after all, the study identified 138 buildings that are taxdelinquent and their property owners owed a total of US$3,797,690 to the city. “It’s a
luxury ghost town,” the then RTTC-NYC coordinator David Dodge said. “If they are not
paying taxes, the city has a right to acquire these buildings” (The city and my life, 2010).
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At the New York State level, the report goes on, the appropriation could be done through
eminent domain, the process by which the government obtains private property for better
public use. Once the acquisition is accomplished, the RTTC-NYC proposed that these
buildings could be owned and operated either by the public housing system or by
establishing community land trusts (CLTs). The underlying aim of the RTTC-NYC in
these proposals was to ensure that the converted units remained “permanently affordable”
and “free from the pressures of the speculative market” (RTTC-NYC, 2010a: 47). This
represents an important political intervention in a city, which has been refashioned as the
capital of global capitalism in the last few decades.

The release of the report sparked two very different responses to its proposed solutions
for vacant housing units in New York City, which, I will argue, embody two different
formulations of what urban justice and the right to the city should be about. The first
response resonates with the RTTC-NYC’s position: Housing is a universal human right;
therefore, its use value and social function should be privileged against its exchange
value that is dictated by the market. If the real estate market is unable to humanely
provide everybody with a shelter to live in, then other mechanisms should be mobilized,
which does not exclude state intervention, so that the existing supply of housing can
effectively be distributed to those who are in need. Some of the elected officials,
including City Council members Melissa Mark Viverito, Leticia James and Brad Lander,
responded positively to the report and admitted that housing was way too important to
leave its distribution to market mechanisms alone. They agreed that “bold government
action” was required to convert these vacant condos in New York City into affordable
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housing units. For instance, Council Member Brad Lander from Brooklyn commented
that “in a city where a record number of families are going homeless every night, this
report shows us that there is an opportunity to turn some of these problematic buildings
into real community benefits” (RTTC-NYC, 2010b: 2). Cerita Parker, member of
Mothers on the Move—a South Bronx-based community organization, led almost
entirely by women of color and which took part in the production of the RTTC-NYC’s
report—agreed that these condominiums had nothing to do with benefiting her
community. Having been born and raised in the Bronx, Parker told reporters that an
astonishing number of condominiums were built recently in her neighborhood, which is
essentially populated by working class people of color. “They are building luxury
unaffordable housing in my community and I can’t afford to live in it,” she said. “My two
professional daughters can’t afford to live there” either, she added and asked: “Who are
they [condominiums] for? I can’t live in these buildings, and I can’t shop in these stores”
(Moore, 2010). An analogous sentiment is articulated by Arvanetta Henry, a member of
Picture the Homeless—RTTC-NYC member organization directed and run by homeless
people—who said at the press conference that she became homeless in 2008 because she
was unable to keep up with her constantly increasing rent, and many in her community
were in a similar situation. “My landlord decided to raise our rents to $2,100, which I
couldn’t afford. If this happened to me it can happen to anyone. It makes me sick to see
all this empty housing when there are thousands of people in NYC who need somewhere
to live” (RTTC-NYC, 2010b: 1). As we can see, the major grievance of both RTTC-NYC
members lies in the fact that the use value of housing is almost made irrelevant by its
exchange value.
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The second response to the report, however, immediately rejected with much sarcasm the
RTTC-NYC’s proposal of converting vacant condominiums into affordable housing.
Steven Spinola, the president of the Real Estate Board of New York, a powerful
organization of landlords, reportedly asked if it was April Fools’ Day when told of the
RTTC-NYC’s condo conversion plan. “If an owner wants to charge a certain amount and
believes he can get it, he has a right to hold onto it,” he told to Metro daily newspaper.
“These people clearly don’t believe in the idea of private property” (Oder, 2010).
Michael Slattery, senior vice president at The Real Estate Board of New York, said real
estate is far more complicated than turning the vacant units to people who are in need.
“The call for the confiscating of private property for ideological reasons is the most
startling since the Russian Revolution,” he said. “To simplify it, and say that we should
take private property and turn it over to the homeless population, it seems to me that we
shouldn't try to feast on someone's misfortune,” Slattery said (Markey, 2010).

I juxtapose these two responses here because they encapsulate two different notions of
urban justice, two distinct right demands and two different group’s claim for the right to
the city. The first position privileges the use value of housing, vacant condominiums in
this case, and the right of every urban inhabitant to a humane shelter. The implication
behind the appropriation proposal is that the urban space is primarily for those who
realize its use value. The second position, in contrast, emphasizes the exchange value of
these units and the right of property owners to own and command their private property.
After all, under the jurisprudence of private property laws, the vacant properties belong to
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their owners and they are free to do whatever they want with them, including keeping
properties vacant as long as they please. While the first position implies a right to the city
defined by the realization of use values embedded in urban space, the second position
pushes forth a right to the city of those who seek to realize spatial exchange values in the
city.

The struggles for the right to the city that crystallize around use value against exchange
value are vital, especially when we take into account the ideological and material
hegemony of exchange value in contemporary urbanism. And certainly, the right to the
city struggles for accessing use values in the US, exemplified by the work of the RTTC,
are not unique and isolated given the globalization of exchange value’s dominance
around the world in the past few decades, which instigated similar struggles for use value
in different cities. Several movements and their struggle around use value have become
increasingly salient around the globe especially since the turn of the twenty first century.
For instance, the Shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo founded in Durham,
South Africa, has been fighting primarily against evictions and for prioritizing “the social
value of urban land” and housing against their “commercial value” since 2005 (Abahlali
baseMjondolo, 2010). Its campaigns include other issues that take shape around the
politics of use value such as access to clean water, electricity, transportation and free
education (Pithouse, 2010) for the poor and working classes who are marginalized by the
exchange values of these urban services.
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Another notable movement fighting for accessing use values in the city is Recht auf Stadt
(Right to the City), a network of squatters, tenants and artists in Hamburg, Germany. It
emerged out of the occupation of vacant buildings that were owned by the city of
Hamburg in 2009 and since then they developed into a viable community (Souza, 2010).
The city had been keeping the buildings on purpose letting them deteriorate with the hope
of selling them to a developer to increase city’s revenues. The plan seemed to work
initially as the city found a Dutch investment company, which aspired to demolish the
run-down working class housing stock and build high-end office buildings and luxury
condominiums in its stead (Boeing, 2010). However the investment company was hit
hard by the global financial crises, which was instigated by the collapse of the housing
market in the US, and had to delay the construction in August 2009, which was followed
by the occupation of these buildings by the squatter movement (Oehmke, 2010). In a
way, the crises of exchange value enabled a network of 29 activist groups gathered under
the banner of the right to the city to claim these buildings for realizing their use value.

The most recent example of a right to the city claim for realizing use values that received
widespread public debate and visibility across the globe comes from the home of 2014
Football World Cup, Brazil, a country that has been a hotspot for the struggles around
accessing use values for some time. Only a year before the political controversies around
the World Cup and its effect on rising housing costs that grabbed global public attention,
the major urban centers of Brazil had been shaken by a countrywide uprising, the initial
flame of which was a rise in public transportation costs and diminishing urban services
(Watts, 2013; Bowater, 2014). As the 2013 uprising dwindled by the end of the summer,
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the organizations such as Homeless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores
Sem Teto – MTST) accelerated their organizing efforts against the evictions and rising
prices in the housing market that were caused by organizing the World Cup.

On 2 May 2013, the MTST led hundreds of families in Sao Paulo to occupy a vacant lot
and set up a tent city only four kilometers away from the newly built stadium where the
opening ceremony of the World Cup was to be held (Langlois, 2014). The number of
occupying families was an estimate 5,000 only a week later. The rapid increase in the
number of occupying families is a testament to the gravity of the “chronic affordable
housing problem in Brazil” (Kestler-D’Amours, 2014). For instance, the Itequera
neighborhood, where the occupiers set up the tent city has seen 165% increase in the cost
of each square meter of housing in the rental market during the last six years (Langlois,
2014). The displacement due to the skyrocketing housing prices in the past few years got
even worse due to the evictions caused directly by the efforts to open space for building
new stadiums and other facilities for the World Cup. The recent estimates that were
published right before the 2014 World Cup began suggest that around 250,000 people
were evicted from their homes as a direct cause of World Cup related constructions
(Sanchez, 2014; Bowater, 2014). 90,000 of these evictions took place in Sao Paulo alone
(Bergfeld, 2014). It is fair to assume that the evictions at such a massive scale put even
more pressure on the problem of affordable housing, which suggests some shortage of
available housing. On the other hand, however, according to a UN-HABITAT report
(2013), there are at least seven million vacant housing units in Brazil, 70% of which are
in urban areas. Sao Paulo, where the magnitude of the lack of affordable housing problem
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led thousands of families to occupy a vacant lot and live in a tent city, has almost
1,500,000 vacant housing units alone (UN-HABITAT, 2013: 22).

This brings us to the contradiction between use value and exchange value in capitalist
urbanism. How come a metropolitan area like Sao Paulo can have 1,500,000 vacant
housing units, the use values of which sit unrealized, while having a shortage of
affordable housing, which leaves masses without an adequate shelter, thus blocking their
access to use values? Recall that the crux of the right to the city struggle in New York
revolves around the same contradiction. The excessive property vacancy goes hand in
hand with excessive homelessness, hence the title of RTTC-NYC’s report: People
without Homes and Homes without People. The right to the city struggles for accessing
use values lie at the root of the examples that we briefly mentioned in Hamburg and
Durban as well. In all of these examples, the desire to realize exchange values put serious
limits to the urban inhabitants’ ability to access use values. In other words, what could be
expressed as the right to the city struggles of the privileged for realizing exchange values
comes face to face with and overrides the right to the city struggles of urban inhabitants
for accessing use values. It is therefore no coincidence that we observe various grassroots
struggles around the world over the city that take shape around accessing use values
against the globalized hegemony of exchange value.

As important and geographically widespread as these struggles for accessing use values
are, this dissertation argues that an exclusive focus on use value—both as a target of
political struggle and as an analytical focal point of analysis—faces certain limits. In
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order to develop an understanding of the ways in which contemporary capitalist urbanism
operates, and to device tactics and strategies to overcome its problems, the argument
goes, we have to get into a theoretical exploration of exchange value and value, and
analyze the right to the city struggles that are primarily about exchange value and value.
After the brief introduction about the right to the city claims on use value presented at the
outset of this chapter, this dissertation will examine two other right to the city claims that
are primarily over exchange value (chapter III) and value (chapter IV).

It is crucial to note at this point that the right to the city claims that crystallize primarily
around exchange value and value are indeed about use value and about different kind of
urbanisms that would, in different ways, enable urban inhabitants to access use values.
This is the main reason why we observe a certain kind of vortex effect in the notion of the
right to the city. This vortex effect is two-sided. Both various right to the city claims over
the city that are mostly discordant in their political aims and the literature on urbanism
that sets to analyze such struggles are pulled into the conceptual apparatus of the right to
the city. Hence, for instance, an anarchist movement mobilized for occupying vacant
buildings to realize their use values such as Recht auf Stadt and powerful agents of
international development such as UN-HABITAT, mobilized for finding solutions to the
problems of capitalist urbanism by primarily staying within the realm of exchange value
can talk about their mostly incompatible political projects through the language of the
right to the city.
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In order to delineate and analyze the often-irreconcilable political projects represented by
the right to the city claims that crystallize around use value, exchange value and value, I
initiate a theoretical discussion of the right to the city concept in chapter II,
“Appropriating the value of the right to the city.” As I discuss in a greater detail there, the
ways in which Henri Lefebvre (1996) theorized the notion was open enough to allow for
conflicting interpretations. I identify a series of oppositions, which could be extracted
from Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city, and I argue that these oppositions lie
at the root of the conflicting interpretations of the concept. While some of the oppositions
are, in part, offered by Lefebvre himself, others emerge or become more salient in the
literature on the right to the city that discusses Lefebvre’s work. In both cases, though,
the two concepts that form each opposition open up a space for interpreting Lefebvre’s
formulation of the right to the city and make it possible to take the implications of the
concept towards different and often-conflicting directions. For the sake of simplicity, I
will call these different directions liberal and radical interpretations of the right to the
city. The two paths are not mutually exclusive in absolute terms but rather characterized
by a dialectical tension. The tension between the two paths is a productive one that
underwrites multiple right to the city claims I scrutinize in this dissertation. In other
words, the tension between the liberal and radical conceptualizations of the right to the
city is productive of politics as the specific components of each strand is present in each
claim I examine in varying degrees.

I begin to identify the conceptual oppositions by focusing on the two aspects of
Lefebvre’s theorization of the right to the city that are persistent themes in the writings of
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his interlocutors, namely, the “right to participation” and “right to appropriation.” I argue
that both its liberal and radical readings are enabled by the oppositions implied in
Lefebvre’s discussion of each concept. Lefebvre’s lack of clarity about what specifically
the urban inhabitants were supposed to participate in allows on the one hand for a set of
interpretations that reduce the idea of political participation to a liberal call for procedural
participation in existing formal practices and structures of urban governance. I call this
liberal notion of participation “reproductive participation” as it rarely challenges the
dynamics of existing hegemonic urbanism and the power relations it embodies. On the
other hand, the right to participation implied in Lefebvre’s work opens up a more radical
path. By offering a close reading of Lefebvre’s discussion on participation both in
Writing on Cities (1996) and in his larger body of work, I argue for a reading of his
emphasis on participation to realize the right to the city as a call for participation in
political struggles for a radical transformation of the processes that orchestrate the
production of capitalist urban spaces and cities. The right to participation in Lefebvre’s
understanding, as I read it, underscores a kind of political activism directed towards
transforming the social processes that shape capitalist urban space and its very
governance. I call this radical notion of political participation “transformative
participation” as it aims to transform the ways in which urban space and cities are
produced along with the social relations they sustain. One of the discerning features of
“transformative participation” is that it aims to transform the conditions under which its
political participation became possible in the first place. Thus, it does not primarily look
to reproduce the system but to transform it in unprecedented ways.
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The second opposition I discuss, which rests in the notion of the “right to appropriation”
is very much dormant in Lefebvre’s account and faintly implied in the literature on the
right to the city. Lefebvre is even less clear about what he means by appropriation than he
is on participation as he refers to the right to appropriation directly only in passing.
Although he is vague about it, it occupies a central place in his discussion on the right to
the city and the notion of appropriation rarely goes unmentioned in the literature that
discusses his work. Lefebvre’s lack of clarity on the meaning of the right to appropriation
is frequently reproduced by his interlocutors, and curtails the political potential of the
concept. To clarify the two elements of the opposition that are conflated in the notion of
appropriation, I conceptualize two forms of appropriation, namely, “appropriation in
consumption” and “appropriation in production.”

A great majority of Lefebvre’s interlocutors tend to equate the notion of appropriating
urban space with having access to and utilizing urban spaces. While having access to
already produced urban spaces in order to use them is important—as it implies an
argument against spatial marginalization and exclusion while underwriting the struggles
we mentioned around use value—I argue that the politics of “appropriation in
consumption” does not take advantage of the possibilities inherent in the notion of
“appropriation in production,” which is implied but not realized in Lefebvre’s
formulation of the right to the city. As I discuss in chapter II in a greater detail,
Lefebvre’s use of the concept of appropriation vacillates between “appropriation in
consumption” and “appropriation in production” both in his writings on the right to the
city and beyond. Hence, he indeed implicitly creates the opposition by using the notion of
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appropriation vaguely and using its two meanings I identify interchangeably, which
simultaneously opens the path for the liberal appropriation of the concept. To tackle this
problem, I go back to Karl Marx’s Grundrisse (1993) and Capital (1990) to substantiate a
notion of appropriation that goes to the heart of the process of producing use values, i.e.,
the labor process. Incorporating “appropriation in production” in Lefebvre’s notion of the
right to appropriation as a critical component of the right to the city is necessary, I argue,
if we are serious about formulating the right to the city as the right of inhabitants to
radically transform the processes that orchestrate the production of cities and urban
spaces, rather than as a liberal right to access and consume what is offered in the sociospatial repertoire of existing cities.

The third opposition I identify in Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city is much
more salient and creates a theoretical and political fissure between liberal and radical
interpretations in a much deeper manner than the previous two oppositions do. As
aforementioned, one of the fundamental ways in which Lefebvre weaves the notion of the
right to the city is based on his argument that the contradiction at the heart of capitalism
between use value and exchange value is also inscribed under the skin of urban space.
Unlike the previous two oppositions, in which Lefebvre’s lack of clarity contributes in
the production of the theoretical and political fissure between the liberal and radical
interpretations, Lefebvre is crystal clear about this one. He argues that the capitalist
urbanism privileges exchange value and enables the right to the city of capitalists over
use value and the right to the city of those who rely on use value and social function of
urban spaces. This turns the city more and more into a “product” whereas it should be
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built and lived as an “oeuvre.” Lefebvre thus calls on the inhabitants who are users of the
city to organize themselves in order to claim their right to the city by transforming the
capitalist processes that marginalize them for their lack of command over exchange
value. It is hard to miss the point here. Therefore, I treat the liberal interpretations that
spring from this opposition in a particular way, conceptualizing them as political
appropriations, which I discuss in a greater detail in chapter III. One of the central
arguments encapsulated in my discussion of dialectical oppositions is that the diverse
right to the city claims I examine in this dissertation are better understood, assessed and
evaluated if seen through the dialectical relations I offer in chapter II.

“Global inclusive urbanism: The right to the city as a bridge across the urban divide,” the
third chapter of the dissertation, begins with examining the brief history of popularization
of the notion of the right to the city in grassroots activist circles and in the policy circles
of UN-affiliated organizations such as UNESCO, UNDP, and UN-HABITAT. Initially
discussed and put in practice by the urban social movements in Brazil in the 1980s and
1990s (Fernandes, 2007: 212; Friendly, 2013: 158), the notion of the right to the city was
made more popular at the global scale by grassroots activists from around the world who
gathered in various international social forums from 2001 onwards. UN agencies grasped
the global popularization both of the forum format and the right to the city concept as an
opportunity early on and launched the World Urban Forum in 2002, allocating a
significant portion of the discussions to the right to the city and its policy implications.
The engagement of UN agencies with the right to the city amplified in each forum and
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climaxed in 2010, carrying the notion to the title of the World Urban Forum as the main
theme: “The right to the city: Bridging the urban divide” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a).

I take this political engagement seriously and examine the right to the city politics of UN
agencies as one of the various right to the city claims I analyze in this dissertation. By
examining the documents, reports, and policy papers drafted by the UN agencies—
particularly the World Urban Forum reports produced by UN-HABITAT, which lay out
the central themes and discussions in the forums as well as the policy implications and
implementation plans—I investigate the main direction UN agencies tend to take the
notion of the right to the city. I say the main direction because of the nature of the World
Urban Forums. The forums claim to bring “all stakeholders” of the global urban politics
together and the group of participants is fairly heterogeneous, ranging from grassroots
organizations to top global corporations, from high-rank government officials to
urbanists, conservative and progressive alike.

I am aware that this appears to present a problem for my analysis because I attribute a
certain degree of agency to UN-affiliated organizations and argue that there is an
identifiable trend in UN organizations’ take on the right to the city. I do so because I
detect these trends and tendencies—especially the constant translation of Lefebvre’s
emphasis on use value into exchange value terms, among others—in the ways in which
UN-agencies present and discuss the important themes of the forum. Moreover, as I
analyze in the third chapter in detail, although the UN-HABITAT advertises the forum as
a democratic platform that brings together all the “key urban stakeholders,” including
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grassroots organizations, this is not entirely true. As the forum reports show, the
overwhelming majority of the participants are “heads of state, government ministers,
mayors and leaders of global foundations and big business,” which UN-HABITAT talks
about as a very good thing. This reaffirms, according to the 5th World Urban Forum’s
report, “both the Forum and its glittering exhibition as the world’s premier cities
convention” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2). Therefore, even though some participants of the
forum make some radical remarks, I infer that such participants, especially those who
criticize the commodification of urban spaces and cities, remain marginal at the forum.

I analyze UN agencies’ right to the city politics against the background of two dialectical
oppositions I lay down in chapter II. One constant theme in World Urban Forums and in
the documents published by the UN agencies to explicate how the right to the city is
central to UN’s “global campaign on urban governance” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 8) is
the question of participation. I go through the aforementioned documents and examine
what the UN-HABITAT presents as desirable, among other ideas discussed in the
forums, and argue that the idea of participation in the context of realizing the right to the
city remains to a large extent to be a “reproductive participation” rather than a
transformative one. I also examine these documents to detect how Lefebvre’s emphasis
on use value instead of exchange value resonates in the forums. Although some
discussion takes place about the importance of use value and the social function of urban
spaces, I identify a remarkable tendency to translate the centrality of use value in
Lefebvre’s account into exchange value terms. In other words, I argue that anytime UN
agencies talk about and promote the importance of use value in these documents, they
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presuppose that use values will only be accessible to consumers in the market, i.e., use
value will be mediated by exchange value.

In this chapter, I try not to develop a moral argument. I argue that those who reduce the
idea of democratic participation of the people to “reproductive participation,” and those
who constantly translate Lefebvre’s emphasis on use value into exchange value, do so
due to the class position they occupy. I also argue that there is a liberal, rather than
neoliberal, strand within the UN agencies. They organize these forums and publish these
documents because they try to contest neoliberal urbanism and the exacerbated inequality
it produces without, however, in anyway challenging the perpetuation of capitalism. It is
also notable that some organizations and individuals in the UN world are very concerned
about the sustainability of contemporary urbanism, ecologically, socially, politically and
economically. This is the core reason why I examine the urban politics that emerges out
of UN documents and forums as a right to the city claim, which attempts to contest
contemporary neoliberal urbanism. However, the contradiction lies in the fact that the UN
agencies’ and many of the participants’ trust in the market to solve urban problems, one
of the central components of neoliberal ideology, remains constant. All the forums I
examine over-represent the members of global corporations, talking about how their
companies work to reduce unemployment, poverty, and socio-economic marginalization
in cities testifying to their “corporate responsibility.” The reality is, I argue, that the
hegemonic urbanism that emerges out of the documents and forums I examine treats the
city as a space of free market for realizing exchange values, and equates the idea of
political/economic inclusion in the city with inclusion of consumers in the market. For
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this reason, while the issue of accessing use values is a part of the right to the city claim
made by the UN agencies, I analyze their urban politics as a set of political struggles
primarily for exchange value. In this light, the right to the city claim of the UN agencies
that I analyze in this chapter appear as a counterpoint. It lays bare, on the one hand, the
contrast between the politics of use value (chapter I) and the politics of exchange value. It
also demonstrates, on the other hand, how the politics of use value could be absorbed and
appropriated by the politics of exchange value. It therefore demonstrates one of the
central arguments of this dissertation: Without understanding the contrast between the
struggles for use value and those for exchange value and how the latter absorb the former,
it would be hard to grasp the specificities of the politics of value, which I analyze and
argue for in chapters IV and V.

The right to the city claim I examine in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, “From
urban development to urban uprising and back again: Gezi protests amid ‘economic
growth,’” emerged out of the spontaneous collective mobilization of massive numbers of
people to save a public park from government-planned destruction in Istanbul, Turkey.
The spark that drew Istanbul into a fire of protest and uprising was initially set off by a
modest “occupy style” peaceful sit in, initiated by roughly 25 people in May 2013 against
the planned destruction of a small park, in order to make way for a shopping mall.
Following serious police brutality against the protestors, who were quickly dismissed by
the government as a few looters and extremists, urban centers of Turkey saw a fullfledged uprising with the participation of millions of its ordinary citizens. I was based in
London when the small protest turned into an uprising and was drawn to it right away for
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personal, political as well as intellectual reasons. I went to Istanbul in the early days of
June and participated in the uprising, staying as well to attend the park forums that
emerged after the heat of the uprising. I spent two months organizing, documenting and
participating in the events. Although the two months spent in the streets and parks might
not qualify as ethnography, this chapter contains ethnographic moments. The intensity of
political organizing and struggle, as well as my longstanding personal connections with
the people who have been part of the urban social movements in Istanbul contributed to
this. I attempt to reflect this close and first hand engagement with the uprising in the
organization of this chapter by initiating my account with the early days of the uprising,
depicting the unfolding of lively events to give this chapter the flesh and blood it calls
for. Following the path of the social mobilization flowing from Gezi Park to larger
geographical scales of the neighborhood, the urban, the national, and beyond, I analyze
the expanding political geography of the uprising in the first part of the chapter, and
attempt to make a case for the necessity and effectiveness of the politics of scale to claim
the right to the city.

The fact that the uprising emerged for protecting an urban commons against the
construction of a private shopping mall in the park’s stead puts this right to the city claim
squarely within the politics of use value mobilized by the inhabitants against the
hegemony of exchange value defended by the state and capital. Although I discuss
various reasons for such a widespread collective mobilization, the emergence and the
course of the uprising as well as the novel political forms, such as the collective park
forums where the money was absent in transactions show, I argue, that the main
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grievance collectively shared by the inhabitants of urban Turkey was the
commodification of every aspect of urban life. Therefore, as in the third chapter that
examines the right to the city claim made within the institutional confines of UN
agencies, this chapter situates the practical politics on the ground in urban Turkey within
the theoretical discussion occasioned by the dialectical opposition between exchange
value and use value.

The second part of the chapter takes a step back from the heat of the uprising and
examines the growth-based political economy of Turkey in the last decade, which, I
argue, has been primarily based on land redevelopment and production of space. This
gave way to a very diverse, albeit mostly localized resistance and dissident politics that
eventually exploded in the urban centers of Turkey during the June 2013 uprising.
Having discussed the expanding political geography of the uprising and the political
economy that set the stage for it, finally, the third part of the chapter focuses on novel
forms of political activism that, like the uprising itself, sprung from Gezi Park and spread
across urban Turkey. Neighborhood assemblies, or as the people call them, park forums
have been unique both in terms of the political form they have taken, and the degree of
popular participation in them. The forums provided people with a new space of political
engagement outside the familiar venues such as political parties and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). In this section I argue that park forums embody a desire for direct
democracy, for enacting new solidarities, and provided people spaces to practice and
experiment with politics rather than simply talking about it. But above of all, park forums
represent a popular will for grassroots organizing to redefine what living together means,
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the meaning of civility and solidarity; the forums represent an attempt by the people to
redefine what is socially necessary outside the neoliberal imposition, that is, individual
self-interest and commodification of life in its every aspect. In short, the social, political
and economic experiment embodied in park forums was an attempt to define in practice
what the right to the city is about, which I conceptualize as a politics of value.

Finally, the last chapter of the dissertation “Dialectics of claiming the right to the city”
discusses the dialectical relations I establish in chapter II and their further development
by means of following the practical politics of claiming the right to the city, discussed in
the rest of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER II

APPROPRIATING THE VALUE OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

This chapter offers a theoretical discussion on the right to the city concept in order to lay
the groundwork for interpreting different right to the city claims that rest on the politics
of use value, politics of exchange value and the politics of value. By reframing the notion
of the right to the city to foreground its roots in Marxian labor theory of value, this
chapter aims to develop a theoretical framework, in which contradictory political projects
proposed for realizing the right to the city could be distinguished and analyzed.

The theoretical discussion begins with the emergence of the urban problematic for Henri
Lefebvre and the ways in which he weaves the notion of the right to the city with the
systemic transformations he identifies within the workings of capitalism at the end of the
1960s. After a close reading of how Lefebvre frames the right to the city, I identify three
nodal points that are paramount in Lefebvre’s theorization, dominating as well the ways
in which Lefebvre’s interlocutors have discussed the notion, particularly since the turn of
the twenty-first century. I do not, by any means, argue that the three nodal points I
identify, namely, “participation,” “appropriation,” and “value,” are the only important
aspects of Lefebvre’s right to the city. I argue, however, that each nodal point implicitly
or explicitly carries an opposition, and these oppositions lie at the root of the conflicting
elucidations between the liberal and radical interpretations of the concept. In other words,
the two concepts that form each opposition open up a space for interpreting Lefebvre’s
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formulation of the right to the city and make it possible to take the implications of the
concept towards different and often-conflicting directions. I discuss these oppositions one
by one, and argue that there is a dialectical tension within each opposition and therefore
they cannot be thought of separately in absolute terms. However, this does not mean that
the two concepts should be conflated either, as one of the concepts in each opposition, I
argue, opens the path for a more radical interpretation of the right to the city, which this
chapter aims to construct.

My discussion of Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city naturally pays specific
attention to his Writings on Cities (1996), which contains a translation of his short book,
Le Droit à la Ville, where he first introduced the concept. Coined during the tumultuous
days that led to the Parisian uprising of 1968, the concept of the right to the city sprung
from the “cry and demand” rising from the streets, and resonates in various forms of
urban politics I analyze in this dissertation. In addition to Writings on Cities, my analysis
of Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city will delve into his other work, especially The
Urban Revolution (2003[1970]) and The Production of Space (1991[1973]). I will then
critically discuss how the interlocutors who follow Lefebvre from various academic
disciplines have interpreted and engaged with the notion of the right to the city.

This chapter, then, establishes the right to the city as a critical theory of radical and
alternative urbanism.
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Emergence of the “urban problematic” and the Right to the City
Henri Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city is linked to his powerful and farsighted
argument in The Urban Revolution (2003), originally published in 1970. There, Lefebvre
argued that industrialization, which had been the primary force of capitalism for more
than two centuries, was increasingly accompanied, even sidestepped, by the related
process of urbanization as the dominant life force of capitalism. Observing the
invigorated role of uniquely urban processes in the formation and accumulation of capital
in the late 1960s, Lefebvre presciently argued that urban processes such as “real estate
speculation and construction” became “the principal source for the formation of capital,
that is the realization of surplus value” (Lefebvre, 2003: 160). What Lefebvre recognized
in his time was a set of social processes that gave the urban question a certain salience
within the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production. The urban problematic, for
him, was bringing about its unique crisis, which could not be easily subsumed under the
crisis of industrial capitalism. The crisis that led to the 1968 uprising, for instance, during
which he penned Le Droit à la Ville (The right to the city), “was more profoundly a crisis
of urban society than a crisis of capitalist industrialism” (Smith, 2003: xi). In the
following book he published in French the same year, The Explosion, where he examined
the 1968 uprising, he made a similar point. While discussing the “void”—structural
problems with the “neo-capitalism” and “centrality of the French state”—that enabled the
“spontaneous uprising,” he argues that “the dominant problems” [the void] “are those
relating to urban society. These are becoming increasingly more important than the
problems of an industrialization still in progress” (1969: 157). Therefore, rather than
interpreting urbanization merely as a process subsumed under the workings of industrial
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capitalism, Lefebvre argued for the significance of urbanization as a distinctive process to
examine closely, with a dynamic of its own.

This did not mean, however, that urbanization should be understood as an isolated
process, severed from the processes emanating from industrialism. Nor did it mean that
the renewed salience of the urban question Lefebvre sought to explain rendered the
dynamics of industrial capitalism irrelevant. Rather, he offered an analysis that revealed
the ways in which industrialization was funneled more and more into the dynamics of
urbanization. For Lefebvre, industrial capitalism became crucially about urbanization,
which was itself becoming a global phenomenon and the central problematic of advanced
capitalist societies.

Lefebvre’s argument was as path breaking as it was prescient. He was one of the first to
reveal the imperative role of urbanism in general, and production of urban space in
particular, in the reproduction of capitalist relations. This role, according to him, went
well beyond the simple production of urban space as a commodity exchangeable in the
market. Lefebvre went further and argued that capitalism survived in the 20 th century, not
by simply organizing production in space but by orchestrating the production of space
(Lefebvre, 1976: 21; 1991; 2009: 156), which underscores his call, at the end of the
1960s, for a struggle over shaping the very processes that produce a capitalist urbanism,
which denies the right to the city to most of its inhabitants.
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Both Lefebvre’s analysis of capitalism and his politics of emancipation underpin his
understanding of urban space as the primary battleground of political struggles for
democracy, social rights, and justice (Isin, 1999; Soja, 2010). The right to the city, in
Lefebvre’s framework, does not only imply a right to urban space but a right to “a
political space as well, constituting the city as a space of politics” (Dikeç, 2001: 1790).
Reflective of his emphasis on the city as a space of politics, Lefebvre envisions a city
where its inhabitants could properly participate in urban political life. Geographers Don
Mitchell and Joaquin Villanueva also insist that the right to the city is “an argument for
the right not to be excluded, and especially for full political participation in the making of
the city” (2010: 668, original emphasis). This emphasis on the city as a space of politics
and an arena of full political participation is most visible in the specific way Lefebvre
frames the right to the city. “The right to the city manifests itself,” he argues, “as a
superior form of rights: right to freedom, to individualization in socialization, to habitat
and to inhabit. The right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct
from the right to property) are implied in the right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1996: 173-174,
original emphasis).

Although Lefebvre’s observations regarding the emerging salience of the urban process,
with a dynamic of its own, and the surfacing of “the urban” as a space of politics are
quite intriguing and compelling, the nature of economic processes that underpin his
observations remains somewhat vague. In a quite Lefebvrian manner, he asserts very
gripping and provocative arguments about the fact that urban space became one of the
most crucial foci of political struggle, yet he leaves such an important argument relatively
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unfounded, especially on the question of the changing economic dynamics within
capitalism and their role on the emergence of the city as the primary space of politics. For
instance, Lefebvre argues that speculation on fixed capital investment—any form of built
environment to be used for productive purposes such as factories and railroads—as a
second circuit supplants the first circuit, which is simple industrial production of
moveable commodities for realizing surplus value. In the section that Lefebvre discusses
this important process in the lengthiest and most detailed manner in The Urban
Revolution he argues:

“Real estate functions as a second sector, a circuit that runs parallel to that of
industrial production, which serves the nondurable assets market, or at least those
that are less durable than buildings. This second sector serves as a buffer. It is
where capital flows in the event of a depression, although enormous profits soon
slow to a trickle. In this sector, there are few "multipliers," few spin-off's. Capital
is tied up in real estate. Although the overall economy (so-called domestic
economy) soon begins to suffer, the role and function of this sector continue to
grow. As the principal circuit—current industrial production and the movable
property that results—begins to slow down, capital shifts to the second sector,
real estate. It can even happen that real-estate speculation becomes the principal
source for the formation of capital, that is, the realization of surplus value. As the
percentage of overall surplus value formed and realized by industry begins to
decline, the percentage created and realized by real-estate speculation and
construction increases. The second circuit supplants the first, becomes essential”
(Lefebvre, 2003: 159-160).
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In this crucial passage, Lefebvre clearly states that when the primary circuit of industrial
production starts to face its limits, thus facing a crisis, the capitalist start to invest in the
secondary circuit of real estate construction in order defer the crisis. What is not so clear
is the economic conditions in the primary circuit under which the problems that lead to a
crisis takes place. We do not also find any elaboration on the role of the shift from the
primary to the secondary circuit on capitalism and its consequences vis-à-vis the
urbanization process. In short, Lefebvre asserts but does not substantiate the relationship
between the internal contradictions of capital accumulation and circulation, and the
emergence of “the urban” with a dynamic of its own, as a space of intense political
struggle. There is a missing link, in other words, between the two of his crucial
observations: the role of urbanization in the process of capital accumulation and the
emergence of “the urban” as a principle site of political contestation.

I think that this missing link could be provided by David Harvey’s analyses on the
process of urbanization under capitalism. According to Harvey, urbanization has had a
historical role in absorbing capital’s surpluses. The process behind this historical role is
pretty straightforward to him. The “coercive laws of competition” forces the capitalist to
reinvest some of the surplus value s/he extracts from the laborer in a profitable manner so
that the capitalist can later extract even more surplus value out of the process of expanded
production. The result is the perpetual expansion of surplus production at a compound
rate, which is what the capitalist growth is all about (Harvey, 2012: 5). This process,
nevertheless, is not without frictions. In order to achieve perpetual expanded production,
the capitalist constantly needs to find new sources of labor, means of production and raw
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materials and has to chase new technologies if s/he wants to remain as a capitalist under
the coercive laws of competition. Moreover, the capitalist needs also to expand the
market in which the increasing number of products could realize their exchange values.
When the capitalist hits the limits in any of these aspects of expanding production (be it
labor, means of production or the process of realization), the capital accumulation is
stalled and the capitalist faces with an imminent crisis. In other words, the capitalist faces
the realization problem, i.e., the surplus capital cannot be invested in a profitable manner,
which leads to its devaluation (Harvey, 2012: 6).

Under such conditions of crisis, which emerge out of the internal contradictions that exist
within the primary circuit of capital accumulation, the capitalist has to look elsewhere to
reinvest the over-accumulated surplus capital. The tendency towards overaccumulation of
capital, according to Harvey, periodically produces such conditions under which the
capital might look to flow from the primary into the secondary circuit (Harvey, 1978:
106). In other words, by investing in the built environment, the capital looks for a “spatial
fix” to avoid the crisis of overaccumulation (Harvey, 1982). This process has huge
repercussions for the process of urbanization. The investment in the secondary circuit
takes physical shape either in the form of fixed capital (productive fixed assets in the
form of factories, warehouses, highways etc.) or in the form of consumption fund
(physical entities for the consumption and reproduction of labor such as houses, streets
and parks). Periodic heavy investment in the built environment (in either form) in order
to avoid the crisis of overproduced capital has been one of the main motors of
urbanization throughout the historical geography of capitalism and produced and
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reproduced the cities we live in. Here, Harvey crucially notes that the flow from the
primary into the secondary circuit plays a stabilizing role on capitalism. However he
argues that this stabilizing role is temporary. The shift from primary to secondary circuit
does not eliminate but defers the overaccumulation problem. Moreover, it leads to “a
pervasive tendency towards over-investment” in the secondary circuit as well. “This
over-investment,” Harvey stresses, “is in relation solely to the needs of capital and has
nothing to do with the real needs of people, which inevitably remain unfulfilled” (1978:
112).

I would like to argue that this is the crux of the missing link in Lefebvre’s analysis on the
relation between the emergence of the “urban problematic” and the materialization of the
city as a primary locus of political struggle and contestation. Almost all urban political
struggles around use value has something to do with the fact that the process of
urbanization (investment in the secondary circuit of capital accumulation) has a little
regard for the “real needs of people” and has almost everything to do with the “needs of
capital” to avoid crisis or to seek new venues of capital accumulation. Recall that in the
first chapter we briefly discussed the right to the city struggles in New York and Sao
Paulo, both of which were mobilized against the irrationality of a capitalist urbanism that
concomitantly produces the shortage of affordable housing on the one hand, and massive
numbers of vacant housing on the other. The city is a site of political struggle to a large
extent due to its role in solving or deferring the realization problem that the capitalist
faces periodically. “A process of displacement and dispossession” in the words of David
Harvey, “lies at the core of the urban process under capitalism,” and it constitutes “the
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mirror image of capital absorption through urban redevelopment” (2012: 18). It is largely
for this reason that a revolutionary urban politics would require “the right to
appropriation” and “the right to participation” that Lefebvre talks about when he
formulates the right to the city. The contemporary city is a product of capitalists’ search
for solving the realization problem, thus, by and large, it is produced as a space of capital,
which gives way to all sorts of political resistance and struggle. Hence Lefebvre’s
argument that a right to the city claim should encompass the “right to appropriate” the
spaces of capital and its political process should embody the “right to participation.”

Let us now focus on these two aspects of the right to the city, namely, the “right to
participation” and the “right to appropriation.” I would like to do so for these two aspects
of the right to the city occupy a central place in the analysis of scholars who have
engaged with the concept in the past decade. Despite their popularity and centrality, the
notions of participation and appropriation remain vague and unspecified, used by many
urbanists in conflicting ways. This partly stems from the fact that Lefebvre is not
immediately clear about what the urban dwellers’ right to participation means. The
question of what exactly the urban inhabitants are supposed to participate in does not
have a uniform answer in Lefebvre’s account. This initial ambiguity gives way to a series
of interpretations from some of Lefebvre’s interlocutors who reduce his emphasis on
participation to participation in the formal procedures of existing urban governance
without contesting the liberal capitalist order. In other words, they take the city as it is,
and promote participation in city administration’s formal political processes. I argue
against such an elucidation and make a case for a close reading of Lefebvre’s account,
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which renders a much more radical notion of participation that aims to transform the
processes that orchestrate the capitalist production of space.

Likewise, Lefebvre’s lack of clarity on the notion of appropriation enables some of his
interlocutors to reduce the notion to utilizing and having access to city’s already
produced spaces. To contest this reductionism, I go back to Karl Marx’s Grundrisse
(1993) and Capital (1990) to substantiate a notion of appropriation that goes to the heart
of the process of producing use values, i.e., the labor process. But first, let me delve into
the question of participation in the notion of the right to the city.

Participation in the right to the city
Lefebvre’s emphasis on the right to participation in urban politics within his discussion of
the right to the city constitutes perhaps the one aspect of the notion that rarely goes
unmentioned. Whether coming from liberal or more radical readers of Lefebvre, the
notion of participation has mostly been a welcome facet of the right to the city, enjoying
a certain degree of primacy in the discussions. However, we can detect a tendency in the
literature of affirming the notion of participation without much qualification. Alessandro
Busà, urbanist and architect, for instance, argues that the right to the city “seeks to
encourage the democratic participation of all urban dwellers in decision-making
processes … thus fundamentally challenges existing power relations” (2009: 6-7). Edésio
Fernandes, lawyer and city planner asserts that the right to the city basically consists of
the right of city dwellers to enjoy urban services and the right to participate in the
management of their cities (2007: 208). Similarly, for city planner Anna Plyushteva, the
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right to the city can contribute to the meaning and practice of urban citizenship by
bringing to the forefront “the right to have sufficient access to urban public spaces” and
“the right to directly participate … in urban political processes” (2009: 95). Mark Purcell,
a human geographer who published extensively on the right to the city in early 2000s,
and who has been affirmatively referenced by the urbanists above and some others
(Fenster, 2005; Fernandes, 2007; Busa, 2009; Duke, 2009; Plyushteva, 2009) also argues
that the right to participation forms one of the most fundamental aspects of the right to
the city and it poses a serious challenge to the established structures of liberal citizenship
(Purcell, 2002: 103).

I think the importance attributed to the notion of participation by these urbanists is
understandable, yet I do not share their affirmation of participation without qualification.
Assuming that the participation of urban dwellers in decision-making processes would
fundamentally challenge existing power relations, as Busa does, or associating the
participation of dwellers in urban management with a better access to urban services and
spaces, as Fernandes and Plyushteva do, is not entirely convincing. Nor do I think the
right to participation automatically poses a serious challenge to the established structures
of liberal citizenship, as suggested by Purcell. If such calls for participation in urban
management and decision-making take the city as it is, presupposing the liberal capitalist
order, they might merely end up reproducing existing socio-spatial relations. Participation
in urban management and decision-making processes, for instance, are fundamental
themes in UN-organized World Urban Forums and, as I shall demonstrate in chapter III,
do not necessarily challenge the existing power relations. Let me demonstrate my
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argument that participation, in and of itself, might not change existing power relations by
focusing on how the notion of participation operates in Mark Purcell’s formulation.

As mentioned, Mark Purcell is favorably quoted in the analysis of many urbanists and
enjoys a certain degree of importance in the discussions concerning the right to
participation. However, Purcell’s analyses have a series of problems. His examination of
participation within the right to the city framework is, in fact, structured to criticize the
liberal democratic citizenship model. He argues that the notion of participation within the
confines of “liberal democratic citizenship” is primarily “limited to decisions taken by the
state,” which according to him is a misguided target for claiming the right to the city.
Instead, he argues, urban dwellers should participate in “the decisions that produce urban
space” (Purcell, 2003: 577, original emphasis). Purcell supports his position with a highly
radical reading of Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city and participation:

“I suggest that Lefebvre’s right to the city is an argument for profoundly
reworking both the social relations of capitalism and the current structure of
liberal-democratic citizenship. His right to the city is not a suggestion for reform,
nor does it envision a fragmented, tactical, or piecemeal resistance. His idea is
instead a call for a radical restructuring of social, political, and economic
relations, both in the city and beyond. Key to this radical nature is that the right
to the city reframes the arena of decision making in cities: it reorients decisionmaking away from the state and toward the production of urban space” (Purcell,
2002: 101).
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While this quote implies a quite radical interpretation of Lefebvre, let us look at what
exactly Purcell asks the urban dwellers to participate in “for a radical restructuring of
social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond:” In his 2003 article
“Citizenship and the right to the global city: Reimagining the capitalist world order” he
argues that “those who have a right to Los Angeles would have the right to participate
centrally in a corporate board decision of a transnational corporation headquartered in
Chicago that would affect urban space in Los Angeles” (2003: 578, emphasis added). He
is more forthcoming when he details his example a few pages later:

“To take an example of decisions outside the state, now that Boeing
(headquartered in Chicago) owns Hughes Electronics’ satellite communications
operations (in the Los Angeles region), Los Angeles inhabitants would have the
right to participate in any decision Boeing might make to shift satellite
investment … elsewhere … Since the geography of employment is a key
component of inhabitants’ lived space, the right to participation would allow
Angeleno inhabitants a seat at the table in Chicago” (Purcell, 2003: 581,
emphasis added).

Although Purcell’s interpretation of Lefebvre sounds quite radical, as he acknowledges
that Lefebvre’s call is not for reform but for a radical transformation of capitalist
relations; and although he recognizes the significance of inhabitant participation in the
production of space, he ends up offering city dwellers a seat at the corporate table in a
boardroom. He does so because his alleged radical reading of Lefebvre is severely
curtailed by the fact that he accepts the city as it is. While Purcell argues that the
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inhabitants should participate in the decisions concerning the production of urban space
“for a radical restructuring of social, political, and economic relations, both in the city
and beyond” (2002: 101), all he sees the right to the city providing is a seat in a corporate
headquarter. This means Purcell’s horizon is limited to the capitalist city. From this
vantage point, the subtitle of his 2003 article makes more sense: “Reimagining the
capitalist world order.” He re-imagines a right to the city within the capitalist world
order, indeed. Even though he reimagines a renewed city, it is still a capitalist city.
Despite Purcell’s radical remarks, then, he ends up formulating a notion of participation
that would, to a large extent, reproduce existing social, political and economic relations in
the city. I would like to call such a notion of participation “reproductive participation.”

Liberal interpreters who remain within the confines of “reproductive participation”
interpret Lefebvre’s emphasis on participation in political struggles over the production
of urban space as a simple call for democratic participation in existing formal procedures
of urban governance. Or, as Purcell does, they renounce the seat in the municipal
boardroom for a seat at the corporate table. But the city of the right to the city remains the
existing city. Although Lefebvre’s ambiguity contributes to such a reading, “reproductive
participation” is surely not all there is in Lefebvre’s discussion. Rather than participating
in urban space as it is, and rather than participating in the existing procedures of urban
governance, what Lefebvre prioritized, I want to argue, was a kind of political
participation directed towards transforming the social processes that produce capitalist
urban space and its very governance. Lefebvre’s call to urban dwellers for claiming their
right to participate in urban politics should be understood as a form of political
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participation directed towards a fundamental restructuring of capitalist city and the social
and economic relations it sustains. “Reproductive participation,” on the other hand,
presumes an already established capitalist urban governance in which the participation of
urban residents through pre-established channels then might become desirable. In
Lefebvre’s original formulation, too, asserting the right to the city involves the
participation of urbanites, but this participation is for remaking the city in novel ways, not
for reproducing its existing dynamics. The crux of my argument is that “the city” of the
right to the city is not the existing city, but the city that has not been produced yet; the
one that exists in potentiality.

This is most evident when Lefebvre frames the ideal city as the political cradle of
continuous social change, collectively driven by city’s inhabitants. “The ideal city,” he
puts forth, “would be the ephemeral city, the perpetual oeuvre of the inhabitants,
themselves mobile and mobilized for and by this oeuvre” (1996: 172-173, original
emphasis). This is an important argument that reveals how Lefebvre encapsulates the city
and its inhabitants within a dialectical framework. The “ephemeral city” is the fluid and
dynamic product of its inhabitants, who are themselves products of the city, mobilized
and inspired by the city. By virtue of being interwoven with the city, Lefebvre argues, its
inhabitants have a fundamental right to the “ephemeral city,” that is, the city to come; the
city that exists in potentiality; the city in the making (Lefebvre, 1996: 173). For him, “to
direct growth towards development, therefore towards urban society, means firstly to
prospect new needs, knowing that such needs are discovered in the course of their
emergence … they do not pre-exist as objects” (1996: 165, original emphasis).
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Margit Mayer aptly captures this, when she argues that the rights implied in the right to
the city exist only insofar as people fight to create them through social and political
action (2009: 367). They are not given as inalienable rights. If the appeal and strength of
universal human rights is its promise to all humans of certain inalienable rights by birth,
by virtue of them being human, the strength of the right to the city comes from the
absence of such an a priori promise. Instead, the right to the city implies certain rights to
urban inhabitants only insofar as they envision such rights, and get organized to fight for
them. David Harvey makes a similar point when he argues: “the right to the city is an
empty signifier. Everything depends on who gets to fill it with meaning … The definition
of the right is itself an object of struggle, and that struggle has to proceed concomitantly
with the struggle to materialize it” (2012: xv). This is what Mustafa Dikeç has in mind,
when he argues that “the right to the city is not simply a participatory right but, more
importantly, an enabling right, to be defined and refined through political struggle”
(Dikeç, 2001: 1790). Therefore, Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city implies a notion
of participation in politics in order to discover and determine new needs in a new city in
the course of the political process itself, rather than inviting city dwellers to the
participatory processes of liberal urban administration.

Revolutionary, transformative and forward-looking character of the social rights
embedded in the right to the city is also evident in Lefebvre’s own formulation. The right
to the city, according to him, “cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a
return to traditional cities” (Lefebvre, 1996: 158). Instead, he argues that the right to the
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city “can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Lefebvre,
1996: 158). It is important to pause for a moment and contemplate on the meaning of
Lefebvre’s emphasis on the right to the city as transformed and renewed right to urban
life, because it foregrounds what kind of a “right” Lefebvre talks about and also implies
what kind of “participation” he has in mind when he talks about the right to the city.

First of all, he immediately puts forth a notion of right that should not be perceived as a
simple “visiting right,” by which he means that the right to the city is not limited to, and
aims beyond, advancing liberal notions of tolerance, hospitality and individual liberty in
the city, where even the most marginalized can roam and live free from discrimination,
exclusion and harassment. This is what David Harvey echoes when he argues that the
right to the city is not simply about “individual liberty to access” to what the city has to
offer (Harvey, 2008: 23). The right to the city, if understood as a visiting right, argues
geographer Mustafa Dikeç, would bring Lefebvre too close to a Kantian notion of liberal
cosmopolitanism, which is underwritten by universal hospitality and conditional
tolerance. Dikeç argues that “the stranger” (read excluded or marginalized), following
Kant’s famous essay on “Perpetual Peace,”

“cannot claim a right of residence but rather a right of visit. The stranger, upon
his or her arrival also enjoys another right, that of hospitality, which suggests that
he or she not be treated as an enemy by the host of the territory in question. There
is no room for the stranger to claim a right, but simply to enjoy a right to visit or
pass through.” (Dikeç, 2001: 1789-1790)
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Neither such conditional hospitality towards those who are practically and essentially
unwelcome, nor such transitionary right of passage for those who are at best temporarily
tolerated are what Lefebvre has in mind when he argues for the right to the city. His
notion of the right to the city aims at achieving much more central a place for urban
dwellers, the users of the city; a centrality that is best understood both spatially and
politically. The right to the city “would affirm, on the one hand,” argues Lefebvre, “the
right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in the
urban area; it would also cover the right to the use of the center, a privileged place,
instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’
and even for the ‘privileged’)” (Lefebvre, 1996: 34). Here, centrality refers to being at the
center of both urban politics—in terms of not being excluded from the political processes
determining the fate of the city—and of urban space, in terms of not being pushed to the
geographical peripheries of the city.

Second, in addition to dismissing a possible reductionist interpretation of the right to the
city as a liberal visiting right, Lefebvre also remains distant from a romantic longing for
the traditional medieval city, the old urban cores of which were “exploded” by the
generalization of the exchange value relation. His comparisons between pre-capitalist
European cities—where the work-of-art credentials of the city, the city as oeuvre, were
more salient—and the modern capitalist city—which eventually erased those credentials
and the primacy of use value off the face of the urban space—might possibly tempt some
to read a certain romanticism in Lefebvre’s account. After all, the city as oeuvre, “which
was the dominant mode of its production in western history,” (Isin, 2000: 13), was
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replaced with the city as product, according to Lefebvre, by the ever expanding processes
of modern capitalism. However, he is very clear on the implausibility of conceiving of
the right to the city as a return to traditional cities. The notion of returning to some
mythical urban past would be as absurd as politically undesirable for Lefebvre. “It is
impossible to envisage the reconstitution of the old city,” he notes, “only the construction
of a new one on new foundations, on another scale and in other conditions, in another
society” (Lefebvre, 1996: 148).

New foundations, on another scale, in other conditions and another society are, I want to
argue, what we should keep in mind when we construe Lefebvre’s highly celebrated
notion of urban dwellers’ right to participate in urban politics integral to the right to the
city. When we read this alongside his emphasis on the “ephemeral city” as the ideal city
that should constantly be in the making by the city’s inhabitants, both the conception of
“rights” and the vision of the “city” embedded in the right to the city concept strike us as
dynamic, transformative and anticipative notions.

I would like to call this radical notion of political participation “transformative
participation,” as it is geared to transform the ways in which urban space and cities are
produced along with the social and economic relations they sustain. There is a
considerable tension between “reproductive” and “transformative” forms of political
participation. While the former implies a participation in the existing social, political and
economic institutions in the existing city, the latter implies a participation in producing a
new city, “on new foundations, on another scale and in other conditions, in another
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society” (Lefebvre, 1996: 148). The tension between the two forms of participation is a
dialectical one, similar to the dialectical tension between the actual and the possible, the
existing and the potential. As Marx famously put it in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte (1972: 10), “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under given
circumstances directly encountered and inherited from the past.” We do not, in other
words, have the luxury to transform social relations without getting engaged with the
historically produced present conditions in the first place. Therefore, by distinguishing
between “reproductive” and “transformative” modes of participation, I do not mean that
they are mutually exclusive in absolute terms. It is much more productive, I think, to
grasp and keep them in a dialectical tension.

The fact that the two forms of participation are dialectically related and should be thought
of together does not mean, however, that there is not a meaningful difference between the
two. The fundamental difference resides in the ways in which the existing social relations
and institutions are treated, and to what extent getting over them is put in the horizon.
There is also another component of this difference: Since Lefebvre frames the city and
inhabitants’ fundamental right to it in such fluid and dynamic terms, he is wary of any
urban prescription wrought and imposed from top down by capital, state or experts.
According to him, urban life could not be recovered or stimulated “by authoritarian
means or by administrative prescription, or by the intervention of specialists” (1996:
146). Instead he advocates for a right to the city, where human needs would be
collectively defined by the inhabitants in the course of their struggle for a new urban
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society. In other words, the right to the city “entails not a right to be distributed from
above to individuals, but a way of actively and collectively relating to the political life of
the city” (Dikeç, 2001: 1790). Hence Lefebvre’s insistence of “the ideal city,” as the
“ephemeral city, the perpetual oeuvre of the inhabitants, themselves mobile and
mobilized for and by this oeuvre.” (Lefebvre, 1996: 172-173). Therefore, there is a
genuine democratic potential to be mobilized within “transformative participation.” Here,
we do not talk about the participation of inhabitants in an already established political
program. This is what the “reproductive participation” promises. Rather, we are talking
about a “transformative participation” in the very process of building political
programs. Only in this way can Lefebvre’s “ideal city,” which is the perpetual oeuvre of
the inhabitants appear in the horizon as a possibility. Such fluid and processual
formulations of the city, and our fundamental right to reshape it, intentionally carry all
the dialectical tensions between the actual and the possible, while keeping the prospect of
collectively determining the political paths that might lead to realizing the right to the
city.

The Right to Appropriation
Although it has not been the center of attention as much as the right to participation, the
right to appropriation, too, attracted some interest from those who have recently engaged
with Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city. Upon review, the first salient characteristic
that catches the eye in the literature is the tendency to equate the notion of appropriating
urban space to the notion of having access to and utilizing city spaces. Joanna Duke, for
instance, defines “the right to appropriate” as “utilizing city’s use value” (2009: 112).
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Feminist geographer Tovi Fenster, argues by quoting Lefebvre, that “the right to
appropriate urban space” implies the right to use. More explicitly, for her it refers to “the
right of inhabitants to ‘full and complete use’ of urban space in their everyday lives. It is
the right to live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban space in a
particular city” (2005: 219). On similar grounds, Eugene McCann asserts that “the right
to the city entails a continual and active process of appropriation in the sense of use … of
urban spaces” (2002: 77). Finally, geographer Mark Purcell, who is again widely and
favorably quoted by many of these scholars, makes a similar argument, noting that
“[a]ppropriation includes the right of inhabitants to physically access, occupy, and use
urban space” (2002: 103). More specifically, for Purcell, “the right to appropriation is a
right of use” (2003: 581, original emphasis).

Although the notion of appropriation certainly implies the right to have access and to use
urban spaces—an argument against spatial marginalization and exclusion—I would like
to argue that limiting the meaning of “appropriation” to “use” would lead to capturing
only a part of the story. In other words, all of these accounts are helpful in suggesting
what the appropriation of urban spaces might entail for the right to the city politics in
terms of having access to and use what already exists in the spatial repertoire of the city.
For instance, the right to housing, right to move freely in the streets free from all sorts of
harassment, and the right to occupy and assembly for political expression in public spaces
could all be considered as important aspects of the right to appropriation as characterized
by the urbanists above. However, by equating the right to appropriate to the right to use
already produced urban space, these accounts reflect a notion of appropriation that is
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limited to the domain of “consumption,” and leave out crucial political possibilities
immanent in foregrounding appropriation in “production.” Let me be clear: my aim here
is not to dismiss the kind of urban politics revolving around what I want to call
“appropriation in consumption,” but to suggest that a much more productive
understanding of appropriation could be developed by bringing “appropriation in
production” into the analysis.

Among those who have recently engaged with the notion of the right to the city, Mark
Purcell indeed hints at this direction when he argues that “[n]ot only is appropriation the
right to occupy already-produced urban space, it is also the right to produce urban space
so that it meets the needs of inhabitants” (2002: 103). However, Purcell simply asserts
this and does not substantiate the argument any further. Purcell’s claim on the importance
of the appropriation of urban space and its critical relation to production of space thus
remains unfounded. Maybe this is not so surprising. Purcell acknowledges, recall, that
Lefebvre’s call is not for reform but for a radical transformation of capitalist relations,
while he recognizes the significance of inhabitant participation in the production of
space. Yet he still ends up implying that what the right to the city could offer for city
dwellers is a corporate seat at the boardroom. His political horizon, in other words, does
not get beyond the existing city and excludes any formulation of a post-capitalist urban
order, where there are no corporate seats to be claimed. Therefore, the question remains:
how should we frame the notion of appropriation so that the analysis of “appropriation in
consumption” does not conceal or inhibit the analysis of “appropriation in production?”
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The kind of appropriation concept I would like to mobilize here could take its cue from
the way Karl Marx frames the concept both in Grundrisse and Capital. One could argue
that Marx’s notion of appropriation encompasses both appropriation in consumption and
production without losing the dialectical tension between the two. For instance, in one of
the key passages of Grundrisse he lays it down explicitly:

“[I]n production the members of society appropriate (create, shape) the products
of nature in accord with human needs; distribution determines the proportion in
which the individual shares in the product; exchange delivers the particular
products into which the individual desires to convert the portion which
distribution has assigned to him; and finally, in consumption, the products
become objects of gratification, of individual appropriation” (Marx, 1993: 8889).

Here in this passage, we can see that Marx uses appropriation in two dialectically related
but different meanings: The first form of appropriation he refers to is what I call
“appropriation in production.” Humans appropriate nature in order to produce use values.
According to Marx, human societies cannot reproduce themselves without producing
their livelihoods, and the production process requires appropriating nature through human
labor. In the production process, therefore, humans appropriate and metabolize nature
through their labor and concomitantly produce use values, the rest of nature (space) and
human nature within a single process (Smith, 1984).
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The second form of appropriation Marx refers to is what I call “appropriation in
consumption.” Products become objects of individual appropriation hence become
subjectified in “use” during the (final) consumption process. In the former conception,
appropriation is cast as an inherent and inevitable moment of the production process, in
the sense that humans appropriate external nature and socialize it through labor. Hence,
in this conception, appropriation becomes a sine qua non element for the production of
space. “All production,” Marx argues “is appropriation of nature on the part of an
individual within and through a specific form of society” (1993: 87). For him,
“appropriation through labour”, should be understood as “the real economic process of
making something one's own” (1993: 514, emphasis added). He makes a parallel
argument in Capital when he defines productive activity as “an activity that appropriates
particular nature-given materials to particular human wants” (1990: 29). In the latter
conception of appropriation (in consumption), appropriation is represented as an inherent
moment of the consumption process, whereby objective products of labor are made one’s
own through final consumption.

In contrast to Marx’s appropriation of the concept of appropriation, Lefebvre’s
appropriation is vaguer and vacillates between appropriation in consumption and
appropriation in production. In addition to the difficulty presented by the fact that what
Lefebvre means by the term appropriation is unclear at any given time, it also seems like
he uses the term in one sense in one paragraph and in another sense in another paragraph
without warning the reader. If we limited ourselves with what he wrote in The Writings
on Cities (1996), we would find that he refers to the concept of appropriation
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unsystematically, without explicating what he means when using the concept. Most of
what Lefebvre’s interlocutors make out of the notion of appropriation in the context of
the right to the city comes from the famous passage where he argues that “[t]he right to
the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property)
are implied in the right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1996: 174, original emphasis). Other than
that, Lefebvre refers to appropriation at various points in contradistinction to domination,
but never goes into detail on any of these concepts. However, if one traces his thoughts
on appropriation in his magnum opus, The Production of Space (1991), it is possible to
see more clues on the different meanings in which he uses the term, as he discusses
appropriation in relation to both domination and diversion.

According to Lefebvre, there is a highly significant distinction between domination and
appropriation, hence between dominated and appropriated spaces. Yet, these concepts are
inseparable from one another as they dialectically oppose each other. By dominated
space, Lefebvre seems simply to mean abstract space of power, superimposed on an
existing space by means of technology. “Military architecture, fortifications and
ramparts, dams and irrigation systems—all offer many fine examples of dominated
space,” which he defines as a space that is transformed and mediated by technology
(1991: 164). “A motorway brutalizes the countryside and the land, slicing through space
like a great knife. Dominated space is usually closed, sterilized, emptied out” (165).
“Dominated (and dominant) space,” he goes on, “is invariably the realization of master’s
project” whereby “technology introduces a new form into a pre-existing space—generally
a rectilinear or rectangular form such as a meshwork or chequerwork” (164-165).
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Although Lefebvre’s initial definition of dominated space as a preexisting space that is
transformed by power via technology is terribly general—any space can be deemed as
trasformed by technology, which always involves a practice of power—it is pretty clear
what kind of spatial practice Lefebvre has in mind. At a general level, dominated spaces
could be understood as spaces produced by the powerful, while at a more particular level,
Lefebvre seems to use this concept to denote certain interventions in space, which could
be exemplified by Hausmann’s transformation of Paris through boulevards and Moses’s
reshaping of New York by taking the “meat axe” to the Bronx. In both these examples,
one could argue, preexisting space is transformed via boulevards and highways in order
to attain the “master’s project,” to use Lefebvre’s term.

Lefebvre neither defines nor explains his understanding of appropriation as clearly as he
does with domination. One simply has to follow his line of reasoning, hoping that it will
become more clear what he means by the concept in the next paragraph. Right at the
outset of his account of appropriation, he ventures into a discussion of appropriation in
Marx and never really goes back to what he thinks of the notion of appropriation himself,
except in a few phrases. He begins his discussion by noting that appropriation is the
dialectical opposite of domination. Then comes the paragraph where Lefebvre is more
forthcoming in terms of his understanding of appropriation:

Only by means of the critical study of space, in fact, can the concept of
appropriation be clarified. It may be said of a natural space modified in order to
serve the needs and possibilities of a group that it has been appropriated by that
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group. Property in the sense of possession is at best a necessary precondition, and
most often merely an epiphenomenon, of 'appropriative' activity, the highest
expression of which is the work of art. An appropriated space resembles a work
of art, which is not to say that it is in any sense an imitation of a work of art.
Often such a space is a structure — a monument or building — but this is not
always the case: a site, a square or a street may also be legitimately described as
an appropriated space. Examples of appropriated spaces abound, but it is not
always easy to decide in what respect, how, by whom and for whom they have
been appropriated” (Lefebvre, 1991: 165, original emphasis).

This is the passage where Lefebvre comes closest to an understanding of appropriation
we have seen more clearly in Marx’s formulation. When Lefebvre states that “[i]t may be
said of a natural space modified in order to serve the needs and possibilities of a group
that it has been appropriated by that group,” he seems to use the concept of
“appropriation in production.” A natural space is appropriated in order to serve the needs
of that group within the process of production. However, notice the difference when he
discusses the notion of appropriation in the following passage:

“The diversion and reappropriation of space are of great significance, for they
teach us much about the production of new spaces ... From a purely theoretical
standpoint, diversion and production cannot be meaningfully separated. The goal
and meaning of theoretical thinking is production rather than diversion.
Diversion is in itself merely appropriation, not creation — a reappropriation
which can call but a temporary halt to domination” (Lefebvre, 1991: 167-168,
emphasis added).

55

Different from the earlier passage, Lefebvre here argues that diversion—a
reappropriation of space that outlived its original purpose—is merely appropriation,
which is cast as external to the process of production of use values. Here it seems like
what he has in mind is the appropriation of an existing space, not the production of space
through appropriation. It is worthwhile to note that in this second meaning, Lefebvre
clearly puts forth that such appropriative activity (appropriation in consumption) would
only temporarily halt the “master’s project,” i.e., the process of domination of space. It is
in this second sense—appropriation in consumption—that attracted the attention of most
of those who have recently become engaged with the notion of the right to the city. The
notion of appropriation in production is simply absent in these accounts. By taking into
account the right to appropriation in production as I suggest here instead of merely
casting it as utilizing and accessing urban spaces would highlight the process of
production of urban space, as well as the laborers who take active part in this production
process and their fundamental right to radically transform the ways in which urban space
is produced.

I think it is important to distinguish instead of conflating the two forms of appropriation
since the urban politics based on “appropriation in production” and the “appropriation in
consumption” would look very different from one another. While the latter would entail
the democratic distribution of what already exists in the city, which is very important, the
former would push for a revolutionary transformation of the ways in which urban life is
produced. Moreover, while the latter could partially be subsumed under and swallowed
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by hegemonic liberal urbanism, the latter would necessitate a renewed urbanism, at
another scale, produced under entirely different conditions. Finally, limiting the meaning
of appropriation to having access to what already exists in the city would block the
transformative and revolutionary potential of the right to the city concept. The politics of
the right to the city, in short, should include the politics of appropriation in consumption
but should transcend and transform itself by extending into the politics of appropriation
in production. Limiting what the right to the city implies to the political struggle over
what already exists in the city would cripple its transformative radical potential.

Collective Individualism of “Rights Talk”
Some contemporary radical urban theorists, such as David Harvey (2008) and Peter
Marcuse (2009) have recently reiterated this crucial point by arguing that the right to the
city should not be construed simply as a right to have access to the resources of existing
city, but as a right to radically transform the material processes shaping it. As Harvey
puts it explicitly:

“The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what
kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic
values we desire. The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to
access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It
is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation
inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the process
of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I

57

want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.”
(Harvey, 2008: 23)

Along similar lines, Peter Marcuse argues that the right to the city is not limited to single,
isolated rights such as right to housing, right to information, or right to access to the city
center, although each is important and has a role to play in achieving the right to the city.
Instead, ‘the right’ of the right to the city embodies a political claim that encompasses
multiple rights. This claim is about “the right to a totality, a complexity, in which each of
the parts is part of a single whole to which the right is demanded” (Marcuse, 2009: 193).
More significantly for him, “the totality” to which a right is demanded is not the totality
of what now exists under the current circumstances in cities today. Rather, it is “the right
to a totality, to something whole and something wholly different from the existing city,
the existing society” (Marcuse, 2009: 194).

However, the rights discourse, deeply embedded in the liberal capitalist tradition, does
not sit easily with these radical formulations. There are many different sorts of rightclaims, securing myriad interests, and more often than not, they are in conflict with one
another (Attoh, 2011), precisely because the “open” and “indeterminate” language of
rights could be incorporated in any political project (Tushnet, 1984: 1375). More
crucially, rights discourse is dominantly individualistic, and seems to be inseparable from
private property rights (Mitchell, 2003). As David Harvey points out, “we live in a
society in which the inalienable rights to private property and the profit rate trump any
other conception of inalienable rights you can think of” (2003: 940). This is why he, for
one, insists that the right to the city should be conceived in terms of collective rights as
58

opposed to individual rights of private property (Harvey, 2008). Harvey goes on to
suggest that those concerned with social justice issues should wage a political struggle to
define social rights as collective rights against those who have a vested interest in
defining them on an individualistic basis (Buckingham, 2010; Caruso, 2010). Peter
Marcuse agrees with David Harvey, insisting that the right to the city is concerned with
“the collectivity of rights, not individualistic rights” (Marcuse, 2009: 193; also see
Horlitz and Vogelpohl, 2009: 1068).

It is important to carve out a space for collective rights against the often-undisputed
political power of individualistic rights, especially under the neoliberal hegemony of the
past few decades. Although collective rights imply a mechanism for collective voice and
action, such juxtaposition, nevertheless, still leaves us with certain questions we must
address in order to engage critically with the theory behind the right to the city concept,
and the practical political problems that might flow from it. How does framing the right
to the city as a collective right overcome the difficulties that may arise from the very
embeddedness of rights discourse within the liberal tradition? From a liberal standpoint,
Immanuel Kant’s early formulations of cosmopolitanism onwards, corporations and even
nation-states “can be regarded as single individuals” that aim to maximize their selfinterest within the political-economic field (Kant, 1983: 115). The concept of “corporate
personhood” ratified and protected by the US juridical system might be considered as a
case in point.
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However, this peculiar individualism is not simply confined to large corporations or
nation-states. Grassroots community organizations, often mobilized around an axis of
social difference (race, ethnicity, nationality, or sexual preference) are also susceptible to
what I wish to call collective individualism. I suggest this term to highlight the tendency
of social groups, small or large, to mobilize against a social problem, not because its logic
is seen as “universally” unjust, but because it is happening “particularly” to them. In this
context, the sort of collectivity produced through collectivist—yet simultaneously
particularist—politics on the one hand, and liberal individualism on the other seem to be
the two sides of the same coin. In other words, political mobilizations around collective
rights neither necessarily open a space for radical politics, nor such mobilizations
automatically fall outside of the liberal tradition. As such, the problems implicated in
collective individualism—that surface in a variety of collective mobilizations and have
been a hallmark of “not-in-my-backyard politics”—are not easy to overcome by a simple
resort to defining the right to the city in terms of collective rights as opposed to individual
rights, as Harvey and Marcuse seem to be suggesting.

Harvey’s analysis of the right to the city, however, proposes more than defining the right
to the city in terms of collective as opposed to individual rights. Criticizing the politics of
human rights at the outset of his article for occupying the center stage of oppositional
politics while not fundamentally challenging “hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market
logics, or the dominant modes of legality and state action” (2008: 23), he argues for an
alternative human right, namely that of the right to the city, which could, according to
him, pose such a fundamental challenge. In order to make his case for the importance of
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the right to the city, Harvey examines the historical coupling of urbanization and the
process of capital accumulation. Elaborating on two examples—of Haussmann’s Second
Empire Paris in the 1850s and Moses’ New York in the 1940s—Harvey forcefully
argues, as we discussed earlier, that urbanization has historically played a crucial
strategic role “in absorbing the surplus product that capitalists perpetually produce in
their search for profits” (2008: 25). At both of these historical moments as well as with
the neoliberal turn in the 1970s, Harvey observes, urban transformation at ever increasing
geographical scales, accompanied by innovations in the financial system, played a chief
role in solving the problem of “absorption of capital surpluses” (2008: 37).

The specificity of the contemporary era, as Harvey correctly points out, is that both
urbanization, and the financial system together with the problem of absorption of capital
surpluses are globalized (2008: 37). If the right to the city should “mean the right to
command the whole urban process,” as Harvey argues (2008: 28), then fragmented social
movements around the world should come together, according to him, for devising a
sufficiently unified response to this globalized process in order to assert their right to the
city (2008: 37). “Signs of rebellion are everywhere,” he notes, but “unlike the fiscal
system” social movements of opposition “are not tightly coupled” and integrated (2008:
37). While Harvey’s critique of “fragmented social movements” did not go unchallenged
(Shepard, 2010; Souza, 2010), I would like to direct our attention to elsewhere: to what
Harvey deems a “simple enough” answer to the question of what movements should
demand, if they somehow come together to claim the right to the city. I would like to do
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so as this question is directly linked to our discussion of what constitutes a radical
formulation of the right to the city.

The “democratic management” over urban deployment of capital, “as the urban process is
a major channel for surplus use,” is what constitutes the right to the city, according to
Harvey (2008: 37). The right to the city, then, is about democratically managing how to
use accumulated capital within the urban process. For Harvey, “the neoliberal assault”
was mainly about preventing “the public share from expanding as it did in the 1960s.”
Therefore, on the question of how to achieve the “democratic management of its
[capital’s] urban deployment,” he argues “raising the proportion of the surplus held by
the state will only have a positive impact if the state itself is brought back under
democratic control” (2008: 37, emphasis added). Now, even if we brush aside Harvey’s
appropriation of the language of “democratic management”—which unfortunately echoes
UN-HABITAT’s liberal technocratic discourse on urban governance—there is a
significant mismatch between Harvey’s attempt to render a radical interpretation of the
right to the city and what he thinks constitutes the right to the city. By mainly targeting
the neoliberal assault on the public share of surplus, and by proposing to bring back the
state under democratic control, Harvey’s formulation ends up affirming and calling back
1960’s capitalist welfare state, perhaps as part of a new “new deal.”

To be fair, Harvey also mentions democratic control over the conditions of surplus
production, which would require a more thorough restructuring of capitalist relations
beyond reviving the 1960s style welfare state, of which Lefebvre, by the way, was an
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adamant critic, calling it “a bureaucratic society of managed consumption” (1996: 147).
Harvey seems not to sufficiently emphasize democratic control over the conditions of
surplus production in his formulation of the right to the city since he does not see any
strong and sufficiently unified political movement capable of challenging capitalists’
control over the production process. However, even so, we have to ask whether confining
the right to the city to the “democratic management” of surplus’ urban deployment by
“raising the proportion of the surplus held by the state” through “bringing back the state
under democratic control” transcend the political limitation Harvey highlighted at the
beginning of his article? That is, can Harvey’s analysis be considered as going beyond
reproducing “hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market logics, or the dominant modes of
legality and state action” (2008: 23), while his analysis implies a longing for preneoliberal welfare state? More precisely, does Harvey’s analysis transcend the “liberal”
market logic, modes of legality and state action as successfully as it does the “neoliberal”
ones? If we cannot satisfactorily answer this question with a solid yes without
reservations, then how could we frame the right to the city so that its radically
transformative potential remains open?

The Value of use value for the Right to the City
Instead of grounding the notion of the right to the city in the binary of individual vs.
collective rights, or limiting its scope to the “democratic management of surplus’ urban
deployment,” I propose starting from Lefebvre’s earlier formulation by framing the right
to the city in terms of the use value of urban space, and the ensuing rights of its
inhabitants who “use” the city. According to Lefebvre, the fundamental contradiction at
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the heart of capitalism between use value and exchange value is also inscribed under the
skin of urban space. After all, he argues, space “is producing and produced by social
relations” (Lefebvre, 2009: 186; see also, Smith, 1984). Spatial processes and social
relations are interlaced in such a way that “space and politics of space express social
relationships but react against them” (Lefebvre, 2003: 15).

For Lefebvre, the spatialization of the contradiction between use value and exchange
value reflects capitalist social relations, in which the inhabitants who ‘use’ the city are
marginalized in favor of those who seek to realize ‘exchange’ value of urban space. He
argues that the capitalist strategy of privileging exchange value over use value requires
producing and controlling urban space in a way that necessarily “overwhelms, the ‘user,’
the ‘participant,’ the simple ‘inhabitant’” (Lefebvre, 2003: 156; see also, Dikeç, 2009).
Capitalist urbanism simply reduces the user, the inhabitant to “being a buyer of space,
one who realizes surplus value” (Lefebvre, 2003: 156); or still worse, it displaces and
excludes the ones who are unable to pay the price from what is essentially a social, but
commodified and commercialized space under capitalism. For Lefebvre, however, “city
and urban reality are related to use value. Exchange value and the generalization of
commodities … tend to destroy it by subordinating the city and urban reality which are
refuges of use value, the origins of a virtual predominance and revalorization of use”
(Lefebvre, 1996: 67-68). The form of exchange and equivalence, however, is “indifferent
towards urban form; it reduces simultaneity and encounters to those of the exchangers
and the meeting place to where the contract or quasi-contract of equivalent exchange is
concluded: the market” (1996: 131). Reduction of the urban to the market and
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subordination of use value to exchange value is the core of the reason why Lefebvre
frames the right to the city primarily as the right of a city’s inhabitants, who daily use the
city, rather than the right of developers, real estate agents and financiers who perceive the
city as a space of opportunities for realizing (spatial) exchange values. If the constant
generalization of exchange value relation under capitalism tends to “destroy the city and
urban reality,” and “overwhelms, the ‘user,’ the ‘participant,’ the simple ‘inhabitant,’”
then it is the exchange value relation itself that should be abolished so that the right to the
city could meaningfully be realized. As Lefebvre asserts in The Production of Space by
echoing Marx, “a new society can only be defined as a turning of the world upon its
head” (1991: 348). That new definition requires nothing short of the production of an
alternative urban society based on use value. Lefebvre thus calls on the inhabitants who
are users of the city to organize themselves in order to claim their right to the city by
transforming the capitalist processes that marginalize them for their lack of command
over exchange value (Mitchell and Heynen, 2009).

Lefebvre’s analysis of the right to the city, and the way he formulates it around the
central contradiction of capitalism between use value and exchange value—presciently
formulated at the dawn of what we could call today the globalization of capitalist
urbanism—are nothing short of a testament to his insight and brilliance. Be that as it may,
it is in fact curious that Lefebvre, dialectician and theorist of triads, limits his analysis to
the contradiction between use value and exchange value, and does not introduce “value”
into his formulation of the right to the city to give a more dialectical spin to his analysis.
In the capitalist mode of production, the source of value, as classical political economists
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and Marx agreed, is labor, while value embodies the contradiction between use value and
exchange value. Far from being a simple synthesis of the two in Marx’s framework, value
presents a convergence point of use value and exchange value that should be further
expanded and explained. The relational dialectics between use value, exchange value, and
value forms the fundamental triad through which Marx establishes his examination of the
capitalist mode of production in Capital (1990).

Lefebvre’s exclusion of value from his analysis of the right to the city is curious, because
on multiple occasions he argues against the productivity of simple oppositions and
promotes a dialectical analysis that springs from triads. For instance, right after
introducing his famous triad of “spatial practice,” “representations of space” and
“representational spaces” in The Production of Space, Lefebvre pauses to warn his
reader: “A triad: that is three elements and not two. Relations between two elements boil
down to oppositions, contrasts or antagonisms,” which philosophy, he suggests, has
found “very difficult to get beyond.” Instead, Lefebvre highlights “the dialectical
relationship which exists within the triad” (Lefebvre, 1991: 39). “Dialectical processes,”
he argues even more forcefully later in the book, “cannot be reduced to binary
oppositions, to contrasts” but they “mobilize triads, tripartite conflicts or connections”
(1991: 228).

Lefebvre’s curious exclusion of value from his analysis is also interesting as inclusion of
value would not undermine, but strengthen his main argument. The crux of Lefebvre’s
critique in his short book, Le Droit à la Ville (The right to the city) is that the city as
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oeuvre, the domain of use value, is reduced to a product by the generalization of
exchange value relation in the capitalist city. That is to say, under capitalism, the city as
oeuvre, the city as the “materialized labor” of its inhabitants, as value, is reduced to, and
represented by exchange value. The collective materialized labor of city’s inhabitants—
which is the substance of value—is the substance that makes the city an oeuvre. Value,
however, is represented only by its form of appearance, exchange value.

From this vantage point, Lefebvre’s argument could be read as not a simple privileging of
use value of the city within capitalist relations, but as an argument for the critical nexus
between use value and value that should be established in an alternative urbanism where
the capitalist law of value is abolished. Only the integration of value and use value,
without the mediation of exchange value, would reveal use value as the ultimate form of
value, which is possible only outside of capitalist relations. As long as value is
represented by exchange value, a city’s useful qualities and its use value will be
dominated by quantified exchange value. This means cities will be made and remade
along the interests of capital and its constant appetite for profit and not by the social
needs and requirements of its inhabitants, the ventricle of the right to the city as
conceptualized by Lefebvre.

Taking value into account enables us to strengthen Lefebvre’s argument against the
determination of what is of value in urban life by exchange value, which reduces the city
to a product, the urban to the market. More importantly, it also enables us to excavate and
bring to the forefront the collective labor process behind the creation of city as an oeuvre,
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which remains implicit and quiescent in Lefebvre’s framework. Underlining the
importance of value, and its substance—labor—for the right to the city is vital since, it is
labor that builds the city and makes it livable by producing use values, and under the
capitalist mode of production, it is primarily labor that is excluded from urban space, the
city, the oeuvre and hence from claiming the right to the city.

Last but not least, there is yet another reason why we should establish the critical nexus
between use value and value, and this point is political as much as it is theoretical. Mark
Purcell, for one, argues in numerous places for the primacy of use value for the right to
the city (2002; 2003; 2014), yet, as we have seen, he still imagines a capitalist city where
the democratic participation of inhabitants would be defined by their ability to get a seat
at the corporate table. Furthermore, as we shall see in the next chapter, UN agencies have
little difficulty in talking about the importance of use value and the social function of
urban space. Nevertheless, every time they do so they translate the centrality of use value
in Lefebvre’s account into exchange value terms. In other words, anytime UN agencies
talk about and promote the importance of use value in the documents and forums I
examine next, they take for granted that use values will only be accessible to consumers
in the market, i.e., use value will be mediated by exchange value.

That is to say, although the primacy of use value is recognized as one of the radical
aspects of Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city, it also provides an entry point
for liberal appropriation. The main reason for this, I think, is that just like the notion of
appropriation, which is interpreted by liberal observers as accessing and utilizing what

68

already exists in the spatial repertoire of the city, the notion of “use” in use value implies
accessing and consuming what the existing city has to offer. Therefore, similar to what I
attempt to do in this chapter by offering the notion of “appropriation in production,”
which brings to the forefront the labor process and the process of production as opposed
to (final) consumption, I argue for the inclusion of value in the right to the city, both to
enable a more dialectical understanding of the notion and to render the collective labor
process behind the production of oeuvre an integral part of the right to the city.
Otherwise, as we will see in the next chapter, Lefebvre’s argument could be read simply
as an emphasis on the significance of use value of urban space within capitalist relations,
rather than as an argument for establishing the critical nexus between use value and value
that could only be formed in an alternative urbanism where the capitalist law of value is
abolished. In order to prevent the hijacking of the politics of use value by a consumer
politics for accessing use values in the city, which constructs the urban inhabitant as a
passive dweller and user of urban services, we need to recast the urban inhabitant as an
active political architect of appropriation in production. One of the ways to achieve this is
building creative means of transformative (political) participation for establishing the
critical nexus between use value and value, which I would like to call the politics of
value. For this, going beyond Lefebvre by incorporating value into the theory of the right
to the city is indispensable.

***
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This chapter discussed the trans-disciplinary literature on the right to the city and
attempted to construct the right to the city as a theory of radical and alternative urbanism.
It mainly identified three nodal points (participation, appropriation and value), each of
which

embodies

dialectically

opposed

concepts

(reproductive/transformative

participation, appropriation in consumption/appropriation in production, exchange
value/use value-value) that I use in the rest of this dissertation as a framework for
theoretical analysis and political evaluation.

The following two chapters take varied cuts into the politics of and political struggle for
the right to the city and evaluate and analyze two right to the city claims in relation to
three dialectical relations I establish in this chapter. These dialectical relations for
analyzing diverse urban political projects form the foundation of the central argument
that undergirds the next two chapters: To the extent that any urban political project is able
to move its political practice from appropriation in consumption towards appropriation in
production, from the politics of exchange value towards establishing the critical nexus
between use value and value, while establishing mechanisms for political participation
that are characterized by a move from reproductive to transformative participation, it
comes closer to realizing the right to the city and the more just urbanism embodied in it.
This would be a move towards the production of space from below.
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CHAPTER III

GLOBAL INCLUSIVE URBANISM: RIGHT TO THE CITY AS A BRIDGE
ACROSS THE URBAN DIVIDE

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the right to the city claim made by UN agencies in their attempt
to reform the hegemonic neoliberal urbanism and argues that their attempt falls short
because UN agencies trip on their own contradictions. In the heart of UN agencies’
contradictions lies the belief shared by most of its political agents, whether institutional
or individual, that the primary venue to solve urbanized world’s problems is the global
free market.

The chapter begins with a brief history of the globalization of the struggle for the right to
the city among the activist circles in various national, regional, and world social forums
and offers a narrative about how the UN institutions got interested in the notion of the
right to the city. As I hope to show, these two narratives are intertwined, as the
development of UN agencies’ interest in the right to the city is not detached from the
popularization of the notion among grassroots activist circles. The chapter then shows
how the formulation of the right to the city differs between the grassroots World Social
Forum activists and the UN-organized World Urban Forum participants by looking at the
documents that were drafted by UN agencies, particularly the World Urban Forum
reports produced by UN-HABITAT. I juxtapose the ways in which the notion of the right
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to the city is understood in World Social Forums and World Urban Forums to make the
argument that, other differences notwithstanding, the fundamental difference lies in UN
agencies’ translation of use value into exchange value terms as the defining characteristic
of the right to the city concept.

In addition to the translation from use value into exchange value, I also detect a salient
tendency in the World Urban Forum reports that attempt to define the right to the city as
a “group of ethical values,” which the urban poor must “adhere to” in order to claim their
right to the city. According to this stance within the UN institutions, the poor can only
claim their right to the city if they are “responsible.” This standpoint argues that the poor
must be taught “how to live in cities,” which I examine as an example of paternalist
urbanism that is not particularly inconspicuous within the UN circles.

The chapter then moves on to examine the fifth World Urban Forum convened in Rio De
Jeneiro, Brazil in 2010, as the notion of the right to the city was carried to the title as the
central theme, and was elaborated in a more detailed way than it had been the case in
previous World Urban Forums. After examining what the forum report brings to the
forefront as desirable aspects of the right to the city, its policy implications and plans, I
identify another salient tendency that does not sit easily with the paternalist urbanism
detected earlier: UN agencies’ genuine effort to push for a more participatory politics to
create inclusive cities. Closely examining in the reports and documents what this political
participation entails and the meaning of inclusive cities, as well as the prominence of
market as the primary venue to solve the problems of the urbanized world, I argue in the
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end that when UN agencies talk about inclusive cities, they have in mind the inclusion of
the marginalized and the excluded in global capitalism, as it is, perhaps without its worst
outcomes. Since the dominant urbanism that emerges out of UN agencies, their reports
and forums, implies a right to the city defined by exchange value terms, the city
consequentially emerges from this picture, first and foremost, as a space of free market.

Finally, in the last section of this chapter I dwell upon conceptual and political
conundrums of UN agencies’ appropriation of the right to the city against the backdrop of
the relatively recent discussions on the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical,
postdemocratic social condition. I do so because the symptoms identified in the
postpolitical urban condition by important urbanists such as Eric Swyngedouw,
symptoms such as the dominance of expert knowledge, stakeholder-based arrangement of
governance, and consensual vision of the urban environment are quite prevalent in World
Urban Forums I examine. In this section I question the helpfulness of framing the right to
the city claim made by UN agencies as a process that contributes to the consolidation of
postpolitical, postdemocratic society. Instead, I propose that one should approach and
analyze UN agencies’ right to the city politics as a political project, which has
identifiable political agenda and objectives.

Globalization of the struggle for the Right to the City
Although the Brazilian urban social movements have been using the right to the city
language since the 1980s and 1990s (Fernandes, 2007: 212; Friendly, 2013: 158), it
would still be fair to argue that early in the twenty-first century, the right to the city idea
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gained a whole new momentum. Urban justice movements around the world began to
express their urban politics through the language of the right to the city, which in turn
increasingly popularized the concept in activist circles as an explicit organizing tenet and
guide for political action. Some of these activist groups, networks, and grassroots
organizations that led the political revival of the concept were not newcomers to the
global activism scene, and had their roots in the anti-globalization struggles of the 1990s,
and in the anti-war mobilizations of the early 2000s (Leavitt et al., 2009). It is not
possible to put a finger on the exact historical moment when diverse and geographically
scattered social justice movements around the globe began to express their urban politics
through the language of the right to the city. Nevertheless, one could start from the World
Social Forum where the right to the city idea was carried to the global stage in its first
convention, held in Porte Alegre, Brazil in 2001.

The World Social Forum was conceived as an open space to exchange ideas, experiences,
and proposals constructed for and by a variety of activist networks, grassroots
organizations, social movements and other civil society initiatives that opposed neoliberal
globalization (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003; Leite, 2005; Waterman and Sen, 2007).
“Another world is possible,” the emblematic common cry of the forum, was an
affirmation of the very demand for an alternative globalization, and of the various ways
in which activists who attended the World Social Forum situated themselves against the
“domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism” (World Social Forum,
2001). Since its inception, the forum has served as a ground to collectively reflect “on the
mechanisms and instruments of domination by capital, on means and actions to resist and
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overcome that domination, and on the alternatives proposed to solve the problems of
exclusion and social inequality … with its racist, sexist and environmentally destructive
dimensions” (World Social Forum, 2001). Given the role and the prominence of cities as
command centers within the intricate network of global capitalism that activists overtly
opposed, it is understandable that the notion of the right to the city surfaced in
discussions among various social movements that came into contact in Porte Alegre,
Brazil.

Among activists and grassroots organizations, interest in the idea of the right to the city
became more salient at the second World Social Forum, as “the World Seminar on the
Right to the City – Against Inequality and Discrimination” was held in 2002. This
seminar was very crucial in initiating the first steps towards the formulation of a World
Charter for the Right to the City, which was drafted in 2003, and later revised in 2004
(Busà, 2009). Concomitantly, the aim of mobilizing for “a global movement for the right
to the city” was first expressed at the World Social Forum in 2003, and “since then it has
been renovated in later editions while growing and facilitating a degree of convergence
among a growing number of activists” (Caruso, 2010: 103). Increasing interest in the
notion became very visible, for instance, in Porto Alegre in 2005, where more than seven
hundred activists took active part in a workshop on the right to the city during the fifth
World Social Forum (Osorio, 2006: 107; Fernandes, 2007: 216). Many of the participants
of the forum, in short, increasingly embraced the idea of the right to the city as a common
ground to form alliances against urban injustices, and to produce alternatives that “stand
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in opposition” to a globalization “commanded by the large multinational corporations …
governments, and international institutions” (World Social Forum, 2001).

The grassroots activist networks that sprung from the World Social Forum facilitated, for
instance, coalition-building practices among urban justice groups across the United
States, and paved the way for the formation of the National Right to the City Alliance
(RTTC-US) in 2007 (Caruso, 2010; RTTC-NYC, 2009; Leavitt et al., 2009), which we
briefly examined in chapter I. In addition to inspiring a US-wide alliance of urban justice
movements, Lefebvre’s concept as invigorated in various national, regional and World
Social Forums, has been embraced increasingly by radical grassroots movements around
the globe. Geographically and socio-economically distant groups—whose struggles
crystallize around accessing use values—such as the Shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali
baseMjondolo in Durham, South Africa (Pithouse, 2010), and Recht auf Stadt, a network
of squatters, tenants and artists in Hamburg, Germany (Souza, 2010: 316), frequently use
the language and organizing tenets inspired by the right to the city concept. Moreover,
even though they may not be part of the same formal alliance, common right to the city
language and international network of activists enable similar groups to get into contact
with each other. For instance, one of the founding RTTC-NYC organizations, Picture the
Homeless travelled to Budapest, Hungary, to meet and exchange experiences with A
Város Mindenkié (The city is for all), a similar grassroots homeless organization fighting
against the criminalization of homelessness in Budapest (Udvarhelyi, 2012).
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The popularization of the right to the city at the global scale, both as a concept to
problematize and examine existing sociospatial relations in increasingly commodified,
privatized, and gated cities, and as a political slogan to flame the revolutionary
transformation of these cities is not surprising. In the first decade of the twenty-first
century, when the right to the city idea was revived and gained global political
momentum—for activists and academics alike—many of the political economic problems
Lefebvre addressed at the end of the 1960s had already reached unprecedented levels in
cities around the world. Lefebvre’s call to reclaim the city for the increasingly
impoverished urban dwellers, who rely on the use value of urban space rather than its
exchange value resonated with manifold social groups who were excluded from urban
spaces that are brought under the hegemony of exchange value relations. The enclosures
of the urban commons, surveillance of public spaces, criminalization of homelessness, as
well as the widening gap between those who toil everyday and those who speculate over
the labor of others are not unique to any specific geography of global neoliberalism.
Lefebvre’s slogan thus appealed to myriad urban social movements, fighting against the
disenfranchisement of cities’ users and inhabitants.

In the meantime, however, the right to the city concept has also drawn considerable
attention from a less anticipated mix of organizations, which have not been renown for
their valorization of the social function of urban space and use values embedded in cities.
UN agencies such as UN-HABITAT, UNDP and UNESCO have been quick to organize
conferences and symposiums—gathering governmental and non-governmental elites as
well as experts from around the world—and have outlined policies to absorb the notion of
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the right to the city into their own political framework. How is that the UN-affiliated
institutions—often accompanied in these conferences by the delegates from the
institutions of global finance capital, such as the IMF and the World Bank—got
interested in the notion of the right to the city? How did a notion put forth and elaborated
by a Marxist theorist find itself a seat in the boardrooms of UN-affiliated organizations?
Even a brief glance at the history of UN agencies would suffice to suggest that these
institutions, which have been critical for the sustenance of global capitalism in the past
six decades are not marching behind the banner of the right to the city in order to
challenge the hegemony of exchange value in capitalist urbanism. What is it, then, that
makes the right to the city concept so attractive for UN-HABITAT and UNESCO? What
are the political ends UN-agencies attempt to realize by reframing their urban politics
within the right to the city framework?

The answer to these questions, I want to argue, partly lie in the two conflicting tendencies
within the UN institutions. On the one hand, there is a strong tendency within the UN
circles to equate human well-being with the liberation of individual entrepreneurial
freedoms in the free market. As I argue later in the chapter, this neoliberal strand
constitutes the hegemonic majority, and characterized by a trust in the market to solve
globalized urban problems. As we shall see shortly, many urban problems, according to
this faction, can be solved with more investment, more credit and by including the poor
in business practices in the free market. Letting free market capitalism do its job, albeit
with a few regulations and reforms, would suffice, they hold. Theirs is the main discourse
that defines the hegemonic urbanism at the World Urban Forum, and in the larger UN
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circles. I would like to frame this hegemonic urbanism within UN institutions as “global
inclusive urbanism.” I would like to do so because, although UN agencies hardly discuss
the urban issues of the cities of the Global North, such as homelessness in New York, or
spatial segregation in Paris, the scope of their policies is global. This global urbanism,
which takes the global free market as the primary venue to solve urbanized problems,
decidedly aims at a more inclusive urban setting.

In addition to this neoliberal strand, there are some organizations and individuals within
the UN institutions that are highly worried about the ecological, social, political and
economic sustainability of contemporary neoliberal urbanism. Raquel Rolnik, the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, for instance, often talks about the
detrimental effects of contemporary neoliberal economic policies on the urban poor and
criticizes market-based solutions to the housing problem as it leads, according to her, to
massive displacement of poor people (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 28). Furthermore, she
argues that the states have “obligations to take steps to ensure and sustain the progressive
realization of the right to adequate housing” and that the financialization of housing only
helps to increase the gap between the rich and the poor (Rolnik, 2013: 3; 2009).

Raquel Rolnik is not alone in her critique of free market fundamentalism. Nobel Prize
winning economist Amartya Sen has significantly contributed in the formulation of the
Human Development Report published by the UNDP and advised UN’s International
Labor Organization for years. Sen argues that the most crucial question of our times is
whether we can change the nature of capitalism to have a more just society. In the context
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of United States, for instance, he suggests that the most effective stimulus to counteract
2008 crises might be state health care spending (Smith, 2009: 11). I take this tendency,
which remains critical to the straightforward neoliberal stance within the UN circles as
the liberal strand. As the two figures I mentioned shows, the liberal strand is
heterogeneous, containing people like Rolnik who attempts to push UN-affiliated politics
towards the left, and people like Sen, who is borderline neoliberal but still highly
sensitive to issues pertaining to social justice (Harvey, 2005: 184).

The liberal strand within UN organizations seems to see the notion of the right to the city
as an opportunity to curtail the excesses of neoliberal urbanism, and this might be one of
the factors behind the liberal interest in the right to the city. They emphasize the social
function of urban land, promote sustainable, inclusive cities and endorse poverty
reduction programs in the World Urban Forums. As we will see in the forum reports
shortly, the chief problem for the liberals that attend these forums is that they remain
minority and their voice is marginal in the forums. Although the UN-HABITAT
advertises the forum as a democratic platform that brings together all the “key urban
stakeholders,” from all political backgrounds, this is not entirely the case. As the forum
reports show, the overwhelming majority of the participants are “heads of state,
government ministers, mayors and leaders of global foundations and big business,” which
UN-HABITAT is proud of (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2). Despite the presence of critical
voices from the liberal faction, the UN agencies’ and most participants’ trust in the
market as a venue to solve urban problems remains powerful and dominant. As I will
demonstrate shortly, if the liberals within UN-affiliated organizations thought that the
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right to the city concept provided them with a leverage to break neoliberal hegemony
within UN circles, it is hard to argue that they were right in that respect.

Before examining the World Urban Forum reports, and other documents drafted by the
UN agencies, particularly by UN-HABITAT and UNESCO, to detect the chief ways in
which the right to the city is elaborated on, I would like to say a few words about the
constitution of the World Urban Forum and forum reports themselves. Although the
World Urban Forum provides a venue for the expression of diverse views on globalized
urban problems by diverse actors, UN-HABITAT remains the most important player in
the forum as the convener of the event. The forum report of the inaugural meeting of the
World Urban Forum reflects this under the title: Working Arrangements of the World
Urban Forum.

“The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) will serve
as the convenor and secretariat of the World Urban Forum. It will organize the
dialogue sessions in consultation with Governments, local authorities and other
Habitat Agenda partners, taking into account, as far as practicable, the need for
geographical, partner and gender balances. It will also be responsible for
supporting the Chair in the preparation of the report of each session. It may
delegate the organization of particular dialogue sessions to specific partners”
(UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 48-49).

“The provisional agenda for each session of the World Urban Forum will be
prepared by the secretariat in consultation with national governments, local
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authorities and other Habitat Agenda partners, at least six months in advance of
the session” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 48).

UN-HABITAT makes a couple of important points here. First, it announces that the
dialogue sessions are organized by UN-HABITAT in consultation with governments and
local authorities. That is to say, the primary agenda and context in which diverse actors
share their views at the forum is set by UN-HABITAT and state agents. Second, the
reports of the sessions, which I draw a lot from in my analysis, are written by the Chair of
the forum, supported by UN-HABITAT.

“In essence, the main discussions of the Forum will be conducted in the form of
dialogues among all participants. Towards this end, selected panelists would
introduce and make short substantive presentations on specific issues followed by
discussions among all participants on those specific issues” (UN-HABITAT,
2002b: 48).

“At the end of each dialogue session, the Chair of each session, drawing from the
deliberations, would prepare a summary of the main issues and observations
raised during the presentations and discussions. These dialogue summaries
should be as inclusive as possible. Once endorsed by the plenary as an accurate
reflection of what transpired in the dialogues, these dialogue summaries would
be part of the report to be submitted by the Chair of the Forum to the Executive
Director of UN-HABITAT for consideration and appropriate action, including
transmittal to the biennial sessions of the Governing” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b:
48, emphasis added).
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As it is evident in this quotation as well, even though diverse actors express opinions on
various issues at the forum, it is the Chair of the forum who eventually decides what the
“main issues and observations” are in sessions, which are then reflected in the forum
report. The primary aim of the forum report is also set as providing advice and
recommendations to world’s governing elites.

“The report of the World Urban Forum will be presented to the Executive
Director of UN-HABITAT for consideration and appropriate action, including
transmittal to the biennial sessions of the Governing Council of the United
Nations Human Settlements Programme” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 47, emphasis
added).

This aim of the report writing is also expressed by the Executive Director of UNHABITAT, which is reflected in the report of the 2002 inaugural World Urban Forum.

“The Executive Director noted that as a biennial event, the World Urban Forum
would be held in inter-sessional years when the Governing Council of UNHABITAT was not held. The World Urban Forum would complement, not
replicate the work of the Governing Council. Its mandate was to make and
forward substantive recommendations, through the UN-HABITAT Executive
Director, to the Governing Council” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 51, emphasis
added).

These substantive recommendations, according to Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, the
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Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, should not only concern UN-HABITAT but also
all national governments.

“Since the World Urban Forum fundamentally is meant to provide advice to the
Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, who may then advise the Governing
Council and ECOSOC on issues of priority importance, the direct recipients of
the recommendations from this World Urban Forum are besides UNHABITAT
itself, all national governments … In this regard, the Executive Director thanked
Government participants, particularly Ministers and other very senior officials
who had attended. The Forum will have little impact if governments and other
actors do not make use of the Governing Council to discuss what has transpired
and to mainstream appropriate recommendations into the official decision
making system” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 59, emphasis added).

Besides providing advice and recommendations to the world’s governing elites, primarily
composed of state agents, another crucial aim of UN-HABITAT in the forum seems to
put the ideas developed in the forum in the service of UN’s global development agenda
and its partner international development agencies. This is expressed explicitly by Sankie
D. Mthembi-Mahanyele, then the Minister for Housing of the Republic of South Africa
and the chair of the first session of the World Urban Forum. In the opening session of the
2002 World Urban Forum, Mthembi-Mahanyele implied that the primary function of the
World Urban Forum was to bring together governments and international development
agencies to solve problems posed by urbanization.
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“As an open-ended gathering of Governments and all Habitat Agenda partners,
the Forum was expected to recommend solutions to current urbanization
challenges, identify synergies among development agencies and contribute, from
the human settlements point of view, to the global debate on sustainable
development. The current session of the Word Urban Forum would also serve as
a preconference event to finalize inputs on Habitat issues for the World Summit
on Sustainable Development to be held in Johannesburg in August 2002” (UNHABITAT, 2002b: 50, emphasis added).

“By remaining focused on these challenges of urbanization, the World Urban
Forum would evolve into an effective venue for global civic engagement that
would have a continuing impact on the development agenda of the United
Nations” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 51, emphasis added).

If we take a look at the UN-HABITAT document that describes the “objectives of and
arrangements for the World Urban Forum,” it would not be unfair to argue that the
United Nations General Assembly imagined and aimed for a forum, to a large extent, that
would bring together government elites and experts to resolve urban issues:

“The United Nations General Assembly decided, in its resolution 56/206, that the
Forum would be a “non-legislative technical forum in which experts can
exchange views in the years when the Governing Council of the United Nations
Human Settlements Programme does not meet.” At the same session, the General
Assembly, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 56/205, encouraged local authorities
and other Habitat Agenda partners to participate, as appropriate, in the World
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Urban Forum in its role as an advisory body to the Executive Director of UNHABITAT” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 47, emphasis added).

The same document, under the title of “participation,” details the actors, whose
participation in the forum is important:

“Participation in the World Urban Forum will be open to representatives of
national governments, local authorities and other Habitat Agenda partners. The
latter include, inter alia, global parliamentarians on Habitat, non-governmental
organizations, community-based organizations, human settlement professionals,
research institutions and academies of science, the private, business and nonprofit sectors, foundations, relevant United Nations organizations and other
international agencies” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 47).

The elite and expert dominated composition of the World Urban Forum also transpires in
the opening statement of Luis F. Garcia Cerezo, Permanent Representative of Spain to
UN-HABITAT on behalf of the European Union, reflected in the forum report.1

1

The elite composition of World Urban Forum is visible in the constitution of the Advisory
Group for the First Session of the forum: “At its first plenary meeting, the Chair, on behalf of the
Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, announced the names of the persons who would constitute
the Advisory Group for the first session of the World Urban Forum and who would advise and
assist the Executive Director with the organization, management and conduct of the meetings of
the session. These were the following:
(a) Mrs. Sankie D. Mthembi-Mahanyele, Minister for Housing of the Republic of South Africa
(Chair);
(b) Mr. Sören Häggroth, State Secretary for Housing and Deputy Minister for Finance of Sweden
(Co-chair);
(c) Ms. Jan Peterson, President, Huairou Commission;
(d) Mr. Alan Lloyd, President of the World Associations of Cities and Local Authorities
Coordination (WACLAC);
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“Speaking on behalf of the European Union, Mr. Garcia Cerezo welcomed the
decision by the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements through its
resolution 18/5, paragraph 10, to merge the Urban Environment Forum and the
International Forum on Urban Poverty into a new Urban Forum. He was
confident that the active participation of experts from European Union member
countries and the European Commission would make a valuable contribution to
the discussion of the wide range of subjects on the agenda. He noted the presence
of experts from many countries around the world and praised the innovative
format of the Forum which he described as its greatest asset. The Forum, he said,
was an important step, particularly in relation to the preparation of a report for
the preparatory committee of the World Summit on Sustainable Development”
(UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 56, emphasis added).

At this point it is worth noting that the main concerns of the world’s governing elites that
set the agenda in the forum, which is then discussed with experts and other participants,
are not the only source of elitism in the constitution of the World Urban Forum. A lot is
at stake for UN-HABITAT itself as well. Organizing a united event with the merger of
two distinct events on urban issues would give, UN-HABITAT actors hope, a leverage to
UN-HABITAT for pushing for more power within UN and more funding from its
member states. This is reflected in the summary of the opening statement of Daniel
(e) Mr. Sergey P. Melnichenko, representative of the City of Moscow;
(f) Mr. David Painter, United States Agency for International Development (USAID);
(g) Mr. Markku Villikka, International Federation of Surveyors (FIG);
(h) Mr. Arputham Jockin, President, Slum Dweller Federation of India;
(i) Mr. René Frank, International Real Estate Federation (FIABCI), representative of the private
sector” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 3).
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Toroitich arap Moi, the President of the Republic of Kenya and the host of the event, who
called for more resources for UN-HABITAT’s valuable work. The forum report notes:

“UN-HABITAT would require a predictable and sufficient flow of resources to
enable it to fulfil [sic] its mandate. He [the president] therefore appealed not only
for a significant increase in the regular budget provision for UN-HABITAT, but
also for more non-earmarked contributions from member countries. He proposed
that such contributions should be directed into UN-HABITAT’S foundation fund.
This would give it the desired flexibility in carrying out a wider range of
programmes” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 52, emphasis added).

The closing statement of Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, the Executive Director of UNHABITAT also lauded UN-HABITAT’s efforts and argued that its practices were
successful and on the right track to achieve its “global programmes.”

At the last session of the Human Settlements Commission, where UN-HABITAT
was given the task of organizing this Forum, it was stated that UN-HABITAT was
on the right road towards playing a more significant role within the United
Nations system. The vibrancy of discussion during the Forum suggests that UNHABITAT is also on the right programmatic track. She reassured that UNHABITAT will be revisiting the proceedings of the World Urban Forum as a
priority technical resource in order to make UN-HABITAT’s campaigns, global
programmes and technical cooperation activities even more responsive to the
voices of the Habitat Partners (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 59, emphasis added).
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In her statement at the closing session, the Chair Sankie D. Mthembi-Mahanyele also
described the first World Urban Forum as a success.

“The open-ended gathering of Governments at all levels and organizations of
civil society had already, at its first session, demonstrated its capacity to be a
global marketplace of collecting and exchanging views on the future of cities and
other human settlements, and on their role in sustainable development” (UNHABITAT, 2002b: 57, emphasis added).

The Forum was expected to make a major contribution on advising on the best
ways to meet the targets set by world leaders at the Millennium Summit of
improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020. At this
first session, the Urban Forum had pronounced itself very clearly on several
principles including: the concept of the “right to the city” and its essential
element of citizenship…” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 57).

Let us now examine the forum reports and other documents drafted by UN agencies to
interrogate how successful the World Urban Forum has been in becoming “a global
marketplace of views,” and in meeting “the targets set by world leaders” as well as in
pronouncing “itself very clearly on several principles including the concept of the right to
the city.”

UN-Right to the City: Paternalist urbanism and civilizing the urban poor.
In 2002, the same year that the second World Social Forum organized “the world seminar
on the right to the city,” the first World Urban Forum, was organized by the UN and held
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at the headquarters of UN-HABITAT in Nairobi, Kenya. The inaugural meeting of the
World Urban Forum saw the participation of urban justice and human rights
organizations similar to those at the World Social Forum. However, unlike the World
Social Forum, more than half of the participants were composed of local and national
state officials, agents of intergovernmental organizations, as well as UN-affiliated
representatives (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 2). The presence of such officials at the Urban
Forum, however, was not what primarily distinguished the Urban Forum from the Social
Forum. Rather, their fundamental difference resided in the lexicons through which they
framed their politics, and in the disparities between their stated political objectives,
suggested as appropriate ways of realizing the right to the city amidst the problems that
flow out of the globalized urbanization of the twenty-first century.

The “central theme” of the first World Urban Forum, established by the “UN General
Assembly,” revolved around the question of “how best to tackle the problems of
urbanization so that everyone, rich and poor alike, can fully address their Right to the
City” (UN-HABITAT, 2002a). In the words of Sankie D. Mthembi-Mahanyele, the chair
of the first session of the World Urban Forum, one of the fundamental aims of the forum
was “to balance the overall market demands on land in an urban environment with the
urgent need for land and shelter for the urban poor” (UN-HABITAT, 2002a). The
seasoning of the recalcitrant language of the World Social Forum for a liberal appetite
digestible in the Urban Forum is evident in the latter’s omission of the anti-capitalist
ingredients of the World Social Forum’s discourse. Notions such as “domination of the
world by capital,” and “corporate globalization” prominent in Social Forum’s language
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cede to softer liberal conceptualizations such as “everyone, rich and poor alike,” and
“balancing market demands on land with the need for land for the urban poor” in the
Urban Forum (UN-HABITAT, 2002a). Moreover, the flattening language used in the
Urban Forum to frame the right to the city as the right of “everyone, rich and poor alike”
also runs against the radicalism of the Right to the City activists, who see the notion as a
vision for an urbanism “that meets the needs of working class people” (RTTC-NYC,
2009: 3). Although the substitution of the radical language of the right to the city visible
in World Social Forum’s discourse by a liberal one in World Urban Forum is nothing of
surprise, it demonstrates the main direction the right to the city is taken to, and the gap
between the two discourses.

Besides being emphasized in the “central theme” of the first World Urban Forum in
2002, the right to the city also appeared as the subtitle of the first “thematic dialogue” the
same year, entitled “Global Campaign on Urban Governance: Right to the City” (UNHABITAT, 2002b: 8). Panelists of this dialogue pointed out that the right to the city of
“every citizen, even the poorest” was central to the aims of UN’s global campaign on
urban governance (2002b: 9). For these aims to be fulfilled, however, the impoverished
material conditions in which the urban poor lives had to be uplifted. To this end, “many
participants,” the report of the World Urban Forum tells us, “championed the
participation of the urban poor in poverty reduction programs” (2002b: 9). Consider the
following excerpt from the forum’s report, which makes clear how the participants
perceived the notion of participation as the central component of realizing the right to the
city:
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“An important relationship was identified by many between participation and
citizenship. ‘Do the poor have a right to the city’ asked one participant, ‘yes, they
do if they stand up and be counted and show they can be responsible.’ There was
a call for a new ‘culture of citizenship,’ a new civism. As one speaker pointed
out, ‘we need to teach people how to live in cities.’ Another speaker mentioned
the role of faith-based groups in the process” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 9-10).

What is remarkable about such formulations is the obscurity of their foundations, for
example, of the requirement to “be responsible” as a condition for claiming one’s right to
the city. Nor is it clear how the poor could show that they are responsible, or what this
responsibility entails. What is clear, however, is that what the panelists refer to as
“responsibility” could be cultivated pedagogically by teaching the urban poor how to live
in cities, and that the faith-based groups could play a role in this enculturation process. It
appears that the poor can participate in urban politics and claim their right to the city,
only after going through such a civilizing enculturation process for becoming responsible
subjects. It is also important to note that this formulation implies that participation in UN
programs by the urban poor, such as the aforementioned poverty reduction programs,
appear to be a prerequisite of expressing a political claim such as the right to the city of
the urban poor.

But who are these panelists, who engage in an enthusiastic debate on the limits and
preconditions of one’s right to the city? After all, what these panelists posit does not
sound quite like how impoverished and marginalized urbanites themselves would
articulate democratic participation with their right to the city. In fact, the panelists include
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government officials such as Sankie D. Mthembi-Mahanyele, Minister for Housing of
South Africa; UN bureaucrats such as Paul Taylor, the Chief of Urban Development
Branch of UN-HABITAT; and bank representatives such as John Flora, the Director of
the Transport and Urban Development Department of the World Bank (UN-HABITAT,
2002b: 8). Who the panelists are sheds some light on the roots of the didactical liberal
paternalism in the thematic dialogue, while this patronizing stance reveals the gap
between the panelists’ interpretation of the right to the city and how Lefebvre and
grassroots activists framed it as “a cry and a demand” from the streets.

In addition to blending the right to the city with disquietingly paternalist language, and
erasing all anti-capitalist components from it, UN agencies have recently attempted to
claim credit for the origins of the right to the city concept. In other words, UN agencies
have not only attempted to appropriate the content of the notion as established by the
existing right to the city movements around the world, but have also attempted to rewrite
the history of this concept. In a “policy paper,” named Urban Policies and the Right to
the City: Rights, Responsibilities and Citizenship, produced at the request of UNHABITAT and UNESCO, the section entitled “evolution of the concept of the right to the
city” opens with the following sentence. “The year 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which created a common standard
for all people and nations to liberty, justice and equality” (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009:
13, original emphasis). The policy paper asserts later in the paragraph that “human rights
instruments have also provided inspiration to the concept of the right to the city” (2009:
13, original emphasis). Citing Lefebvre, not as the theorist who originally coined the
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term, but as “among the first to promote the idea” (2009: 14), UN agencies attempt to
construct an unwarranted genealogy of the term, according to which the origins of the
right to the city lies in the UN declaration of human rights: “The right to the city is
founded in the intrinsic values of human rights, as initially defined by the UN
declaration” (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009: 17).2

This unwarranted genealogy is also reflected in the words of the “UNESCO expert,
Brigitte Colin,” who argues that “the right to the city is a group of ethical values that all
urban dwellers have to adhere to in order to promote new content for an urban social
contract … The ethical values included in the concept are particularly relevant with
regard to UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UN-HABITAT, 2010b: 3,
emphasis added). Later in the report, it is further argued that the “international advocacy
to the right to the city is justified by the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights” (2010b: 3, emphasis added). What is striking here—in addition to an attempt to
fix the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the source and justification of the right
to the city politics—is the prominence of the same paternalistic and moralist language
2

This position that reduces the right to the city to but one aspect of UN Universal Human Rights
is problematic as it leaves out the radical aspects of the notion. More importantly, this position
can make sense of any right to the city claim insofar as it fits the human rights framework.
“The answers as to how the right to the city can influence relations between urban dweller and
State, and promote broader access to urban culture and democracy could be based on the entire
spectrum of human rights, rather than civil and political rights alone. This could imply moving
from a right to the city as it is perceived at present, to an approach that combines citizenship and
human rights in the urban realm. As concerns citizenship, the societal ethics which is cultivated
through sharing space could be based on human rights. The UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, could provide a common set of values, to be achieved at the city level, thereby
addressing the many aspects and underlying principles of human rights (e.g. the principle of
nondiscrimination) which are essential to the humane development of inclusive cities. Human
rights in the city as conceived in recent years take this approach, including rights, responsibilities
and citizenship in the city” (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009: 40).

94

that was prevalent in the 2002 World Urban Forum. The reductionism that frames the
right to the city as “a group of ethical values” which should be adhered to by all urban
dwellers replicates the paternalist moralism of “teaching people how to live in cities” and
the proposal to grant economically marginalized inhabitants their right to the city as long
as they are “responsible.”

UN agencies’ attempt to take credit for the right to the city concept—by bypassing
Lefebvre and arguing that its “inspiration” and “justification” are grounded in UN’s
declaration of human rights—is also visible in their effort to overstep the World Social
Forum and grassroots right to the city activists as the regenerator of the term. Although it
appears to be the case that what brought the right to the city concept to the attention of
UN-affiliated organizations is the World Social Forum’s espousal of the concept starting
in 2001, UN agencies claim that “the idea of a project on the right to the city was first
presented at a UNESCO Round Table in 1995 … and at the City Summit in 1996,
UNESCO held a dialogue … [that] touched on the right to the city” (Brown and
Kristiansen, 2009: 11, emphasis added).

How Lefebvre and grassroots World Social Forum activists and their foundational role in
formulating and practicing the right to the city concept are treated by UN agencies is also
explicit in the keynote speech of Anna Tibaijuka, Under Secretary General and Executive
Director of UN-HABITAT, given on the occasion of the public debate on “Urban policies
and the right to the city” on 18 March 2005 in the UNESCO headquarters in Paris.

“Meanwhile, a number of NGOs and stakeholders have been working towards

95

the adoption of a World Charter on the Right to the City. A proposed text was
discussed during the recent World Social Forum in Porto Alegre and this
initiative deserves our attention. The right to the city is to be understood as a
collective right of all city inhabitants, especially those vulnerable and
disfavoured. This concept draws from many sources, including, importantly, from
the Habitat Agenda and the principles promoted by UN-HABITAT’s Global
Campaigns” (UNESCO, 2006: 26, emphasis added).

The designation of grassroots organizations and activists that come together at the World
Social Forum as “NGOs and stakeholders,” and the source of the right to the city as UNHABITAT and its “Global campaigns” are two of the evidences that help us to
understand a couple of crucial points. First, at a general level, the UN agencies’ attempt
to make sense of the world require them to pull diverse reality into its own language and
framework. Hence, grassroots organizations and activists of the Social Forum become
“NGOs and stakeholders.” Second, it shows us, again, that UN agencies attempt to claim
credit for the origins and scope of the right to the city by consistently linking the origin of
the term to UN’s human rights framework, and its agencies’ campaigns.

If the UN attempts to create a clean lineage between the right to the city and its own
declaration of human rights of 1948 and UN agencies’ human rights campaigns—by
concomitantly bypassing Lefebvre and grassroots activists—it is probably because the
UN wishes to take the concept somewhere else. To reveal where this appropriation is
directed, I suggest taking a brief look at the 2010 World Urban Forum, convened in Rio
de Janeiro. At this forum, the notion of the right to the city was carried to the title as the
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central theme, and was elaborated in a more detailed way than it had been the case in
previous World Urban Forums. To be sure, the right to the city was touched upon in the
World Urban Forums between 2002 and 2010. However, the examination of these reports
reveals that the right to the city was less elaborated than simply mentioned. It is
incorporated in general statements such as “every urban citizen has the Right to the City”
(UN-HABITAT, 2004: 23), and “new challenges and emerging issues that need to be
addressed by joint efforts include the ‘Right to the City’” (UN-HABITAT, 2006: 60). To
be precise, the right to the city concept was mentioned twice in the 2004 Urban Forum
report, and three times in 2006, whereas a keyword search returns only one result for the
notion in the 2008 World Urban Forum report. While for a moment, it looked like the
right to the city concept was losing its popularity within UN circles in this period, it was
abruptly brought to the epicenter of discussions concerning the urban question in the
World Urban Forum in 2010 as the central theme, which, recall, is decided by UNHABITAT. In that capacity, UN-HABITAT provides us with an understanding of what,
through its own glances, constitutes the right to the city and its key components through
manifold discussions on a variety of topics in the forum. Let us, then, briefly look into the
2010 forum report, which is written by the Chair of the Forum in consultation with UNHABITAT to follow UN-HABITAT’s path to the right to the city.

The Right to the City as a bridge across the urban divide
Titled as “The Right to the City: Bridging the Urban Divide,” the fifth World Urban
Forum in 2010 saw the participation of 13,795 people from 150 countries, which makes it
the largest World Urban Forum convened until then. Similar to the previous Urban
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Forums, government officials, such as parliamentarians, mayors and other representatives
of municipalities formed the largest participant group (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 7). They
were accompanied by a large number of representatives from “big business” and financial
institutions, most notably from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
Organizing the World Urban Forum under the theme of the right to the city, essentially as
a summit for the world’s powerful governmental and financial elites does not seem to
have posed any contradiction for the forum organizers.3 On the contrary, the forum report
shows that the overwhelming elite presence at the forum is perceived as a success, for the
report boasts that “the presence at the fifth session of the World Urban Forum of a greater

3

Note that the advisory group, who advise and assist the Executive Director with the
organization, management and conduct of all the meetings and events at the forum is almost
exclusively made up of governmental elites, World Bank and UN members.
“The Chair of the fifth session of the World Urban Forum, Mr. Marcio Fortes de Almeida, at the
request of the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, announced the names of the members of the
Advisory Group for the current session. The terms of reference of the Advisory Group were to
advise and assist the Executive Director with the organization, management and conduct of all the
meetings and events. The members of the Advisory Group were as follows:
(a) Mr. Marcio Fortes de Almeida, Minister of Cities of Brazil, Chair of the fifth session of the
World Urban Forum and Chair of the Advisory Group;
(b) Mr. Shaun Donovan, Secretary of State of the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Co-Chair of the fifth session of the World Urban Forum and Co-Chair of the
Advisory Group;
(c) Ms. Salamata Gakou Fofana, Minister for Housing, Lands and Urban Development of Mali,
Vice-Chairperson of the Africa Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development;
(d) Mr. Ali Nikzad, Minister of Housing and Urban Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Chair of the Asia‑Pacific Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development;
(e) Mr. Valery E. Yegoshkin, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
to UN-Habitat;
(f) Mr. Augusto Barrera, Mayor of Quito, Ecuador, Vice-President of the United Cities and Local
Governments World Council;
(g) Mr. Peter G.tz, President of the Global Parliamentarians on Habitat:
(h) Mr. Jan Olbrycht, Member of the European Parliament, Poland;
(i) Ms. Abha Joshi-Ghani, Manager of the Urban and Local Government Unit, World Bank;
(j) Ms. Jan Peterson, Chair, Huairou Commission;
(k) Ms. Sheila Patel, Chair, Shack/Slum Dwellers International;
(l) Mr. Musa Ansumana Soko, Member, UN-Habitat Youth Advisory Board” (UN-HABITAT,
2010a: 9).
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number of heads of state, government ministers, mayors and leaders of global
foundations and big business reaffirmed both the Forum and its glittering exhibition as
the world’s premier cities convention” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2). Nor was it apparently
seen as contradictory to organize a World Urban Forum on the right to the city—a notion
that has mobilized considerable number of urban justice organizations around the world
against gentrification and displacement—at the freshly gentrified waterfront of Rio de
Janeiro. It would, in fact, be highly surprising if such a global “gentry” had convened its
“glittering exhibition” in one of Rio de Janeiro’s numerous disinvested and neglected
neighborhoods. Instead, the forum took place in a brand new convention center, and its
report begins by praising the “spirit of generosity and creativity” of the Brazilian
Government for taking “the opportunity to build a modern waterfront convention center,
bringing new prestige investment, social space and visitors to a once depressed Rio
dockside neighborhood in need of upgrading” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2, emphasis
added). This praise is telling because such mega development projects that redesign
urban space in accordance with cities’ (and in fact globe’s) elite interests have been the
kernel of the critique embedded in the right to the city concept, and a main issue around
which the right to the city activists have been mobilized around the world (see Gold and
Gold 2008; Bowater, 2014).

Securing the right to the city of “every citizen, even the poorest,” the 2010 Forum
suggests, is only attainable in “inclusive cities.” UN-HABITAT has an “important role to
play,” we are told, “in advancing the right to the city,” as it has the capacity “to bring all
the actors together to develop a common action” by forging partnerships between
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“people, markets and governments” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 21). Creating new
investment opportunities through partnerships—a central constituent of neoliberal
governance (Jessop, 2002; Miraftab, 2004; Kuymulu, 2011)—in order to solve manifold
urban problems is a fundamental theme in the 2010 World Urban Forum. In fact, the
forum report underscores that “forging effective partnerships between and with the
public, private and civil society sectors” is “one of the main objectives of UNHABITAT” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2, emphasis added).4 In tandem with this main
objective, it is not surprising that “some of the most distinctive issues emerging from the
Forum were those on the evolution of new forms of partnership” (2010a: 3).

The reason behind attributing such a key role to building partnerships in the World Urban
Forum is a widely shared belief among its participants that these partnerships are an
effective means for advancing democracy and reducing poverty. 5 “New partnerships and
business models that could address the bottom of the economic pyramid,” it is argued in
the report, “provide more inclusive solutions to the lower segments, for the benefit of all”
(UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 72). The “bottom of the pyramid” approaches and practices “that
include the poor in business processes” are presented as necessary “to tackle growing
urban poverty worldwide,” and to develop a right to the city which includes all (2010a:
“A highlight of the Forum was the launch of the World Urban Campaign to elevate the drive by
UN-Habitat and its Habitat Agenda Partners for better, smarter, greener and more equitable cities
to a new level. Launched by Ms. Anna Tibaijuka, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and
Executive Director of UN‑Habitat, it also underscored one of the main objectives of UN-Habitat
– that of forging effective partnerships between and with the public, private and civil society
sectors” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2).
4

One of the “emerging issues” of the thematic dialogue “Innovative Approaches to Realizing the
Right to the City,” presented by the forum report, states the following: “It [is] necessary for urban
professionals and the private sector to partner with the poor on an equal basis to build a
sustainable society in cities” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 20).
5
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The important role attributed to the private sector for “bridging the urban divide” is
visible in the thematic dialogue titled “Global Debate: Sustainable Infrastructure.” The
first point highlighted by the forum report under the title “major issues and concerns”
reveals a certain consensus among the panelists.

“The debate was underpinned by the view that, for the private sector, the theme
of the current Forum [the right to the city] entailed enhancing affordability and
accessibility that could help bridge the divide between the rich and poor urban
communities, between the developed and under-developed urban areas, and
between safe and unsafe neighbourhoods. Those efforts could be reinforced by
innovations through new partnerships and business models that offered more
inclusive solutions” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 73).

What is salient in the 2010 World Urban Forum report is a significant consensus among
the participants in forum sessions on the key role of the private sector in realizing “one of
the main objectives of UN-HABITAT,” that is, building inclusive partnerships that
“bring all the actors together to develop a common action” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 21).
In such partnerships, the private sector, credit institutions, and lending agencies have,
nevertheless, a particular “responsibility” to “include the urban poor in business
processes” (2010a: 104), so that “the poor” could be uplifted to a certain standard of
living reflected in the UN Millennium Development Goals. This particular responsibility
is different, according to Deepak Jolly, the vice-president of Coca Cola, India, from the
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“outdated viewpoint” of Milton Friedman, who once argued that “a company’s only
social responsibility was to enrich its stakeholders” (2010a: 75). Thus, “all Coca Cola
practices,” in contrast to Friedman’s version, Jolly claims, “involve low-income groups
since the majority of its customers were in the low-income and middle-income groups.”
What is more, the report goes on, “Coca Cola provided training and microcredit facilities
to those people to start their own businesses” (2010a: 75). Corporate responsibility, we
are instructed by Coca Cola at the World Urban Forum on the right to the city, required
engaging in the “beneficial business practices that supported the poor,” so that the theme
of the Forum’s “business caucus”—Greening Cities, Bridging the Urban Divide—could
become a reality in the cities around the world (2010a: 74-75).

A close examination of the 2010 World Urban Forum report also reveals the prominence
of a certain discourse on creating inclusive cities in tandem with creating partnerships
that involves the urban poor in business processes. New public-private partnerships have
to be built; participation of urban poor should be enhanced; women and youth should not
be left out so that right to the city of “every citizen, even the poorest” could be realized.
Taking a closer look at this discourse on inclusivity discloses that the crux of what is
meant by the notions of participation and inclusion is the participation and inclusion of
“the excluded” in global capitalism, as it is. The bitter irony of presenting what is
essentially a market expansion for capital as “social responsibility” to “include the urban
poor in business processes” left aside, what is noteworthy here is how more of the same
medicine that created the symptom in the first place is offered, again and again, as the
panacea for solving urban problems. For instance, at the height of a debt-infused global
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financial crisis that had begun in 2007 as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US housing
markets, more credit for lower income households and deeper financialization of housing
markets are proposed at the forum to solve the housing problem.6 “Developers [are] now
attracted into low-income units as they [have] guaranteed market through loans for endusers,” celebrates the forum report. However, more could be done, the report goes on, as
it is crucial to make “finance more readily available to lower-income people than [is]
currently the case. There [is] a need for housing finance to be accessible to the majority
who [are] currently excluded by income” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 27).

It is striking that such proposals are made at a time, when hundreds of thousands of
households in the US alone were foreclosed upon and the social cost of predatory lending
practices and debt-ridden financialization of housing markets, especially for the already
indebted low-income households, became salient. Here, I should stress, my intention is
not to develop a moral argument about the motivations of those who prescribe more
capitalism to heal the ills of capitalist urbanism. What I would like to emphasize instead
is that the forum participants, such as World Bank representatives or CEOs of companies
like Coca Cola, who contribute in the appropriation of the notion of the right to the city
and incorporate it in a liberal development agenda do so due to a particular class position
they occupy. Their social role as representatives of powerful governmental, non-

For instance, the list of “recommendations on the implementation of the gender equality action
plan,” discussed in the “Report on the Gender Equality Action Assembly” mentions the following
as a necessary step towards gender equality:
6

“Better programmes to empower women economically, through access to credit and housing
finance, while guaranteeing their equal rights to land and housing through laws and actual
practices” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 69).
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governmental, and financial institutions that are critical for the sustenance of global
capitalism requires them to discuss urban issues only in such a way that would create
opportunities, first and foremost, for further capital accumulation in the city. Theirs is the
main discourse that defines the hegemonic urbanism at the World Urban Forum.
Although UN-HABITAT advertises the forum as a democratic platform that brings
together all the “key urban stakeholders,” including grassroots organizations, participants
who criticize further commodification of urban spaces remain marginal at the forum.
Others, such as the right to the city activists protesting right outside the “waterfront
convention center,” were not as lucky and faced police brutality for raising their voice
against the appropriation of their right to the city by UN organizations.7 The irony of all
this is reflected in the fact that grassroots right to the city activists were pepper sprayed in
front of the World Urban Forum for protesting UN’s appropriation of the right to the city,
while the representatives of UN-affiliated organizations and global capital discussed
investment plans for creating inclusive cities. This situation reveals a fundamental
political divide between how the notion is understood by the two parties. This divide, it
seems, is not so easy to bridge.

We can shed a light on the nature of this political divide by comparing the notion of the
right to the city as framed by Lefebvre and radical activists on the one hand, and its

According to activists who organized “people’s alternative Forum” right next to the World
Urban Forum, there was a thorough discussion among the activists on whether it was worthwhile
to participate in a UN-organized urban forum, which, according to them, aimed at “reinventing
the meaning of the phrase ‘The Right to the City’ to mean ‘basic service provision.’”
(http://usf2010.wordpress.com/2010/03/25/can-right-to-the-city-work-within-a-capitalismsystem/). It is some of these activists who were pepper-sprayed at the entrance of the building
where World Urban Forum was organized http://usf2010.wordpress.com/2010/03/23/davidharveys-speech-opens-the-urban-social-forum/ (Accessed 8 April 2014).
7
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business-oriented version among the UN circles on the other. As I examine in Chapter II,
the first thing that catches the eye in Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city is his
attempt to put at the forefront use values embedded in the city as oeuvre, and the ensuing
rights of its inhabitants who “use” the city to transform it, as Harvey puts it, to their
“hearts’ desire” (Harvey, 2008: 23) Although UN agencies present a continuation
between Lefebvre’s use of the concept and their urban human rights agenda, the defining
characteristic of right to the city’s UN version is privileging the exchange values in the
city as a space of market, and the ensuing rights of capitalist actors who “exchange”
space and other commodities in the city. While the grassroots right to the city activists
around the world work to frame their urban politics around use value (chapter I) as “a cry
and a demand” from the streets of the city, the policy proposals lauded at the UN
organized forums frame the city primarily as a market that could work more humanely
with the intervention of experts and elites. What is clear is that according to the dominant
urbanism emerges from the UN agencies, the primary venue to work to realize the right
to the city is free market. For that reason, when most panelists of the World Urban Forum
speak about urban problems and how such problems could be addressed through the right
to the city framework, they often talk about a business proposal. In the world of UN
agencies, it seems, every urban issue has an equivalent market-name: affordable housing
means “affordable finance;”8 slum poverty means “financing slum upgrading;”9

Jaime A. Fabiana, Chief Executive Officer of “Home Development Mutual Fund” (Pag‑IBIG
Fund), Provident Fund and Home Financing Institution, Philippines, “introduced the Philippines’
experience, where affordable housing, resettlement programmes and affordable finance were
promoted. Concentrating on finance, he described the Home Development Mutual Fund, a
mandatory savings fund for housing distributed through employers. Through tax‑free employer
and employee contributions with a maturity of 20 years, the funds were used for housing finance.
When applied to social housing, they offered the lowest rates in the market and were
crosssubsidized through different rates for capital borrowing levels” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 27).
8
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feminization of poverty means “microcredit market” for women’s organizations;10 lack of
employment in formal economy means “microfinance market for micro enterprises,” and
so on.

The prominence of the idea that free market is an appropriate venue for solving urban
problems becomes even more evident in 2010 World Urban Forum as the forum report
announces that “a business caucus was held over two days and served as a major platform
for the private sector to share best practices and innovations for sustainable cities” (UNHABITAT, 2010a: 6). The importance of private sector for the aims of UN-HABITAT
and the World Urban Forum is also visible in the speech of Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka,
the Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, as she addresses the business caucus. The
forum report summarizes this speech as follows:

She reminded the audience that the private sector was crucial to the future of
cities. Climate change challenges could be seized as a new business opportunity
with clean, low-carbon infrastructure investment and retrofitted buildings being
opportunities for green investment. That in turn called for true and operative
partnerships with the private sector. She then invited the business community to
engage in the World Urban Campaign to carry the message of “Better cities,
better life” and ultimately have a real impact on policies and people’s lives”

Tibaijuka, Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, “highlighted the challenges of the south-south
cooperation and commented on the role played by Sir John Kaputin in mobilizing European
Union-African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) funding for the Participatory Slum
Upgrading Programme implemented in ACP countries. She also highlighted the importance of
financing the construction industry in Africa and the leading role that Brazil, China and India
could play” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 82).
10
See footnote 7.
9
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(UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 73).

Paying specific attention to the language employed by the UN agencies while talking
about the right to the city reveals more. Certain conceptualizations and specific ways in
which certain issues are framed at these forums lay bare the limits of political objectives
of those who are well versed with the highly standardized language of UN agencies. To
begin with the subtitle of the 2010 Urban Forum theme—bridging the urban divide— it is
clear that what UN agencies have in mind is not putting an end to the processes that
create the urban divide, hence ending the divide itself. Rather, what was put forth as an
aim was to “bridge the divide,” which leaves the divide intact. This is not intended as a
mere polemic on wording and framing of UN-sponsored politics. I think it is important to
look into the language used as it also embodies a degree of honesty and a portion of
political truth that are revealed by the “bridging the divide” language. UN agencies do
not seem to take issue with the fact that a divide exists between rich and poor, socially,
economically, and spatially. The divide is fine. What poses problems seems to be that the
divide became too wide for capitalist urbanism to operate in a healthy fashion. Social,
economic and spatial barriers—partially captured by “the urban divide” discourse—
present serious threats to health and smoothness of capital accumulation and economic
cohesion. To give one example, if cities’ ability to keep the flow of people going between
home and work is compromised by the urban divide, then one could expect not only an
“urban chaos” as Neil Smith argues, but also a “fragmentation and disequilibrium in the
universalization of abstract labor.” (Smith, 2002: 435). The likely effect of this is that
value production would be ceased and the process of capital accumulation would be
scarred, if not stalled downright. To avoid such a grim scenario, bridging the urban divide
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“between the rich and poor communities, between the developed and under-developed
urban areas, and between safe and unsafe neighborhoods” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 73) is
necessary for UN agencies. However, I should stress again, the aim here is not
disintegrating the difference between rich and poor, developed and underdeveloped and
safe and unsafe, but to bridge these differences just enough for capitalist urbanism to
operate in a healthy fashion. That is why UN’s slogan is bridging the urban divide, not,
for instance, eradicating the urban divide.

The examples of UN agencies’ peculiar language that reveals a part of their political
agenda could be multiplied. Similar to the urban divide, poverty is discussed in a very
specific language in Urban Forums. One of the most oft-cited global problems of the
urbanized world in UN-HABITAT forums, poverty is almost always discussed through a
market-oriented language of “poverty reduction.” The language of poverty reduction has
been prevalent since the first World Urban Forum and captured in forum reports.

“Economic and social sustainability is simply not possible when a significant
portion of the urban population lives in abject poverty and is socially and
politically excluded. Deliberate policies and action plans for urban poverty
reduction are required, including slum upgrading, skills training, entrepreneurship
development and access to credit and micro-credit” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 35).

A similar emphasis on poor’s participation in poverty reduction programs is also visible
in the 2010 World Urban Forum. For instance, Anders Knape, president of the United
Nations Advisory Committee of Local Authorities, highlights “local governments as key
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partners in implementing Habitat Agenda” of UN-HABITAT and distinguishes “the
poverty reduction and sustainable development efforts of cities” as the most crucial
efforts towards realizing Habitat Agenda (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 51). In short, UN
agencies aim to reduce poverty but do not aim to inhibit the processes that produce
poverty and wealth. Just like the urban divide must be bridged but not ended, poverty
should be reduced, or to name another favorite term, “alleviated,” but not to be ended.11

Likewise, slums are referred in the World Urban Forums as one of the most dramatic side
effects of rapid urbanization, and are often portrayed as among the gravest urban
problems of our time. Most of the reports penned by UN agencies begin with the truism
that “more than half of the world’s population now live in cities,” which is often followed
by “two thirds of the world’s population will live in cities by 2050 and one third of the
urban population will live in slums” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 14, 58; UN-HABITAT,
2011: ix, 5, 12). The solutions that are lauded in UN circles vis-à-vis the “slum problem”
are to “integrate slum areas into the urban fabric” or “upgrading slums” (UN-HABITAT,
2010a: 23).12 Just like bridging the urban divide and reducing poverty do not take issue

For instance, the title of one of the “networking events” reads “Harnessing Urbanization for
Growth and Poverty Alleviation.” This event was organized by World Bank (UN-HABITAT,
2010a: 92).
12
The “Overview of the Forum” presented in the beginning of 2010 forum report, and written by
the Chair of the World Urban Forum reflects this peculiar language of slum upgrading and its
collision with “big business.”
11

“Added to the dynamic mix were the foundations – both large and small – that could not afford to
lose the opportunities offered by the Forum. Big business groups were also present and some of
them are now working with UN-Habitat around the world, promoting the World Urban
Campaign, bringing know-how in disaster relief programmes, and also in water and sanitation
improvements, initiating educational interventions and new ways of bridging the digital divide,
and also financing slum upgrading” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2-3, emphasis added).
Summary of the special sessions, too, emphasizes that “slum upgrading” was one of the important
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with capitalist processes that produce the divide or the social existence of poverty, slum
integration and slum upgrading do not tell us much about the socio-spatial processes that
produce slums at one end of the city, and the gated communities of the rich at the other.
Again, the aim is not putting an end to processes that produce the most extreme examples
of uneven development i.e., slums, but to “upgrade” them with credit and finance.

If we read the emphasis on “bridging the urban divide,” “reducing poverty,” “upgrading
slums” together with UN agencies’ stress on inclusion and participation of the urban
poor, the notion I introduced in chapter I, and attempted to substantiate in chapter II,
namely, “reproductive participation,” gains a new meaning and prominence. There I
argued that “reproductive participation” is not aimed at ensuring urban dwellers’
participation in processes that would transform existing social relations. Reproductive
participation implies a notion of political participation that would, to a large extent,
reproduce—if ameliorate—existing social, political and economic relations in the city.
The crux of the logic that operates in the language of “bridging the urban divide,”
“reducing poverty,” “upgrading slums,” their commonality, so to speak, is the
reproduction of capitalist mode of production in a healthy manner.

Note that the language that gives meaning to the dominant urbanism that emerges out of
World Urban Forum reports points to a focal point, which is concentrated on mitigating
issues discussed.
“During the Brazil World Urban Forum, a number of special sessions were held, on a range of
themes, including rebuilding in Haiti; sanitation, wastewater and solid waste management; the
right to the city; integrated slum upgrading, and others” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 77).
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the worst outcomes of capitalist urbanism. And this focal point is shared both by the
liberal and the neoliberal strands within UN circles. This language also reveals that the
problems defined and solutions presented in these forums remain at the level of surface
appearances. The urban divide, poverty, slum formation are important social problems
but they are only symptoms of deeper underlying processes that hit the surface. In order
to face the root causes of these phenomena one has to critically examine capitalist mode
of production that enables a specific production of urban space that is so uneven that the
UN agencies acknowledge it as “the urban divide.” Beyond looking for ways to mitigate,
minimize or reduce poverty, a more serious critical approach would necessitate defetishizing such concepts of surface appearances, such as “reducing poverty,” or
“upgrading slums,” and instead require scrutinizing capitalist processes that produce
wealth and poverty, rich gated communities as well as poor slums and so on. The World
Urban Forum reports are inundated with discussions that problematize the geographies of
deprivation, be it from capital, credit or basic services, but not a page is allocated in the
reports to the geographies of abundance, because they do not problematize processes but
the symptoms. Without confronting accumulation of capital in fewer hands and
geographical concentration of abundance, it is difficult to confront poverty, slum
formation and uneven geographical development.

Looking at the surface appearance of capitalist symptoms stems, Erik Swyngedouw
argues, from the assumption that takes problems of capitalism, not as repeated symptoms
of capitalist processes, but as side effects that remain external to the normal workings of
capitalist society. “The social and ecological problems caused by modernity/capitalism
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are external side effects,” according to this view, argues Swyngedouw, “they are not an
inherent and integral part of the de-territorialised and re-territorialised relations of global
neo-liberal capitalism.” That is the reason why we speak, he goes on, “of the excluded or
the poor, and not about social power relations that produce wealth and poverty, or
empowerment and disempowerment” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 199).

When the aim is to bridge the urban divide, to reduce poverty and to upgrade slums, the
means to realize these aims put forth in UN-organized Urban Forums often lead to the
market. It is perhaps important to note that the key role attributed to the “private sector”
in bridging the urban divide, upgrading slums and enhancing the right to the city for all is
a persistent theme and a frequent panel subject, not only in 2010 World Urban Forum I
have focused thus far, but also in previous UN-organized urban forums as well. In other
words, the tendency to solve burning urban problems with investment from the private
sector, which is salient in 2010 World Urban Forum report, is neither new nor accidental,
but a persistent one. Let me demonstrate this point with two examples.

In the 2004 World Urban Forum convened in Barcelona, for instance, the panelists argue
in one of the “thematic dialogues” on “Urban Resources,” that “while there is an urgent
need for more international aid targeted at slum upgrading, it is also important to design
innovative strategies to mobilize domestic capital, including strengthening housing and
micro-finance institutions.”13 The important issues the panelists identify in this session

The section of the forum report that summarizes the panel on “Urban Resources” reads as
follows:
13

“Eight prominent professionals from a range of disciplines discussed the challenges of mobilizing
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are “affordability, risk mitigation, mortgage finance systems for the urban poor and how
strategic partnership between the public and private sectors can be built to leverage
private domestic capital for slum upgrading” (UN-HABITAT, 2004: 31).14 Instead of
confronting the “slum problem” as one of capitalist processes that inevitably produce
uneven development (Smith, 1984), which cannot be overcome by “more credit,” the
problem is coined here as one of slum upgrading. Then, it appears that the problem is
lack of resources and what is needed is more international or domestic capital, and credit
for financing the process.

The contribution of private sector and credit institutions in enhancing the right to the city
is underscored in the World Urban Forum in Vancouver 2006 as well. In another
“thematic dialogue,” this time on “Slum Upgrading and Affordable Housing,” some
panelists argue, the report informs us, that “there should be a role for the private sector
and that micro-finance is part of the solution.” Several others note that “the World Bank
should work with communities to ensure that their loans reach the urban poor” (UNHABITAT, 2006: 32). Along similar lines, during another “dialogue” on “Water

resources in developing countries to meet the shelter needs of a rapidly urbanizing world.
Moderator Michael Cohen effectively summarized the discussion as a simple question:
How do we set interest rates in new markets? The answer to this question, he said, requires us to
define the market, identify and calculate risks, assign those risks and identify and valuate
collateral. Collateral includes not only physical assets but also social assets such as ‘peer
pressure’ and organizational and technical resources not captured in current models, as well as
contributions of governments in legitimizing land ownership or providing infrastructure. When
some of these questions are answered, a better understanding will emerge of how and when to
bring the private sector into the market at the earliest possible point” (UN-HABITAT, 2004: 31,
emphasis added).
“The background paper highlighted that the cost of meeting the internationally-agreed target on
improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 is estimated to be in the region of
US$70 billion to US$100 billion.” (UN-HABITAT, 2004: 31).
14
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Sanitation and Sustainable Human Settlements,” the important function of the “private
sector” and “lending agencies” is reemphasized. “The private sector in today’s
globalizing world has a major role to play,” proclaims the report, “in mobilizing
resources and improving delivery. International lending agencies, such as the World
Bank, regional development banks, as well as non-governmental organizations involving
communities at all levels could use” the World Urban Forum “to build a new consensus
on water and sanitation for sustainable human settlements” (UN-HABITAT, 2006: 69).
These arguments and proposals, and their persistence over the years, are telling as they
reflect the strong belief among those who crowd the UN circles in the supposition that no
matter what the inherent dynamic of the problem is—be it water sanitation, affordable
housing, or “slum upgrading,”—the solution lies in the shiny corridors of global financial
institutions.15 Consequently, these manifold urban problems are, essentially, credit
problems. Thus the translation of right to the city into UN’s language becomes very
straightforward and effortless: “Find: use value;” “Replace with: exchange value.” This is
the crux of UN’s appropriation of the right to the city.

One of the “Highlights and Emerging Issues” of the 2006 World Urban Forum is reflected in
the forum report as follows:
15

“Meeting the financing challenge of slum upgrading and sustainable infrastructure
development. The Forum recognized the critical need for increased financial resources to attain
the slum upgrading target of the Millennium Declaration. It further recognized that the challenge
is to shift from relying on international development finance to tapping local capital markets. In
this context, the Forum acknowledged the need for international donors to play a catalytic role in
building the capacity and improving the credit-worthiness of cities, and to package such
assistance with seed capital, as piloted by UN-HABITAT’s Slum Upgrading Facility, in line with
paragraph 56(m) of the 2005 Millennium Summit Outcome which calls for investments in propoor housing and urban infrastructure” (UN-HABITAT, 2006: 6, original bold characters).
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Monopolization of political space: ‘All things urban’
Reviewing the short history of UN-agencies’ engagement with the notion of the right to
the city reveals a certain attempt of these agencies to appropriate and redefine the notion.
UN agencies, in other words, get involved in the ongoing struggle to define what the right
to the city should be about, and what sorts of politics could flow from the concept. As I
have demonstrated, the crux of the notion of the right to the city as framed by Henri
Lefebvre and practiced around the world by grassroots right to the city activists is use
value (chapter I). UN agencies’ move to redefine the concept in exchange value terms
and recast its origins and justification as rooted in the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights could be read as a part of this struggle. However, there is a related yet
deeper process at work here. UN agencies, I want to argue, do not simply attempt to
appropriate the notion of the right to the city—by offering competing definitions of the
concept and alternative urban policies for a liberal capitalist implementation—but attempt
to monopolize what the right to the city politics could be about. It is an attempt to include
and represent alternative forms of right to the city politics, and hence, to keep such
politics under check. The endeavor of forum’s organizers to provide a stage for
marginalized groups and organizations so that the forum could represent all urban
political claims is strategic towards this end and facilitates translating various political
claims that are articulated in manifold ways into right claims. UN agencies can then
absorb these various and heterogeneous political claims into the language of human rights
and make sense of them within the human rights framework.

In this regard, World Urban Forum, established by the UN and organized by UN-
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HABITAT, does not simply serve as a platform for the global elite to discuss urban
issues, the overwhelming elite presence notwithstanding. A specific effort to get various
grassroots organizations—some of which are pretty radical in their political
orientations—actively involved is also quite visible in these forums. Grassroots women
organizations, slum and shack dwellers, youth organizations and various community
activists and groups have been present since the first Urban Forum in Nairobi, in 2002.
For instance, the 2010 forum report proudly announces that the forum is a vehicle
through which the members of the disadvantaged groups could talk to governing elites.

“Indeed, by assuming a more informal nature, the Forum was able to serve as a
vehicle for international conversations and cooperation at every level, and also
across social and economic divides. For example, at networking events and in
other contexts, government ministers from many different countries met to
discuss the problems of a rapidly urbanizing world. They used these meetings to
forge new approaches to North-South, and South-South cooperation. It also
provided a chance for fresh interactions between mayors and Governments.
Furthermore, it was a vehicle through which grassroots women’s groups, youth
or slum dwellers were able to interact with Government representatives, global
parliamentarians and municipal leaders” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 2, emphasis
added).

The effort to include “all stakeholders,” to use UN’s language, is quite visible and
repeatedly expressed in policy documents. Back in 2002, in the inaugural meeting of the
World Urban Forum, for instance, one of the major aims declared at the opening was to
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“promote partnerships between all stakeholders and empower communities to become
equal partners” (UN-HABITAT, 2002b: 13, emphasis added). The widest possible
participation of various groups is key for UN-HABITAT and appears on the official
webpage of the forum as follows:

“The Forum is one of the most open and inclusive gatherings of its kind on the
international stage. It brings together government leaders, ministers, mayors,
diplomats, members of national, regional and international associations of local
governments, non-governmental and community organizations, professionals,
academics, grassroots women's organizations, youth and slum dwellers groups as
partners working for better cities”.16

What is clear in this statement is that UN-HABITAT does not only attempt to ensure the
participation of various actors in the forum, but also takes these actors with asymmetric
powers simply as “partners” working towards fulfilling a common aim. Once cast as
partners, the discursive effect is the erasure of power inequalities and conflicts (both
actual and potential) between actors that are highly different from one another. A head of
state, and a slum dweller, in this scheme, simply become two stakeholders among many,
and both are partners working together for better cities, according to UN-HABITAT. The
language of stakeholdership actually comes from corporate governance literature
(DeKoninck, 2007, Kuymulu, 2011) and its lurking in UN-organized forums on the right
to the city is neither a coincidence, nor without a specific political function. Such
flattening terminologies as stakeholder and partner imply a democratic platform, where
16

http://www.worldurbanforum.org/worldurbanforum/about-world-urban-forum (Accessed 04
February 2013).

117

different groups can express their political agendas and negotiate their differences with
equal power. The hierarchy of protocol in the quoted paragraph above, which lists all
stakeholders as equal partners, nevertheless, starts with “government leaders and
ministers” and ends up with “youth and slum dwellers” at the bottom, only points to the
inherent hierarchy of power among these actors while attempting to cast them as equal
partners.

Even though UN-HABITAT’s self-representation points to an inclusive and democratic
platform, where “every stakeholder”—from “government leaders and ministers” to the
“youth and slum dwellers”—has an equal voice as “equal partners,” the “forum and its
glittering exhibition” remains “the world’s premier cities convention” (UN-HABITAT,
2010a: 2), where the elites and elite interests reign. Despite all the lip service paid to the
presence of grassroots organizations and activists in the 2010 World Urban Forum, I
could only count a few members affiliated with disadvantaged groups among hundreds of
panelists.17

Even though there may be some members of grassroots organizations at the forum, they
are not given their voice to discuss issues that are related to their marginalization. For
17

Arlene Bailey, Founder, Fletchers Land Parenting Association, Member of the Huairou
Commission and GROOTS International (Grassroots Women’s Organizations Operating
Together in Sisterhood);
Fati Alhassan, Director, Grassroots Sisterhood Foundation, Ghana;
Sheila Patel, Chair, Shack/Slum Dwellers International;
Rose Molokoane, Coordinator of the South African Urban Poor Federation and Coordinator of
Slum/Shack Dwellers International.
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instance, notice the full list of panelists and their affiliations participating the roundtable
discussion titled “Indigenous Peoples and Sustainable Urban Development with Culture
and Identity” in 2010 urban forum:
“Celeste McCay, Researcher, Native Women Association, Canada;
Jecinaldo Satere-Mawe, Secretary of State for Indigenous People, Amazon State,
Brazil;
John Gordon, Director, Urban Aborigine Strategy, Indian and Northern Affairs,
Canada;
Jurema de Sousa Machado, UNESCO;
Janeen Comeneot, National Indian Family Coalition, United States;
Liliane Mbela, Member, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous People,
Democratic Republic of the Congo;
Sonia Smallacombe, Secretariat of the United Nations Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Peoples;
Tonya Gonnella Frichner, Member of the United Nations Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Peoples” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 55-56).

The forum report does not give us any information on the number of grassroots activists
and organizations that attend the World Urban Forum, although we are presented with
detailed information on the number of ministers, parliamentarians, mayors and members
of “big business” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 6-8). However, I would argue for taking
seriously UN-HABITAT’s claim of housing grassroots activists and organizations at the
World Urban Forum. I think there is a genuine effort to enhance the political participation
of marginalized groups in the World Urban Forum, but this participation is, by and large,
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directed at social policies for reproducing existing social, political and economic relations
in the city, not transforming them in a meaningful way. UN-HABITAT’s “reproductive
participation” does not allow urban dwellers to discover and determine new needs in a
new city in the course of the political process itself, which is what the “transformative
participation” does. Rather, it invites inhabitants to participate in the existing formal
procedures of urban governance. The UN-HABITAT’s forums do not, in other words
open a path for urban dwellers so that they can devise their own political program,
through which they can discover new needs and new ends, figure out as well new means
to achieve them. Instead, urban inhabitants are incorporated in a “central theme” of the
World Urban Forum that is established by the “UN General Assembly” (UN-HABITAT,
2002a). Also, recall that the themes of discussion sessions are set by UN-HABITAT. Yet,
as Lefebvre reminds us, the right to the city cannot be imposed from top down by capital,
state or experts. Accordingly, the urban politics cannot be stimulated “by authoritarian
means or by administrative prescription, or by the intervention of specialists” (Lefebvre,
1996: 146). Instead he advocates for a right to the city politics, where human needs
would be collectively defined by the inhabitants in the course of their struggle for a new
urban society. Such genuine democratic potential is hardly present in UN-HABITATorganized Urban Forums.

In this light, one may wonder why community activists and organizations participate in
the World Urban Forum. The motivations of grassroots organizations in participating
World Urban Forum are certainly various. While some organizations possibly participate
due to their faith in and high expectations from the UN agenda on the right to the city,
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some others perhaps do so in order to challenge and subvert this very agenda, or to take
advantage of UN’s resources, or still, to build networks and connections with like-minded
organizations that also attend UN-organized forums. It is not my aim, therefore, to
dismiss those who participate in the World Urban Forum as complicit to the UN agenda.
Neither is it my aim to argue that the grassroots organizations that choose to participate in
the World Urban Forum are simply appropriated by the UN agencies. The appropriation I
try to underline in this chapter is not so much directed to the grassroots activists per se, as
to the meaning, content, and transformative political potential of the right to the city
concept itself.

The monopolizing tendency I am trying to describe here is not limited to who participates
in these forums. This monopolization also applies to what is being discussed in the forum
as well, and is best expressed by the UN-HABITAT executive director Dr. Joan Clos,
who argues that “[t]he Forum has become the preeminent conference on all things urban”
(World Urban Forum official webpage, emphasis added).18 From urban infrastructure to
street art, transportation to urban lifestyles, from climate change to rough slums, all
things urban are on forum’s plate. Just like the effort to get “all stakeholders” involved in
World Urban Forums is an expression of the attempt to assimilate and represent each and
every fraction of progressive urban politics behind the banner of the right to the city,
organizing the urban forum ostensibly on “all things urban” signifies an interrelated
tendency to monopolize the urban political field.

18

http://www.worldurbanforum.org/worldurbanforum/about-world-urban-forum (Accessed 04
February
2013),
http://www.randstadnieuws.nl/24-vastgoed/58-stedenbouw-architectuurlandschapsarchitecten/1958-world-urban-forum-sixt-sesssion-napels-/ (Accessed 09 March
2014).
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This resonates with what political theorist Wendy Brown detects with human rights
politics in general. According to her, while human rights activists and organizations often
represent their work as moral and ethical rather than political—such as reducing human
suffering or protecting the powerless individual against the powerful state— human
rights practices and discourses are political as they “organize political space” in a
peculiar way to “preclude” and “negate” other forms of politics and activism. In other
words, the fact that human rights politics occupy the central stage, not simply as an
international justice project but as the progressive international justice project,
simultaneously “displaces, competes with, refuses or rejects other political projects”
(Brown, 2004:453). In short, according to Brown, international human rights activism
tends to monopolize progressive politics by marginalizing other forms of politics that
could not be subsumed under the rubric of human rights.

UN-HABITAT’s deliberate effort to provide a platform for “all stakeholders,” to borrow
its language again, and discuss “all things urban” could be interpreted as part of the same
process that monopolizes the political field, while at the same time delegitimizes and
negates politics in alternative forms. The aforementioned irony of discussing the ways of
creating inclusive cities to bridge the urban divide at the right to the city conference in the
gentrified convention center, while grassroots right to the city activists were peppersprayed by the police right outside the building does, in fact, succinctly capture the
process of subsuming certain kinds of right to the city politics into what is acceptable in
the UN-World, while delegitimizing and outlawing certain other forms.
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UN agencies’ attempt to monopolize the political space of the right to the city still has
another dimension. Just like the UN-organized forums have to represent “all
stakeholders,” from World Bank delegates to slum dwellers, to talk about “all things
urban,” it endorses a right to the city, unsurprisingly, for “everyone.” When we look at
how UN agencies discuss the actual and possible political agents of the right to the city,
and whom this right should cover, we are either presented simply with a list—starting
from the head of state extending to the homeless—or, simply with a vague shorthand
notion: everybody. “Everyone, rich and the poor alike” and “every citizen, even the
poorest,” are the two of the most popular phrases repeatedly used to denote who has a
right to the city. On more than one occasion the aim of the forum is stated as to “develop
a right to the city which includes all” (UN-HABITAT, 2010a: 104). But, one might
wonder, what does it mean to work for the right to the city of everyone, and what are its
implications?

First of all, the slogan of “the right to the city for everyone” appears to be just another
catchphrase for achieving the monopolization of the right to the city politics in the hands
of the UN agencies. It is a part of the same effort to encompass and represent all there
exists about the right to the city by expanding its scope to include everyone. Second, this
slogan neatly overlooks the fact that the process of urbanization and our globalized urban
society are underwritten by all sorts of divisions ridden with deeply entrenched
inequalities of class, race, gender, ethnic/national origin or sexual preference and it is
precisely because of these divisions that the right to the city of everyone could not be
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realized under the present circumstances. As I have discussed earlier, the business
friendly version of the right to the city that is lauded in UN circles rests on translating
Lefebvre’s stress on use value into exchange value terms and postulates the free market
as the legitimate stage for realizing the right to the city. Since, as the historical geography
of capitalism shows us, the capitalist free market relies structurally on the exclusion and
marginalization of those who are not well situated to take advantage of opportunities
along manifold axes of social difference (class, race, gender and so on), free market does
not seem to be the proper stage of realizing the right to the city of everyone, but rather
appears to be a major obstacle to it. As we have seen, since UN agencies’ version of the
right to the city does not seem to be striving towards eradicating the urban divide
between the rich and the poor—but simply advocates the right to the city of “even the
poorest”, or the right to the city of everyone, “rich and poor alike,”—it reproduces the
social divisions that are obstacles to the right to the city of everyone, which might be
realized only in a more egalitarian political economy.

Last but not least, the themes of “the right to the city for everyone” and its kin, “creating
inclusive cities for all” are very troublesome in terms of what “everyone” was supposed
to be included in. Since UN-right to the city is not about use value but exchange value,
the city it cherishes is not an oeuvre but a product. The city in this framework is not
about a collective artwork that embodies use values produced for and by its inhabitants.
The city of UN’s right to the city is, indeed, a space of free market, where, those who are
unable to pay the exchange value of products are inhibited from laying their hands on use
values, even though use values are produced in a collective labor process. The inclusion
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and participation of urban inhabitants in urban governance, heavily promoted by UN
agencies, is thus characterized by “reproductive participation” that aims to enhance the
political participation of urban dwellers in existing procedures of urban administration of
capitalist city.

In this light, the much-celebrated inclusive city appears to be about including everyone,
rich and poor alike, in the market, and at times UN agencies are quite blunt about it. For
instance, the 2010-2011 edition of State of the World’s Cities: Bridging the Urban
Divide, a yearly report on cities prepared and published by UN-HABITAT, allocates the
last of its three parts to “Bridging the Urban Divide,” the first chapter of which is
“Taking forward the right to the city: Urban advantage for all” (UN-HABITAT, 2011:
122-135). The theme of inclusive cities underwrites much of the discussion on the right
to the city in this chapter, which makes a strong argument for “human rights-based urban
policies” to attain such cities. “Short of a human rights-based reform of municipal
policies,” proclaims the report, “the urban divide cannot be bridged and the right to the
city cannot become effective.” (UN-HABITAT, 2011: 133). The chapter does not do a
terribly good job on elaborating what exactly is meant by inclusive cities. It is rather
treated as a self-evident virtue of urban life throughout the text. We are presented with a
glimpse on what constitute such inclusiveness, however, on page 126, which is
completely covered by a single photograph of an evidently very poor man, a beggar
perhaps, sitting in the street in Delhi, India, holding a Pepsi bottle. The one-liner at the
bottom of the photograph brings the point home: “Rights-based urban policies pave the
way for inclusiveness” (UN-HABITAT, 2011: 126).
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Figure 1 “Delhi, India. Rights-based urban policies pave the way for inclusiveness. ©Galina Mikhalishina
/Shutterstock” (UN-HABITAT, 2011: 126).

This lays bare the fact that UN-HABITAT is very serious in its aim of including
everyone, even the poorest, in the city yet in UN-HABITAT’s framework, the city
appears as a space in which one can access the market. Moreover, the fact that a beggar
holding a Pepsi bottle is represented as being included in the city lays bare that the
criteria for urban inclusion is one’s ability to consume. Recall that the 2010 forum report
126

argues that “for the private sector” the right to the city entails “enhancing affordability
and accessibility that could help bridge the divide between the rich and poor
communities, between the developed and under-developed urban areas, and between safe
and unsafe neighborhoods” (2010a: 73). In other words, the UN agencies seem to be
saying that more intensified consumerism is a tool in the fight against socio-economic
and spatial inequality and exclusion. The Pepsi-consuming beggar image seems to make
the same point for UN-HABITAT. Everyone, whose rights would be covered by UNHABITAT’s right to the city framework, is essentially understood and treated as passive
consumers rather than active citizens. Hence, UN-HABITAT’s slogan—the subtitle of
the chapter on the right to the city—“urban advantage for all” takes on its full meaning.
In this light, given the importance attributed to the private sector and the market for
realizing the right to the city within UN circles, 2002 Forum Chair Sankie D. MthembiMahanyele’s characterization of World Urban Forum as “global marketplace of views”
can be understood in quite literal terms.

The monopolization of who attends and what is talked about the right to the city could be
seen as an attempt by the UN agencies to create a global consensus about what the
acceptable form of urban politics is in the globalized world of urbanization. For the UN
agencies, by monopolizing the political space of the right to the city, aim to achieve the
standardization of urban policies at the global scale under the rubric of “best practices,”
which attends to the generalization and expansion of mainstream liberal urban policies
around the globe. It is the role of consensus in the process of such standardization that I
would like to return to now.

127

Monopolization of politics, or consolidation of the postpolitical condition?
In his 2009 article, “The antinomies of the post-political city: In search of a democratic
politics of environmental production,” Erik Swyngedouw examines a set of processes,
which, according to him, gives way to the emergence and consolidation of postpolitical,
postdemocratic condition. Even though Swyngedouw takes his cue mainly from the work
of quite a few highly influential political theorists such as Jacques Rancière, Alain
Badiou, Slavoj Žižek and Chantal Mouffe, here I will confine my discussion to the
arguments of Swyngedouw, who sharply reworks the arguments of these theorists on
postpolitics, while clearly foregrounding the implications of such arguments for the
contemporary neoliberal urbanism (Swyngedouw, 2009; 2010), which is what I am
primarily interested here.

According to Swyngedouw, “the present consensual vision of the urban environment”
points to “a clear and present danger” that “annuls the properly political moment and
contributes to … the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical and postdemocratic
condition” (2009: 601). The contemporary postpolitical urban order has a number of
salient characteristics and Swyngedouw examines them in a highly enlightening and
engaging discussion. One of the defining characteristics of the postpolitical condition for
Swyngedouw is its reconfiguration of “the act of governing to a stakeholder-based
arrangement of governance in which the traditional state forms (national, regional or
local government) partake together with experts, non-governmental organizations and
other ‘responsible’ partners.” Hence, for him, the postpolitical condition embodies “new
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forms of autocratic governance-beyond-the-state” (2009: 608). Postpolitics “rejects
ideological divisions,” according to Swyngedouw, and “insists on the ‘democratic’
inclusion of all” into the present social order, which Swyngedouw identifies as a sign of
“the ‘totalitarian’ temptation of democratic institutions” (2009: 609). This last point is
particularly important for him because the impulse to include everybody—ostensibly
divorced from ideological differences—into the decision making process seems to
remove barriers before the political process, but the effect is indeed quite the opposite.
For Swyngedouw, the “postpolitical condition is one in which a consensus has been built
around the inevitability of neoliberal capitalism as an economic system, parliamentary
democracy as the political ideal, humanitarianism and inclusive cosmopolitanism as a
moral foundation” (2009: 609). Postpolitics is therefore about “the administration
(policing) of environmental, social, economic or other domains and they remain, of
course, fully within the realm of the possible, of existing social relations” (2009: 609).

One of the key axes that Swyngedouw establishes masterfully in his discussion is the one
between the processes that, according to him, give way to a postpolitical and
postdemocratic condition and a certain populist gesture. In other words, the ways in
which “people” are excluded from what Swyngedouw calls politics proper dovetails with
a rampant populism, which is, in principle, underwritten by a people-know-best-politics,
which seems to put the people at the forefront of politics. A postpolitical urban condition
argues that “all people are affected” by the problem at hand therefore “silences
ideological and other constitutive social differences and papers over conflicts of interests
by distilling a common threat” (2009: 611). “The people know best” populism, according
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to Swyngedouw, is “supported by an assumedly neutral scientific technocracy, and
advocates a direct relationship between people and political participation” (2009: 612).
The lurking danger here is that the “actually existing democratic politics is” thus replaced
by “good governance” or “best practices.” For Swyngedouw “the architecture of populist
governing takes the form of stakeholder participation or forms of participatory
governance,” which confirms and functions “under the aegis of a non-disputed liberalcapitalist order” (2009: 612)

Last but not least, for Swyngedouw, populist politics avoid identifying a privileged
subject position or political actor of social change “like the proletariat for Marx, women
for feminists or the ‘creative class’ for competitive capitalism,” but instead appeal to a
common threat, social condition or collective predicament. This requires, for the same
populist tactic, “the need for common humanity-wide action, mutual collaboration and
cooperation.” The fact that postpolitics—in its populist guise—does not recognize any
internal social tensions or ideological differences is quite important here as “the enemy is
always externalized and objectified” (2009: 612). The externalization of the source of the
problem functions to keep the system pure. The solution of the problem can then be
presented as the assimilation of the external problem back into the system. Swyngedouw
nicely captures this when he argues that

[p]opulism’s fundamental fantasy is that of an intruder or, more usually, a group
of intruders, who have corrupted the system. Pollution, ‘environmental
degradation’ or ‘CO2’ stand here as the classic examples of a fetishized and
externalized foe that require dealing with if sustainable urban futures are to be
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attained. Problems, therefore, are not the result of the ‘system’, of unevenly
distributed power relations, of the networks of control and influence, of rampant
injustices and inequalities, of the police order and its non-egalitarian distribution
of functions and places or of a fatal flow inscribed in the system, but are blamed
on an outsider. It is something that does not play its proper part within the
structure (Žižek, 2008: 279). That is why the solution can be found in dealing
with the pathological phenomenon, the resolution for which resides in the system
itself. (Swyngedouw, 2009: 612)

If what Swyngedouw describes here sounds familiar, it should. What he calls “the
consensual vision of the urban environment,” which mobilizes “stakeholder-based
governance” that “denies ideological differences” and “insists on the democratic
inclusion of all” under the guidance of “experts” and other governmental and nongovernmental elites might as well have been written for describing one of the UNorganized World Urban Forums. His stress on “the lack of privileged subject position or
political agent of social change” in discourses on the “postpolitical city” also coincides
well with UN agencies’ attempt to frame the right to the city as the right of monolithic
“everyone,” with no ideological, social and economic divisions. Swyngedouw certainly
does a solid job in analyzing the pitfalls of actually existing global urban governance, in
which the right to the city agenda of UN agencies form an important part, both at the
levels of its ideological production and global implementation. In this vein, following
Swyngedouw, one is tempted to conclude that UN agencies’ business friendly version of
the right to the city, UN-HABITAT’s and other UN agencies’ meetings, conferences and
“business caucuses” and all the rest of it form essential moments of the process that
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opens the path for and consolidates postpolitical, postdemocratic condition. Although
Swyngedouw’s analysis of postpolitical condition, especially his discussion of the
processes that, according to him, lead to postpolitical condition are quite astute and on
target, I have some reservations in following his lead towards identifying these symptoms
as signs of postpolitical postdemocratic urban society.

In a nutshell, I would argue that Swyngedouw and other scholars who argue that we now
live in a postdemocratic and postpolitical era are quite successful in identifying the
symptoms of our current predicament but is not as convincing when they argue that this
leads to a postpolitical condition. In other words, Swyngedouw is quite right in arguing
that techno-managerial elite consensus runs our cities and the paths for realizing popular
grassroots democratic initiatives are increasingly foreclosed. There are certain problems,
however, with naming these symptoms as configurations of postpolitical, postdemocratic
condition.

One of the most obvious problems is that the notions of postpolitical and postdemocratic
imply, despite the rejections of Swyngedouw and other scholars of postpolitical
condition, a political and democratic social order that has once existed and which at one
point lost its “proper” political and democratic character. For instance, “the consolidation
of an urban postpolitical arrangement runs,” Swyngedouw argues, “parallel to the rise of
a neoliberal governmentality that has replaced debate, disagreement and dissensus with a
series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy
metrics and technocratic environmental management” (Swyngedouw, 2009: 604,
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emphasis added). The implication that properly political and democratic urban order once
existed and has been lost is all the more salient when we pay attention to how much space
Swyngedouw allocates to “the disappearance of the political in a postpolitical
arrangement [that] leaves all manner of traces that allow for the resurfacing of the
properly political” (2009: 613-617, emphasis added) in his discussion. Such implicit
historicism towards the postpolitical turn is also visible when Swyngedouw argues that
the “actually existing democratic politics is” thus replaced by “good governance” or “best
practices” (2009: 612).

Moreover, the notion of postpolitical postdemocratic condition inevitably calls for the
notion of “politics proper.” While Swyngedouw and other scholars of postpolitical
condition loosely agree upon a “classical Greek” notion of proper politics as the
“metaphorical universalization of particular demands,” I do not see why liberal democrats
could not define it as a process whereby all stakeholders are included as equals in the
decision making process, which is how hegemonic notion of liberal democracy in the
twenty-first century would define it. A related problem also presents itself: The
discussions on “politics proper” inevitably narrow the scope and frequency of appearance
of “the political.” For Swyngedouw, following Badiou and Ranciere, “the political” is
rare. He writes against 1970s dictum that everything is political. Yet, for Lefebvre, for
instance, the production of space is political all the way down, in which everyday life
occupies an important part. “(Social) space is a (social) product,” Lefebvre’s simple yet
path-breaking assertion in The Production of Space (1991: 26), rests on a notion of
politics that infuses the process of production of space from beginning to the end,
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including the everyday practices through which the space is lived and experienced. As he
argues more clearly for the political character of everyday practices in The Explosion, he
notes: the “dissociation between the political and non-political—both fictitious and real—
is itself political” (1969: 51).

Instead of conceptualizing these processes that Swyngedouw discuses as the
consolidation of postpolitical urban condition, which implies there once was proper
politics that is now lost, I suggest understanding UN agencies’ claim on the meaning and
scope of the right to the city as political attempts by the global capitalist elite to
appropriate and tame the notion of the right to the city. This is the core reason why I have
discussed UN agencies’ claim over the notion of the right to the city as a right to the city
claim. The claim is here plainly political. Grasping and analyzing UN-affiliated and
sponsored urban projects as politics rather than postpolitics is more productive in my
point of view than discussing whether these projects could be seen as a legitimate part of
“politics proper” because doing so then enables us to ask what kind of politics UNurbanism represents, where it is headed (and through what kind of counter-politics it
could be turned around) rather than sweeping heterogeneous set of projects, discourses
and practices under a monolithic social condition that is ostensibly postpolitical and
postdemocratic. If we subscribe to the latter, it seems like there is nothing left to analyze
further. Contemporary elites and their institutions create and consolidate a postpolitical
condition, and that is that. The former path, however, takes the discourses and practices
of UN agencies’ global inclusive urbanism that undergirds its own version of the right to
the city as a conflicting and heterogeneous set of political projects in order to appropriate

134

the radical and transformative version of the right to the city. Once cast as a specific form
of politics, then we are able to ask where this appropriation is headed politically and what
its actual and possible political outcomes might be. In this way, there still exists further
dialogue and discussion as well as for a space for further political activism.

The literature on postpolitical postdemocratic condition, then, ironically gives way to an
unintended effect that it actually powerfully criticizes: foreclosing dialogue and
dissensus. The crux of the problem here is not that a certain kind of urbanism, implicated
in the UN’s version of the right to the city, successfully forecloses political paths or not.
Rather, the problem is the kind of political paths it actually opens, which, as I have
argued, leads to a dead-end for realizing the city as a collective artwork of city’s
inhabitants who produce use values, that also ultimately leads to a drastic reduction of the
city to a space of market. Moreover, as the abundance of the right to the city struggles for
accessing use values that we discussed in chapter I, and the urban uprisings in Turkey
which will be discussed in chapter IV show, the argument for the successful foreclosure
of politics is highly questionable. Politics is constantly regenerated in practices of
grassroots organizing and it may unforeseeably explode at any time as it did in Istanbul
or resurface anywhere in unanticipated milder forms.

This was indeed the case in 2010 World Urban Forum as well. One might argue,
following Swyngedouw, that “the consensual vision of the urban environment,” which
mobilizes “stakeholder-based governance” that “denies ideological differences” and
“insists on the democratic inclusion of all” under the guidance of “experts” and other
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governmental and non-governmental elites in World Urban Forums all lead up to an
attempt to successfully foreclose the politics proper. Yet, despite the efforts of UN
institutions to encompass and represent all there exists with regard to the right to the city
struggles, nevertheless, the grassroots right to the city activists were able to organize an
alternative peoples’ forum adjacent to the World Urban Forum under the name of the
Urban Social Forum. As I mentioned earlier, this was a group of grassroots activists, who
were specifically worried about the appropriation of the right to the city by UN
organizations.

According to the blog of the Urban Social Forum, “[w]hen the UN announced that the
theme of the 5th Session of the World Urban Forum … would be called ‘The Right to the
City’ the first reaction of many intellectuals and social movement members of the
Brazilian Urban Reform Forum was a sense of worry that the UN, in collaboration with
institutions like the World Bank and business interests, would co-opt the term and change
its definition, depoliticizing the concept.”19 Therefore, both in order to keep the UNorganized forum in check, and to organize their own version of the forum on the right to
the city, the activists organized the Urban Social Forum with support and sponsorships
from the Brazilian labor unions such as the Brazilian Industrial Federation and Brazilian
Federal Petroleum Workers Union. The topics covered in both forums were similar,
reports Peter Marcuse, who participated both events. According to him, there were
lengthy discussions on poverty and inequality in both forums but the ways in which they
were addressed, their ideological content, and the range of alternative solutions to these
problems were radically different. One of the most notable ideological differences
19

http://usf2010.wordpress.com/ (Accessed 07 August 2014).
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between the two forums, argues Marcuse, that the “desirability/inevitability of capitalism
was a foundational belief at the World Urban Forum” whereas it was not the case at the
Urban Social Forum (Marcuse, 2010b). A similar divide existed on the issue of the right
to the city too. Whereas the right to the city mostly meant “a laundry list of goals to be
achieved with better designed, planned, managed cities” in the UN-organized forum, “its
content was much more radical—a demand for an alternative organization of the city” in
the Urban Social Forum (Marcuse, 2010b).

I think the intervention of grassroots activists is important for our discussion because it
points to an always potentially existing possibility that no matter how powerful and elite
sponsored political projects may be, there are possibilities for contestation. According to
an activist account, in one of the sessions at the World Urban Forum, for instance, an
activist commented how important it is for everyone “to remember that the Right to the
City is a concept that has been developing over the course of 40 years and it is a political
concept. After all of this struggle,” activist went on “we can’t let it be redefined in a
technocratic manner that depoliticizes its central message.”20 Although what went on in
the World Urban Forum most of the time might look like a postpolitical social situation,
taking grassroots resistance and contestation into account suggests that the urbanism that
emerges out of UN-sponsored meetings and documents are indeed political projects that
can be resisted and contested, rather than successful attempts to “foreclose the politics
proper.” Taking the contestation at the World Urban Forum by the Social Forum into
account also reminds us David Harvey’s point when he argues that the right to the city is
nothing but “an empty signifier” and everything depends on “who gets to fill it with
20

http://usf2010.wordpress.com/ (Accessed 07 August 2014).

137

meaning.” In other words what the right to the city should be about “is itself an object of
struggle and that struggle has to proceed concomitantly with the struggle to materialize
it” (Harvey, 2012: xv).

I think the literature on the postpolitical urban condition cannot sufficiently address the
significance of such a double-edge struggle, neither do the more recent critiques of the
notion of the right to the city. Andy Merrifield, for one, argues that “the city” of the right
to the city does not necessarily present a well-defined object of struggle anymore because
the urban process went global as “it is now energized by finance capital” (Merrifield,
2011: 476). “Right to what city,” he asks and argues that since urban territoriality is so
“formless and expansive” and “so global in its reach” there is little political purchase in
framing political struggles around “something urban” (Merrifield, 2011: 475). Instead of
making “facile, abstract right claims for something that’s now redundant in an age when
planetary urbanization has become another circuit of capital,” he concludes, we should
“ditch” the concept, “abandon it, give it up to the enemy,” especially in the light of
“recent bourgeois reappropriation” (Merrifield, 2011: 473). Brenner and Wachsmuth
agree with Merrifield by putting forth similar reasons and also propose to “retreat from
the right to the city altogether” (Brenner and Wachsmuth, 2014: 201).

There is a series of problems with such propositions and it is not because the right to the
city is a perfect theoretical tool and an unchallengeable tenet for organizing urban
struggles. First of all, Merrifield’s argument is that the urban process is now global
because it is energized by finance capital does not necessarily point to a new process.
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Harvey, for one, examines the ways in which the attempts to solve capital’s realization
problem historically have had to devise new financial instruments to revolutionize
urbanization at larger geographical scales. He convincingly discusses how the urban
transformation in Haussmann’s Paris and Moses’ New York required in each case further
financialization of urban processes (Harvey, 2012: 7-11).

Moreover, even if the financialization of urbanization and larger urban processes has very
recently gone global, this would be a reason to think further about the right to the city,
not to ditch it, especially if we agree with Harvey that the right to the city struggles
should primarily be about command over the whole urban process. If a social process that
is rightly an object of political struggle is now global, why ditch a tool for organizing
political struggles around it. The argument that we should give the right to the city up to
the enemy, because there have been attempts by multinational companies and UN
institutions to “co-opt” it, as put forth by Merrifield, shares a similar problem. The
attempts to co-opt the right to the city may very well be due to its transformative political
potential, and in this sense Harvey’s argument about the importance of waging a political
struggle over the content and definition of the concept seems to me all the more
important. Finally, as the example of urban justice activists who organized the Urban
Social Forum in response to World Urban Forum’s appropriation attempt should remind
us, such grassroots attempts to contest elite projects and fight back co-option may be a lot
more productive than simply giving it up to the enemy, which would indeed replicate the
problem we identified with the literature on postpolitical condition: foreclosing dialogue
and dissensus. Once we ditch the concept, there is not much left to talk about and analyze
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politically about the right to the city just like sweeping heterogeneous set of political
projects embedded in UN’s version of the right to the city under a monolithic
postpolitical condition forecloses further dialogue on the issue.

Regardless of whether one calls the dominant urbanism that comes out of UN agencies’
reframing of the right to the city as postpolitical or not, the right to the city claim made
by the UN agencies has immense political implications. UN agencies, both in their liberal
and neoliberal guises, engage with the notion of the right to the city because they
genuinely worry about the sustainability of globalized urbanization, and the hegemonic
neoliberal urbanism that underwrites it. Therefore, the right to the city claim made by UN
agencies attempt to contest and ameliorate hegemonic neoliberal urbanism. Their attempt
falls short, however, because they trip on their own contradictions.

In the heart of UN agencies’ contradictions lies the belief shared by most of its political
agents that free market is a legitimate venue to solve world’s urban problems because
capitalism is somewhat inevitable. As I argued at the beginning, although there are
people who contest this fundamental belief within UN circles, their voice is marginal and
their presence is minor. Once the free market is cast as the legitimate ground to solve the
problems of the urbanized world, other contradictions follow. I think the UN agencies are
impressed by the democratic potential implied in the notion of the right to the city, yet
since they rarely think outside the market, Lefebvre’s emphasis of use value gets
translated into exchange value terms. UN agencies might be worried about the
exclusionary mechanisms of neoliberal urbanism, yet they attempt to include those who
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are excluded by promoting “reproductive participation” of urban dwellers into already-set
elite interests, which inevitably dominates UN agencies and their forums.

One is not qualified to comment on the “motivations” of political agents but only on
practices. As Talal Asad (2007) argues, motivations of political agents are obscure,
complicated and difficult to pin down. I do not know whether the political agents that
instigated the interest of UN agencies’ in the right to the city did so with the intention of
appropriating the notion from the beginning to tame its actual and potential radicalism.
But following their practices leads me to conclude that appropriation of the right to the
city, intended or not, is the end product of UN agencies’ right to the city claim.

141

CHAPTER IV

FROM “URBAN DEVELOPMENT” TO URBAN UPRISING AND BACK
AGAIN: GEZI PROTESTS AMID “ECONOMIC GROWTH”

Introduction
This chapter examines the right to the city claim that arose out of June 2013 urban
uprising in Turkey, which was not made as part of a planned political project designed
and organized in advance by specific agents and organizations. Instead, it emerged
spontaneously out of a relatively small struggle to fulfill the rather limited political aim of
stalling the construction of a shopping mall in a small park’s stead in Istanbul and
evolved into a significant claim over the city with the participation of millions of ordinary
citizens as the struggle burst into a countrywide uprising in the space of three days. Such
an irruption, as Lefebvre would have it, is rarely foreseen or calculated. Writing during
the French upheaval of 1968, he argues that “[e]vents belie forecasts; to the extent that
events are historic, they upset calculations” (1969: 7). Such explosive events as the
French upheaval and the uprising in Turkey show that “a (contesting) practice, which
upsets established separations and hierarchizations opens the way for analysis”
(Lefebvre, 1969: 102).

By analyzing the right to the city claim mobilized in Turkey during and after the uprising,
I want to make an argument about the dialectics within the process of claim-making over
the city, between spontaneous appropriation of urban space and assertion of the right to

142

centrality on the one hand, and long term political organizing on the other. The dialectics
I am talking about here are not given; rather, they must be established through political
practice and organizing. In a nutshell, I argue that the two sides of the dialectics do not
present a choice to be made for those who want to make a transformative right to the city
claim. A successful right to the city claim should mobilize both sides of the opposition
and keep the dialectical tension between the two alive during the claim making. More
specifically, the urban uprising following Gezi Park protests in Turkey shows, I argue,
unless successful appropriation (in consumption) of urban space is accompanied and
followed by political organizing towards more durable organizational forms, the radical
transformative potential that is glimpsed as a possibility during the appropriation of urban
space can hardly be realized.

The conflict between an alternative urbanism that privileges use value and the actually
existing urbanism that privileges exchange value runs through this chapter, as it did in the
previous one. The dialectical opposition between a sort of political participation into
existing order of things (reproductive participation) and a kind of political participation in
the processes that would lead to alternative social forms (transformative participation) is
another important theme of the chapter. Finally, since the uprising that was inflamed in
Istanbul and caught fire across the urban Turkey was significantly about “taking space,”
the dialectical opposition between “appropriation in consumption” and “appropriation in
production” is another nodal point of exploration in this chapter.
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The June 2013 uprising in urban Turkey, the central argument of this chapter goes, comes
closest in spirit and in action to the total transformation Henri Lefebvre was implying
when he formulated the notion of the right to the city. However, this right to the city
claim that flowed out of the uprising goes beyond Lefebvre’s version of the right to the
city as it was not simply about the politics of use value against exchange value. That is to
say, this claim represented a possibility that was implied but not realized in Lefebvre’s
formulation. The right to the city claim of the uprising and the novel social, economic
and political experiment that unfolded in public parks of urban Turkey embodies the
seeds of a politics of value, that is, a politics of establishing the critical nexus between
use value and value, by appropriating space in production through autonomous channels
of transformative participation. A successful politics of value would give way to a
different mode of production and certainly the right to the city claim encapsulated in the
urban uprising of Turkey did not do this. However, I think such a politics was glimpsed
as a possibility during and in the immediate aftermath of the uprising.

The spark that drew Istanbul into a fire of protest and uprising was initially set off by a
modest ‘occupy style’ peaceful resistance, staged against the planned destruction of a
historical public park, an urban commons, in order to make way for a shopping mall in
Istanbul. Following heavy police violence against the protestors, who were described by
the government as being a little more than a few looters and extremists, the urban centers
of Turkey saw a full-fledged uprising. Following the path of this social mobilization
flowing from Gezi Park to larger geographical scales of the neighborhood, the urban, the
national, and beyond, the first part of this chapter analyzes the expanding political
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geography of the uprising, and makes a case for the effectiveness and significance of
politics of scale for claiming the right to the city.

The second part of the chapter takes a step back and examines the growth-based political
economy of Turkey in the last decade, which, as I shall argue, has been primarily based
on privatization, urban development and production of space. Although there is
considerable involvement of the state, both local and national, in the ways in which urban
political economy takes shape in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul, I show that the
hegemonic urbanism in Turkey is predominantly neoliberal. As I will explain in a greater
detail shortly, the neoliberal urbanism that has been slouching toward birth in Turkey
since the 1980s was a “class project” from the beginning, the central aim of which has
been the transfer of accumulated value from the public to the private. Both privatization
and urban development have been important strategies to accomplish this and state’s
involvement in these processes was confined to act as an intermediary in the value
transfer. Trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s and its effect on the dominantly rural
society led simultaneously to the impoverishment of the rural and the growth of the urban
population. Concomitant flexiblization of urban labor markets, wage repression, and
weakened social provision and welfare have led to the urbanization of poverty in Turkey.
This gave way to a very diverse, albeit mostly localized resistance and dissident politics
that eventually exploded at the urban centers of Turkey during the June 2013 uprising.

Having discussed the expanding political geography of the uprising and the political
economy that set the stage for it, finally, the third part of the chapter focuses on novel
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forms of political activism that sprung from Gezi Park and spread across the urban
Turkey like the uprising itself. Neighborhood assemblies, or as the people call them, park
forums, were unprecedented both in terms of the political form they have taken, and the
degree of popular participation in them. Forums provided the people with a new space of
political engagement outside the familiar venues such as political parties and NGOs. I
shall argue that park forums embody a desire for direct democracy, for enacting new
solidarities, and provided people spaces to practice and experiment politics rather than
simply talking about it. But above all, park forums represent a popular will to redefine
what living together in the city means, the meaning of the collectivity and solidarity; they
represent an attempt by the people to redefine what is “socially necessary”—implicated
in the concept of value—outside of the neoliberal imposition, that is, individual selfinterest, market hegemony and commodification of life in its every aspect.

PART I
The spark
It was almost midnight on 27 May 2013 when bulldozers entered Gezi Park, without any
warning, and it turns out, without any legal permission to take down the trees. The
demolition of Gezi Park was to make way for a shopping mall in central Istanbul, which
was to be placed in a replica of a nineteenth century Ottoman military barracks (Topcu
Kislasi).21 In response to bulldozers’ incursion, activists quickly organized and called
more people using social media (primarily through Twitter) to the park in order to stop
the bulldozers from uprooting the trees. One of the first messages tweeted from Gezi Park

21

This shopping mall was going to be the 94th shopping mall in Istanbul, which ranks fifth in the
world in terms of the number of shopping malls a city houses. (Turhan, 2013).
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right after midnight shows how small the number of activists was on that first night: “We
are 25 people still waiting in Gezi Park, and we will stand guard until the morning”
tweeted Ahmed Saymadi, now a well-known member of Taksim Solidarity Platform
(Taksim Dayanismasi), which was founded the previous year to forestall the
redevelopment of Taksim.22

Setting up tents and standing guard all night long, the primary aim of activists was to
prevent another bulldozer incursion into the park. And they succeeded. Adjacent to
Taksim Square, the centrality and public visibility of the park—as well as the additional
organizing efforts of the activists through social media—brought about a hundred more
people to the park the next morning, on 28 May (Ince, 2013). While the atmosphere in
the park was turning festive by the minute, the activists saw more bulldozers coming
towards the park, this time accompanied by a heavier police force in riot gear. This attack
was stopped, to a large extent, by Sirri Sureyya Onder, a Member of National Parliament
(MP) from the leftist pro-Kurdish movement “Peace and Democracy Party” (Baris ve
Demokrasi Partisi, hereafter BDP, its Turkish acronym). If he were not there, the
resistance of about a hundred people notwithstanding, the police would not have hesitated
to use force to get the limited number of people out of the park to enable bulldozers.

Having stood between the bulldozer and the trees, and shouted “we will not let you sell
the shadow of these trees where poor people rest everyday for free,” MP Onder did not
only stop the destruction of trees that noon but immediately became one of the symbols
of resistance. Against the police and municipal officials who hesitated to employ physical
22
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violence on an elected MP—for he has parliamentary immunity—but who still verbally
challenged the MP in terms of jurisdiction, MP Onder emphasized that he was elected
from that district and he was a representative of the people as well as the trees. Having
stopped the initial attack MP Onder tweeted: “I am in Gezi Park. Supporters of the right
to breathe, get here!” This message brought many other people to the park.

Still, the number of people who were organizing and participating in the park resistance
did not exceed a few hundred by the second day. Although minuscule when compared to
the number of people that were to come to Gezi Park in the next few days, the
Islamist/neoliberal “Justice and Development Party” (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi,
hereafter AKP, its Turkish acronym) that has been in government since 2002, already felt
threatened and triggered the police. The police entered the park as the night fell and fired
teargas and pepper-sprayed protestors in order to disperse the crowd and to break the
resistance. But activists hung on to their park.

As the news spread through social media about the police intervention and the resistance
to it, more people came to the park on 29 May, the third day of resistance. What these
newcomers saw in the park was not only a growing number of people but also a growing
degree of police brutality. The now usual cycle went on all along that day: People
gathered in the park, police fired tear gas, people ran away, and when the teargas clouds
cleared, protestors came back, chanted and danced in joy only to be tear-gassed again. On
top of growing police brutality, what increased the number of protestors were the
comments of Prime Minister (PM) Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On that same day Erdogan
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made his first public statement on the national TV since the beginning of the protests, and
called the protestors “just a few looters”23 and extremists, who did not want Turkey to
develop and get richer. Addressing the protestors directly he said, “We’ve already made
up our mind about Gezi Park. We’re going to demolish the park no matter what. Protest
all you want—we won’t stop the demolition” (Turkmen, 2013).

Figure 2 Protestors set up tents where bulldozers previously entered the park to block the next attempt. Image
by Nazim Serhat Firat.
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The exact Turkish word Erdogan used was capulcu, literally looter or vandal. In Turkey,
capulcu has a direct class connotation as well, which roughly means “underclass” or “very poor
person.” Ironically, PM Erdogan’s intended insult was quickly appropriated by the protestors,
who immediately called themselves Capulcular (Looters/poor people). Moreover, the protestors
even invented a new concept called “chapulling” that is its English transfiguration into verb form,
which now means to protest or to be recalcitrant.
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As this confrontational tone escalated the tension across the country, the number of
protestors grew into a thousand by the end of the night. Now the park was completely
appropriated and covered with tents to stand guard.

So, in the first three days, the primary aim of activists camping at the park was to prevent
the destruction of an urban commons for the construction of a shopping mall. In other
words, early on, the resistance was organized against an urbanism that puts the exchange
value interests of capital over the use value interests of ordinary inhabitants of Istanbul.
As Lefebvre would have it, at that specific point in time in Istanbul the “capitalist
strategy of privileging exchange value over use value” required “producing and
controlling urban space in a way that necessarily” overwhelmed, “the ‘user,’ the
‘participant,’ the simple ‘inhabitant’” who relied on use values embedded in the city
(Lefebvre, 2003: 156, see chapter II).

However, it is worth noting that during the first three days of Gezi Park resistance the
crowd was not simply made up of “the user, the participant” or the ordinary inhabitants of
Istanbul. Although many people crowded the park during the day, it was the nighttime
when police and bulldozer attack was most imminent, and by then, the protestors were
mostly composed of the “usual suspects” of Turkey’s recent street politics. Leftists,
students, artists, environmental activists, and LGBTQ groups were joined by the antigentrification activists who had long been active around the Taksim area, where Gezi
Park is situated.
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Despite the heterogeneity and diversity of the limited number of people and groups, or
maybe just because of it, a right to the city agenda was fairly easy to identify. The sole
aim of this heterogeneous group was to defend the last public park left in central Istanbul,
also literally the last venue in the city center to spend time without spending money. Yet,
most of them had been involved in such political activism in the larger Taksim area and
in adjacent Beyoglu neighborhood—where gentrification has been rampant in the past
few years—to know well that this was not an isolated attack. A similar crowd had been
fighting against a neoliberal urbanism that used gentrification almost as a weapon against
the “unwanted groups” such as Roma people in Sulukule and Kurdish migrants in
Tarlabasi and displaced them to make way for five star hotels and upscale residential
buildings. The same urbanism that removed dive bars and cafes along with their tables
and chairs in the street, to clear and purify the streets for a touristic shopping experience
without obstacles also led to a closedown of a century-old historical cafeteria, and a
movie theatre (Emek Sinemasi), both of which have been invaluable in public memory of
countless people across class, to make way for another shopping mall.

It is not a coincidence, therefore, that one of the most influential political agents of the
Gezi Park resistance, the “Taksim Solidarity Platform” was founded the previous year
with the participation of 128 groups, involving civil society organizations, trade unions,
labor unions, and several oppositional political parties. The platform had been organizing
hard and had already been gaining steam when the Gezi resistance began. Similarly, a
smaller but influential group, “Our Commons” (Mustereklerimiz), was founded to “stop
the requalification of Taksim Square” and other gentrification processes going on around
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Beyoglu district in February 2013, a few months before the Gezi resistance began
(Mustereklerimiz, 2013).

Figure 3 Demolition of the historic movie theatre, Emek Sinemasi, faced a huge resistance from the people, who
were watered and tear-gassed by the police throughout last year. "Emek" was finally demolished just a week
before Bulldozers entered Gezi Park. This photograph was taken by Nazim Serhat Firat, during one the protests
right before Gezi resistance.

Thanks to the organizing efforts of such groups that have been fighting against urban
redevelopment and gentrification in and around Beyoglu and Taksim, most of the early
participants of Gezi resistance did not perceive the attempt to destroy Gezi Park as an
isolated incident, but saw it as part of an urbanism that targeted any space that did not
yield profit. This relational understanding was audible in their chants—especially when
the tension with the police escalated—such as “The park is ours, the city is ours” and on
the huge banner, hung between the trees in the park that read, “Don’t touch my tree.
Don’t touch my park. Don’t touch my city!” Another banner in the park was as
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forthcoming: “End the urban plunder! Capital be gone, Istanbul is ours.” This classed
language, which denotes Capital as the source of the problem, implies that the activists in
the park understood their struggle to be a fight for a right to the city as encapsulated in
Lefebvre’s formulation.

Figure 4 The graffiti reads "Claim your right to the city..." The photograph was taken by Esen Kara a few
streets away from Taksim Square on 1 June 2013, the day Taksim Square was claimed by the protestors.
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Figure 5 Festive environment in Gezi Park. The banner reads, "End the urban plunder! Capital be gone,
Istanbul is ours" Image by Nazim Serhat Firat.

However urban its agenda was, initially, the resistance was confined to the scale of Gezi
Park, which did not automatically express itself at the urban scale of Istanbul. But,
opportunities for jumping scale to stage a wider resistance were already in place. For one,
the destruction of Gezi Park was never presented as an isolated project by the AKP
government. In fact, destroying Gezi Park for a shopping mall-cum-military barracks was
packaged as part of a larger project of “urban transformation”—AKP’s euphemism for
gentrification and redevelopment of urban land—which aimed to radically transform one
of the most iconic urban centers in Turkey: Taksim Square. Euphemistically called the
“Pedestrianization of Taksim Project,” it aimed to transfer the vehicle traffic
underground, while apparently opening the whole square for the use of pedestrians. What
this project intended to do, however, was to raze Taksim Square and erase the public
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memory encapsulated in it.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Taksim Square for the peoples of Turkey.
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Beyoglu, the neighborhood surrounding
Taksim Square, was the “western” face of the Ottoman Empire and later of Turkey. The
density of Beyoglu’s non-Muslim population, its lifestyle, cafeterias, meyhanes (literally,
drinking-houses), architecture, and the vibe of larger urban life have been unique in
Turkey. Since the founding of the new republic in 1923, Beyoglu and Taksim Square
have always been the spatial center of Turkey’s secularization and modernization and
reflected spatial practices that were inscribed in material space. In other words, Beyoglu
and Taksim Square as the primary center of Istanbul have been entangled in the “regime
question” in Turkey from the beginning.

For instance, Topcu Kislasi, the 19th Century Military Barracks, which the AKP
government wants to revive by building its replica was razed by the new secular republic
in 1940 as part of the urban planning efforts to render the space “more European and
modern.” Moreover, Topcu Kislasi had allegedly become the epicenter of conservative
and fundamentalist Islamic political activities, which the new republic had little tolerance
for. In its stead, was built the Gezi Park. Efforts to rebuild Topcu Kislasi, then, should be
placed within the political question of which political side gets to inscribe its ideology in
the spatial center of urban Turkey as well as within the contemporary economic question
of who gets to extract the profit therein. It is the zeitgeist of the neoliberal order that such
a political battle over the production of space can only express itself in so far as it yields
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profit. It is ironic as well as very telling that the replica of Topcu Kislasi is planned as a
shopping mall, “the spatial incarnation of neoliberal order” (Altinors, 2013).

Since urban space is such a primary battleground of political struggles, plans to build a
replica of 19th Century Ottoman military barracks in Gezi Park’s stead, along with an
over-sized mosque (100 meters from the park) on the location of the biggest cultural and
art center in Beyoglu—both of which were part of the “pedestrianization project,”—
instigated a strong reaction among many groups. On top of its aforementioned symbolic
and material significance, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when leftist political activism
was considerably vibrant, Taksim Square represented labor movement’s “right to
centrality,” as Lefebvre would have it. On many special occasions, Taksim Square was
the central space over which class war was waged with the police, in quite literal terms:
the long state tradition in Turkey to close Taksim Square on May Days and labor
movement’s struggle to enter the square by pushing through the police blockade. This
specific form of class struggle has always been a struggle over space in Turkey.

One such occasion that expresses the symbolic value of Taksim Square for the leftist
movement in Turkey is “Bloody May Day.” At the height of its power, the largest worker
union Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (Turkiye Devrimci Isci Sendikalari
Konfederasyonu, DISK) gathered 500,000 people at Taksim Square on 1 May 1977.
While the general atmosphere was festive at the beginning, all of a sudden unidentified
individuals fired machine guns from the rooftops of multiple high buildings over the
crowd. The ensuing panic along with bullets killed 34 people that day, which led the
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government at the time to introduce a ban on Taksim Square for political demonstrations.
The identities of those who opened fire on the crowd are still unknown, but the fact that
the state has never done anything to identify them gives one a clue. Unfortunately,
“Bloody May Day” is among the many incidents in the long bloody history of struggle
between the state security forces and Turkey’s working classes (Celik, 2013). It is for this
reason that, to this day including the May Day demonstration of 2013 (a month before the
uprising), Taksim Square has always been a battle ground between the leftist groups and
the police forces. Much of the time, this “battle” has been quite literal. It is also
noteworthy that the symbolic and material significance of Taksim Square is not limited to
the labor movement in the classical sense of the term and relevant to many others such as
the LGBTQ groups, which brought together approximately 100,000 people at the square
during the Gay Pride day of 2013. Organized for the first time in Istanbul’s Taksim
Square in 2003 with the participation of merely 30 people, the scale of the Gay Pride
March grew exponentially over the years, reaching to 10,000 in 2011.24 This is
significant—apart from indicating the expanding success and level of LGBTQ
organizing—because it represents the political centrality of Taksim Square as well as the
Square’s significance for political groups to claim their “right to centrality.” It is due to
the centrality of Taksim Square for various political groups’ assertion of the right to
centrality, the so-called pedestrianization project was designed to rebuild the square in
such a way to facilitate the control of its entry points, so that it is much easier to fend off
political demonstrations. What this project exposes is the fact that neoliberal production
of space in Istanbul aims to determine both the material qualities of the area as well as
what specific activities should take place in there. It is welcome to walk in pedestrianized
24

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Istanbul_Pride
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Taksim for shopping. It is not welcome to walk there in a demonstration.

Because of the political and symbolic significance of Taksim Square and surrounding
Beyoglu area for a wide range of people, the urban redevelopment project that aims for a
wholesale transformation of such a central public space has led to a strong opposition.
Yet, it is important to remember that the plan to transform Taksim and surrounding
Beyoglu is only a part of AKP’s generalized strategy of urban redevelopment across
urban Turkey. Although I will examine this issue in the second part of this chapter, at this
point it is important to note that the AKP government passed legislation in October 2012
(Karajeski, 2012), allegedly for disaster preparation, which enabled the government to
demolish and rebuild legally any building at risk in the event of an earthquake—which
covers an overwhelming segment of urban Turkey—rendering the whole country legally
ripe for redevelopment and gentrification.25

“Everywhere is Taksim, resistance everywhere!”
If a specific regime of capital accumulation through real estate construction and
gentrification that is hegemonic at the urban and national scales enabled the struggle for
Gezi Park to jump scales more easily to the urban and the national, it still received a great
deal of help from the authoritarian reflexes of the AKP government and the police
brutality it inflicted on people. After successfully defending the park for two days and
three nights, the activists were woken up at five in the morning on 30 May 2013, by what
the Istanbul police called “operation dawn,” which saw the police raiding the park with
25

There are surely economic barriers to such a generalized gentrification across the urban Turkey,
although the AKP rendered the legal barriers before it irrelevant. I will also examine this point
more deeply in part II of this chapter.
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tear gas bombs and water cannons, burning protestors’ tents and other personal property
on the way. This was the most brutal police attack that the activists had experienced until
that point, which consequently injured scores of people. Here, the problem was not the
fact that the police used “disproportionate force” in the park, as many liberal
commentators argued. The problem was police used force against the protestors, and
raided the park “at dawn” as if the protestors were dangerous enemy combatants. After
all the protestors had just been sitting for three days in a public park, where everybody
has a right to be at any given time of the day, according to the Turkish law.

The so-called “operation dawn” was the breaking point for the protests. In all probability,
the AKP government and its police thought this heavy-fisted intervention was enough to
disperse the resistance in the park for good. Although the protestors had prioritized the
defense of Gezi Park against bulldozers the first three days, they were forced to flee the
park and regroup at adjacent Taksim Square, turning into a spontaneous demonstration.
In the span of a few hours, an exceptional act of collective mobilization gathered several
tens of thousand of people at Taksim Square (estimates range to a few hundred
thousand). This civic mobilization was almost exclusively organized through social
media, while mainstream media was cooperating fully with the AKP government and
imposing a media blackout of the event.

What ensued was nothing short of a war over space. The riot police used every violent
means—from chemically enhanced water cannons to “sound bombs;” from beating
unarmed people with batons to close-range shots of tear gas canisters and plastic
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bullets—to push demonstrators from Taksim Square. However, tens of thousands of
people flocked the streets not only in Taksim Square, but also in other public spaces in
Istanbul and soon spontaneous solidarity demonstrations were held in other cities, leading
to a full-on uprising across the urban Turkey. The famous slogan of the uprising started to
echo in every city center: “Everywhere is Taksim, resistance everywhere!” Pandora’s
Box was now open.

As the Minister of Interior Muammer Guler announced in retrospect on 15 November
2013 in front of the cameras, there were protests in 80 out of 81 cities of Turkey, and
according to the estimate of the Ministry, two and a half million people took it to the
streets in early June alone when the protests irrupted into an uprising. Although no one
really knows how the Ministry of Interior counts from one protest to another, the Minister
announced that there were 5,532 demonstrations after Gezi Park was raided at dawn on
30 May (Today’s Zaman, 2013). What the Minister Guler did not announce that day was
the human cost of the police brutality the Ministry of Interior inflicted on “two and a half
million people” on the streets. According to the report published by Turkish Medical
Association (2013), entitled “Health Status of the Demonstrators,” the number of injured
people who went to state hospitals, private hospitals, and other medical centers as well as
those who were treated at the makeshift infirmaries in the streets was 8,163. The report
notes that this figure does not cover the injured people who were too afraid to seek
medical help as the police reportedly made many arrests in the hospitals. Among the
8,163 injured, 106 people were brought in with a serious head trauma. Most of them were
hit by a tear gas canister shot directly into the crowd by the police. According to the same
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report, the number of people in intensive care was 63. Eleven people lost an eye due to
plastic bullets. A 14-year-old kid, Berkin Elvan, who was shot from a close range by a
tear gas canister on the head on 15 June, and having stayed in a coma for 269 days died
on 11 March 2014. Seven men were killed in total, all between the ages of 14 and 27.

Such was the scale of state violence.

Once this violence started to take its toll on people, it became much harder to remember
that the initial resistance organized at Gezi Park had a clear urban agenda to claim the
right to the city of ordinary urbanites who rely on use value in the city and to place it over
the right to the city of capitalists, developers and their allies in the state who recast the
city as a locus of exchange value and capital accumulation. Contemporary urbanism,
which privileges the healthy accumulation of capital over the health of people, was in fact
recognized for what it was by the protestors at Gezi Park, who kept chanting “Sermaye
defol, Gezi Parki bizimdir” (“Capital be gone, Gezi Park is ours’”).

As the resistance to the actions of the AKP government and the violence it inflicted on
people jumped from Gezi Park to the urban and national scales, its primary political focus
shifted from a clear right to the city agenda to civil rights and individual and collective
freedoms. The “regime question” suddenly appeared at the heart of the nationalization of
the uprising. Once seen as a democratizing force by a considerable segment of people in
the early years of its government—primarily due to the challenge it posed to the
established forces of the state, such as the military and state bureaucracy, the AKP
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government have been increasingly perceived as a repressive force, which have not
hesitated to use violent means on the people.

This created a growing resentment as the scale of violence and the death toll increased
during the uprising. The largest demonstrations were organized to condemn each murder
and to commemorate the lost ones. In spite of the thick teargas cloud covering much of
urban Turkey, this much was clear enough to see. If the AKP government had not
ordered its police to violently crackdown on peaceful protests at Gezi Park and had
instead withdrawn its project of demolishing Gezi Park, the massive mobilization itself,
which turned a small-scale peaceful resistance into full-blown urban uprisings across
Turkey in the space of three days, would probably not have taken place. Nevertheless,
neither the police nor the AKP government was willing to compromise. With solidarity
movements spreading both in and out of Turkey, the mobilization quickly came to
embody every grievance people had against the AKP government and its increasingly
defiant and authoritarian political regime. Slogans like “Capital be gone, Gezi Park is
ours’” were replaced with “Erdogan resign, government resign,” and “shoulder to
shoulder against fascism.”
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Figure 6 Largest demonstrations were organized to condemn each murder and to commemorate the lost ones.
People holding the pictures of protestors directly killed in the hands of Police. This is Kadikoy, one of the largest
districts on the Anatolian side of Istanbul. Image by Nazim Serhat Firat.

This turn from a political mobilization with an urban agenda towards the one that had the
repressive qualities of the political regime at its target was, in part, enabled by Prime
Minister Erdogan himself. As I mentioned earlier, from his first address on television
onwards, PM Erdogan decisively took the confrontational path, discrediting protestors as
looters and a few extremists, asserting on every occasion that the government had already
reached a decision, and nothing, including the protestors, could change it. What is more,
PM Erdogan went on to threaten the demonstrators live on national television not only
with further police intervention, but also by calling on his million supporters to go to
Taksim Square to confront the protestors.

Such an imperious language telling people what to do and what to think was indeed
nothing new for the people of Turkey. It is difficult to recount every event that turned
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people from docile individuals into a new militant collectivity. In the span of a year,
people in Turkey, especially women, were repeatedly told to have at least three children,
not to use contraception, to avoid cesareans, that every abortion was a murder and that
everybody who drinks alcohol was an alcoholic. People heard PM Erdogan declare that
he did not want a youth wandering around drunk, and that instead, he wanted a religious
youth. He also scolded young couples on public television for kissing in the subway,
telling them to behave in accordance with “his nation’s” religious and moral codes. Those
who criticized the government for the “operational accident” (Çubukçu, 2011b) that
killed 34 Kurdish civilians in 2011 in Roboski (Uludere)—allegedly mistaken for
Kurdish guerillas—also became targets of PM Erdogan’s anger. He told people and the
media to stop talking about this “accident,” which was what the “terrorists” wanted. Such
cultural and political conservatism, constantly micro-manages what people should do and
how people should think, intertwined with a neoliberal assault on common living spaces
and the cities, kept a very diverse body of protestors together during the heat of the
uprising. After heavy clashes with the police for three days and nights over the control of
Taksim Square, on 1 June the police forces finally had to withdraw and Taksim Square
was claimed and appropriated by hundreds of thousands of people.

At this point, it is important to go back to the agency question we previously touched
upon. As I have mentioned, the initial resistance in Gezi Park during the first few days
did not necessarily involve the “ordinary inhabitants of Istanbul.” However, what turned
the protest into an uprising was precisely the participation of the ordinary urban
inhabitants. The uprisings that caught AKP government off-guard brought together an
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unlikely body of people from all walks of life for the first time in recent memory. The
overwhelming majority of people who regularly took to the streets everyday during the
uprising reportedly did so for the first time in their lives (Bilgic and Kafkasli, 2013). The
invisible wall of fear that had kept people at home for so long seemed to be superseded
by the sheer creative energy released by massive numbers of bodies on the streets.

Figure 7 The banner mocks the authoritarian tendencies of PM Erdogan referring to him as the "Sultan," the
absolute Ottoman monarch. It reads, “Even if the absolute authority belongs to the Sultan, the parks still belong
to us!” This is an adaptation of famous proverb from the Ottoman times that has “the mountains” instead of
“the parks” in the original, which refers to the widespread guerilla activity at the time. Image by Mehmet Baris
Kuymulu.

The very process of claiming and appropriating the central public space and fighting over
it with heavily armed riot police for days brought about a process of political education
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for people who did not share the same politics. The heterogeneity of banners, colors,
flags and other political symbols I saw in Taksim Square was simply unprecedented in
any political event in the history of Turkey. It was hard to find any oppositional political
fraction, large or small, which was not somewhat represented at the square. It would be
naïve, of course, to think that all these groups, some of which have long been hostile to
one another, simply co-existed in Taksim without any friction.

On the one hand there were Turkish nationalists, who chanted, “We are the soldiers of
Mustafa Kemal,” referring to the “founding father” and the first president of the modern,
secular, and nationalist Republic of Turkey. This chant represented secular nationalists’
disgruntlement with the new political regime of Islamic AKP government and its
reforms, which the former saw as a threat to the secular foundations of “Ataturk’s
republic.” However, this militarist chant with nationalist overtones was constantly
interrupted by the anti-war groups, anarchists and conscientious objectors who chanted,
“We will not kill, we will not die, we will not be soldiers of anyone.” In its other
variations the same nationalist/militarist slogan was humorously appropriated by the
LGBTQ groups who chanted, “We are the soldiers of Zeki Muren,” referring to the
infamous gay Turkish singer of 1960s and 1970s. In other repeated occasions, the same
militarist/nationalist slogan was interrupted, this time, by Kurdish groups, who chanted in
Kurdish, “Biji Serok Apo” (Viva Leader Apo), referring to the imprisoned leader of
Kurdish guerilla groups that have been fighting for Kurdish autonomy against the Turkish
army for over 30 years.
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Figure 8 A man holding the pro-Kurdish movement BDP flag, helping a woman holding a Turkish flag with
Ataturk's face ingrained on it escape the water cannon attack. This image circulated widely in Turkish media as
a symbol of solidarities enacted during the uprising as the two groups (Kurdish activists and secularist Turkish
nationalists) would not normally come together in any other political event. Image retrieved from
Telgrafhane.org. http://telgrafhane.org/gezi-direnisi-ve-sari-okuz-onur-aksoy/

The fragility of new solidarities enacted against a common opponent during the uprising
at Taksim Square was captured neatly by one incident, recounted to me later on by a
participant. The usual safe distance between a socialist fraction of secular Turkish
nationalists and militant socialist Kurdish groups were lost at one point due to the
constant flow of people at the square. Each found the other by its side. At that moment,
the leftist Turkish nationalists started to chant, “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal,”
which was immediately countered by “Biji Serok Apo!” As the tension escalated, both
groups exchanged curses and started to poke one another with the sticks of the banners.
“It was a matter of seconds, my friend” the participant told me “and we started shout the
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infamous socialist chant, ‘Shoulder to shoulder against fascism’…and thank god they
both joined in.”

All these happened alongside the soccer fans and their mostly sexist chants and slogans,
which were constantly interrupted by socialist feminist collectives. Socialist feminists
raised much attention and appreciation when they started a campaign to erase sexist
slogans and graffiti off the walls, attaching a note that read, “Removed due its sexist
content.”

Figure 9 Socialist Feminist collectives at Taksim Square. Image by Saygun Gokariksel.

Those who thought that the people in Taksim Square were exclusively composed of
secularists who had been anxious of the increasingly conservative and Islamist reforms of
the AKP government had their share of surprise when they saw a huge banner (and a
large crowd underneath) that read, “Property belongs to Allah, Capital get out of Taksim”
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(Altinors, 2013). This was an organization called “Anti-capitalist Muslims” and they
were not alone. Further down in Gezi Park “Revolutionary Muslims” had their banner
that read, “Trees bend before Allah, AKP bends before Capital.” Both groups were
preaching how capitalism was completely in discord with the teachings of Qur’an and
were extremely influential during the uprising. “Anti-capitalist Muslims” and
“Revolutionary Muslims” were yet another fraction standing “shoulder to shoulder
against fascism” with more pro-capitalist secularist fractions.

What was interesting with the frictional heterogeneity in Taksim Square was that all these
groups and many more were united against massive police violence, and came to contact
with one another to a large extent for the first time. The fact that they were necessarily
united to resist police violence gave them a chance to talk and get to know one another.
Resisting “shoulder to shoulder” enabled talking face to face. For instance, after the
successful campaign by the feminist collectives, more people started to hush others when
they started to chant sexist slogans intending to insult PM Erdogan. The same went for
homophobic chants and slogans. For instance, the most widely used homophobic insult in
Turkish would probably be ibne, a derogatory term for a male homosexual, the equivalent
of which would be “faggot.” As it is one of the most favorite insults of straight men, it
was widely used to insult the police, PM Erdogan or whomever the crowd was resentful
and angry against during the early uprising. As I mentioned the LGBTQ communities
were very well represented during the uprising and their presence was felt strongly by
many straight man, who would not otherwise spend time with the former. After a few
days loaded with homophobic chants and slogans, the members of LGBTQ groups started
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to carry small hand-banners that read “What if we’re faggots?!” and even further
appropriated the intended insult with their chants: “What if we’re faggots, get used to it,
we’re everywhere!” “What if we’re faggots, freedom is all we’re after!”26

In one of the park forums I attended in Besiktas district in late June, right below the
Taksim area towards the Bosphorus, where people who want to speak could do so for
three minutes, I heard one man confessing in front of hundreds of forum participants that
during the Gezi protests he learnt that he was such a homophobe, and he added that he
probably still is (laughter from the crowd). “But now I know better,” he said and “I try
not to use the word ibne for the gay folk.” He shared his experience in which he was
running away from a police officer in one of the dark winding back streets of Beyoglu in
the middle of the night, and as the police just caught him, a group of gay and transvestite
individuals appeared out of nowhere and confronted the police. The police had to flee.
“They were just living in that building, you know, where I was just caught… and they
took me upstairs. We just sat down for a few hours waiting for the ‘storm’ to pass.” He
added, “They weren’t what I thought they were. They were great brave guys” 27 (Crowd
applauding and cheering).

There is one more crucial dimension to what I have been calling the frictional totality that
emerged during the uprising. Apart from the social groups that would not come together
easily, such as homophobes and transvestites, or sexist soccer fans and feminist

I’d like to thank Oguz Erdur, who helped me with translating this difficult slogan, worded in
quite a specific way in Turkish.
27
He was making an obvious reference to a widely-held stereotype in Turkey and elsewhere
about gay man being more like a woman, hence not man enough, not brave, courageous or feisty.
26
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collectives, this frictional totality also represented a confrontation between what could be
called the old social movements and the new social movements in Turkey. As I
mentioned, the protests and uprising emerged as a spontaneous irruption and the more
traditionally organized political actors, such as political parties, trade and labor unions
were latecomers to the event. It was not until the first week of protests were over that two
of the largest progressive labor unions, Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions
(DISK) and Confederation of Public Workers Unions (KESK) joined forces for a general
strike (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013c). That such labor unions and opposition parties did
not jump on the bandwagon quickly enough led to their dismissal by some groups and
protestors, as they were seen as too big and too bureaucratic, too well entrenched in the
bigger game of politics at the state level to react to a spontaneous uprising. During the
early days of the uprising, there were many calls to labor unions and political parties for
support in such an unprecedented event and criticism ensued. However, after the first
week or so, as Taksim Square was already appropriated and police had withdrawn, the
arrival of the organized “old forces” of political society created as much criticism and
reaction from various groups of protestors. The old forces that had been criticized for
being late to the uprising were, this time, criticized for joining the protests to co-opt “the
Gezi spirit” for it was decidedly leaderless and spontaneous, led by the principles of
direct democracy and solidarity. The organized forces of political society were blamed
for their presumed desire to sit in the front seat behind the steering wheel. The rejection
of such allegations by the leaders of old forces that joined the uprising notwithstanding,
such allegations continued to be a matter of contestation and dispute throughout the
uprising as there were a considerable number of protestors who valued spontaneous and
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leaderless form the uprising represented. There seemed to be a conundrum. While there
were some leftist groups which criticized DISK and KESK for holding the general strike
for only three days and for going back to work, there were others who argued that the
protests were not about political parties, labor unions and their red and yellow socialist
flags, because the Gezi protest was not about “politics”; It was only about saving the
trees.

Although the confrontation between the older traditional actors and the newer less
organized members of the political society did not go away completely, they cooperated
and stood by each other most of the time during the heat of the uprising. None of those
actors boycotted the events, for instance or deserted the streets and squares due to the
presence of the other. They simply kept on existing side by side during the uprising. In a
way, the older and more organized social forces and the newer ones were the two other
somewhat hostile groups that made up the frictional heterogeneity of the uprising.
Nationalists, the Kurdish movement, Anti-capitalist Muslims and secularists as well as
the old forces and the new forces had tensions among them, but this did not deter
cooperation and solidarity in the short run during the uprising and in its immediate
aftermath. One could argue, moving from Lefebvre’s insightful observation about the
revolutionary irruption in Paris, that during the times of revolt and uprising people are
“endowed with intense, rapid, and lucid perception of immediate possibilities,” even
though more often than not this may be temporally limited (1969: 113). Certain options
that were traditionally seen as impossible before the uprising glimpse as possibilities in
the heat of it. The co-existence and cooperation between, say, the secularists and the
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Islamists, the old forces and the new forces glimpsed as a possibility in the fleeting
moment of the uprising, yet it would not be entirely true to argue that their contradictions
were fully worked out in the long run.

The formation of the frictional heterogeneity, which was enabled by the uprising,
therefore, was a process of political education for most people, its inconsistencies and
incompleteness notwithstanding. The participation of massive numbers of heterogeneous
group of people was “transformative” in many respects. They participated in the protests
and uprising to transform the ways in which they were told to live in the city. It was an
uprising against a certain kind of urban life that was imposed upon them, the one that
constantly enclosed and privatized their commons and tell them what kind of activities
could take place in public space. People responded to this by appropriating central
squares and parks in many cities. They set up tents, put up banners, embellished the trees
and set up a solidarity economy where the money, the universal form of power, was
rendered irrelevant. They cleaned the streets and parks together, sang, cooked and ate
together. In other words, the protestors did not only appropriate the already existing
spaces but transformed them into social laboratories where they experimented an
alternative urbanism at a very small scale. Moreover, the protestors’ “transformative
participation” partially transformed them as well. They enacted new solidarities, talked to
the members of groups seen as hostile, and brought politics into everyday life, in the
sense I exemplified with the account of admittedly homophobic man in Besiktas.
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After the heat of the uprising, especially after the police reclaimed Gezi Park on 15 June,
the transformative participation in appropriation also gave way to slightly more durable
forms of political practices and spaces, like the park forums, which I will examine in the
third and final part of this chapter. But before going on with the spontaneous formation of
such new political spaces and organizational forms that sprung from the uprising, I would
like to take a step back and examine the basic pillars of the growth-based political
economy of the AKP decade (2002-2014) in order to establish the relationship between
growth and revolt. After all, as Lefebvre notes in The Explosion, “contestation arises
spontaneously.” However, “the explosion of spontaneity arises out of prior conditions”
(1969: 69).

PART II
‘Specter of comparisons’ and the middle class
As I have tried to elaborate in the first part, the pace and spontaneity of the
unprecedented collective mobilization of millions of people without the overt lead of
established and organized actors of Turkey’s democratization, such as leftist trade unions
and the Kurdish movement, took the governing AKP by surprise. However, AKP was not
the only actor that was caught off-guard and many analysts, both in and out of Turkey,
those who remained critical to the mobilization as well as those who celebrated it, shared
AKP’s shock.

This initial shock and awe was quickly translated into a search for the origins, causes, and
agents of the uprising. A specter of comparisons haunted the initial analysis. Some
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argued that the so-called Arab Spring finally knocked on Turkey’s door. Others brought
to our attention the similarities between the encampments in New York City’s Zuccotti
Park and Gezi Park in Istanbul and the ensuing police violence unleashed in both cities.
Still, others developed several arguments to place Turkey in the politically boiling
southern fringe of Europe, along with Greece, Portugal and Spain.

Figure 10 Demonstration at Taksim Square on 22 June to commemorate the deaths of five young people (then
the death toll) during the heat of the uprising. In the background one of the protestors wave a Brazilian flag in
solidarity with Brazilian protestors. Image by Mehmet Baris Kuymulu.

However, the people in the streets of Turkey were not trying to topple an unelected
tyrant, calling for the first free elections in recent memory, as Egyptians and Tunisians
did. Nor, was the reaction clearly directed at a financial elite, holding the rest of the
society hostage, as in the United States, although class-based disgruntlement was very
salient in the streets of Turkey. Moreover, similarities between the streets of other
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Mediterranean countries and Turkey’s eventually hit the wall of comparison between the
contracting economies of Greece, Spain and Portugal, and the relatively constant upward
trend in the development of Turkey’s economy in the past decade. If all this was not
enough to satisfy the appetite for comparison, protests broke out in Brazil and Bulgaria
roughly at the same time Turkey’s urban protests were grabbing international media
attention in June (O’Brennan, 2013).

There is nothing wrong, in and of itself, with the attempt to understand post-2011 urban
mobilizations around the world in relation to one another, as each represents a growing
dissatisfaction with the globalized capitalism that is increasingly neoliberal and
repressive in character. On the contrary, such connections between distant and apparently
unconnected urban mobilizations should be made; and the common structural
mechanisms behind each of them should be carefully revealed and analyzed. In the end,
youth unemployment, precarious and insecure working conditions, enclosures of
commons, and rampant privatization as well as the widening gap between those who toil
everyday and those who speculate over the labor of others are hardly unique to any
specific geography of global neoliberalism. However, this common dissatisfaction with
aforementioned aspects of authoritarian neoliberalism seemed to get lost in comparison
as the theme of “middle class” became salient to explain protests. Discussions around the
middle class component of social unrest usually took place around vague notions such as
“middle class militants” (Surowiecki, 2013) and “global middle-class revolution”
(Fukuyama, 2013).
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For instance, one of the more influential political scientists, Francis Fukuyama, in a short
article he penned for the Wall Street Journal at the end of June 2013, argues that “the
political turmoil” that he sees “all over the world” stems from “one common theme: the
failure of governments to meet the rising expectations of the newly prosperous and
educated” (Fukuyama, 2013). Fukuyama asserts that “the rise of a new global middle
class” is the theme that connects not only Turkey with Brazil but it connects them with
Tunisia and Egypt as well. Citing a 2008 Goldman Sachs report that defines “the global
middle class” as those who make anything between 6,000 US$ and 30,000 US$ a year,
Fukuyama attests that “the corporations are salivating at this emerging market” since this
new class will “grow by some 2 billion people by 2030.” Moreover, if one takes the
education and not just income into consideration, Fukuyama goes on, it will then be
obvious that the size of the new global middle class is actually larger.

It might look ironic, even futile to take issue with a political scientist who announced the
end of history in 1989 and who still talks about urban upheavals that make history
(Fukuyama, 2000 [1989]). It is not hard to dismiss him right away and outright, yet this
would do a little to change the fact that he enjoys a great deal of global influence, writing
in venues like the Wall Street Journal and Foreign Affairs, and his views are reproduced
by more locally influential figures in such countries as Brazil and Turkey, where the
urban mobilizations take place. Figures like Fukuyama, writing in journals that are the
voice of global capital, or even in more liberal publications such as The New Yorker
(Surowiecki, 2013) and the BBC News (Yueh 2013) are largely responsible both from
global and more local circulation of “the global middle-class” thesis in explaining the
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post-2011 urban mobilizations. I engage with this thesis here in order to make the
argument that what is deemed as middle class by these commentators is made up of
unemployed and underemployed youth, precarious laborers, underpaid professionals,
most of them highly indebted. In other words, the class in formation throughout the 2013
urban uprising in Turkey is much more complicated than the proponents of “the global
middle class” thesis would have it.

There were certainly many among the “two and a half million people” (according to the
figures of Turkish Interior Ministry) who took it to the streets during the Gezi protests
that would fit in Fukuyama’s generous category of educated middle class. But whether
they are as “prosperous” as Fukuyama imagines them to be is less certain. To begin with,
recent research demonstrates that almost 70% of those who were in the streets during the
uprising were younger than 30 years old (Bilgic and Kafkasli, 2013, also see Altinors,
2013). Had Fukuyama looked at the youth unemployment rate in Turkey (Hurriyet Daily
News, 2013a), he would see that it surpassed 20% in 2013 and he might have hesitated to
call the demonstrators “newly prosperous.” Although we cannot be absolutely sure that
the youth in the streets during the uprising was exclusively made up of young people
without jobs, the high percentage of youth participation in the events and high youth
unemployment figures suggest that there may be a relationship between youth
participation and youth unemployment. What is more, the problem with Fukuyama’s
argument is not limited to unemployment and growing pauperization of youth. Those
who are lucky enough to have a job with a living wage are not exactly better off either.
Let me try to demonstrate this with one example.
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The medical doctors who work in Turkey’s research universities would definitely fall into
Fukuyama’s global middle class category, both in terms of income and surely in terms of
high level of education. However, the AKP governments over the past decade
transformed the legal structures that govern worker rights, length of the working week,
pension rights, social security, and many other legal structures that turned Turkey’s
growing population into a flexible labor force. Flexiblization of labor has been one of the
key tasks of neoliberal state around the world, which have undermined the share of labor
in accumulated social value to the advantage of capital in the past four decades and this
process has been highly visible and important in Turkey as well. The neoliberalization of
medical sector in Turkey has historically been achieved by the privatization of almost
every state hospital and by introducing tax-cuts for new private investment in the sector.
Moreover, the AKP government initiated a series of structural transformations by
introducing a new law, effective January 2011, which now dictates that doctors should be
paid according to a “performance evaluation system” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2011). The
Turkish Medical Association (Turk Tabibler Birligi) and the faculty of various university
hospitals repeatedly protested the new law and explained that it threatens scientific
research, the healthy working conditions of doctors, as well as the wellbeing of patients.
The “performance evaluation system” poses such multifarious threats, according to the
medical association, because it ties the amount of money doctors could earn to the
number of patients they examine, and to the number of surgeries they perform during the
working day. The more one examines, the more “prosperous” one gets. By doing so, it
takes precious time away from scientific research, which is what the primary function of
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university doctors is supposed to be. It threatens the well-being of patients as they are
examined very quickly, not as patients who need proper care, but as another obstacle
before a higher pay.

I intentionally chose my example from the flexiblization of medical doctors because they
belong to one of the most privileged strata of wage laborers. The arguments like
Fukuyama’s do not even consider such labor conditions under which people produce; the
alienation they experience; the rights violations they have to endure; on the growing
insecurity and precariousness workers experience. That is to say, Fukuyama and others
(Bohn and Bayrasli, 2013; Deen, 2013; Yueh, 2013) make such claims about “the global
middle class” only by looking at the income figures of the laborers without even
considering the material conditions under which people produce.

By questioning how quickly Gezi protests were identified as a middle class mobilization
by many, I do not mean to argue that people deemed as middle class were absent in the
protests. Instead, I argue that the class in formation throughout the uprising was much
more complicated than simply being about “middle class.” However, there is a good
reason why such broad-based mobilizations around the world are labeled as middle class
movements. Ideologically, it is handy for the ruling elite and for its media pundits, since,
what middle classes often demand is more of something that already exists. This can be
more democracy, more freedom, or more purchasing power, but such movements are
thought to exclude a demand for the wholesale transformation of the social and economic
structure that enables such demands. That is to say, the ideological function of
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representing the agency of such mobilizations as “middle class” is to imply that the
hegemonic neoliberal capitalism is working just fine except an issue here, and a trouble
there, and these problems could be reformed with a few minor touches.

The middle class card is especially handy in an explosive situation like Gezi protests
because it also appears to quickly explain why such a grand mobilization took place in a
country like Turkey, which has been a star student of the IMF, with relatively healthy
growth rates in the past decade, unlike, say contracting economies of Greece, Spain and
Italy. It is often argued by the liberal commentators who subscribe to “the global middle
class” thesis that while the recent urban mobilizations in the latter stem chiefly from the
austerity measures that inhibited economic growth, the protests in Turkey happened
precisely because there was such growth, which ostensibly uplifted people’s living
standards (Keyder, 2013; Deen, 2013; Yueh, 2013). Therefore, in order to interrogate the
ideological function of postulating a freedom searching newly prosperous middle class as
the agent of social mobilization in Turkey, it is necessary to unpack Turkey’s so-called
economic success.

The “construction” of growth in Turkey
Caglar Keyder, one of the most prominent urbanists and social theorists of Turkey,
argues in his piece “Law of the Father,” published during the uprising in the London
Review of Books that the protestors in Istanbul were the “beneficiaries of economic
growth and greater openness to the world” accomplished by the AKP government.
Furthermore, Keyder argues, economic growth was coupled with the AKP’s policies that
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allocated “more money for education,” which led to some 200 universities in total, and
2.5 million new graduates were added to the population since 2008. Therefore, greater
investment for education powered by economic growth under AKP’s decade-long rule
gave way to a new middle class, according to Keyder, that is more open to the world and
demands the standards of its global counterparts (Keyder, 2013).

So much has been made of the growth-based economic success of the AKP government.
It is lamentable that Keyder’s account among others remains uncritical of this success
story and simply offers a local version of Fukuyama’s “global middle class” argument. It
is true that one observes about 5% annual growth rate, fluctuations notwithstanding,
throughout early and mid-2000s, which is deemed healthy by liberal economists. To
equate such growth rates with the increase in purchasing power of the population and
with the rise in its general standard of living and welfare, however, is to assume that the
extra wealth occasioned by economic growth is distributed across the society in such a
way to make up for the existing class inequalities. Even if we brush aside crucial issues
of social justice and look at the growth rates in isolation, which is what many liberal
economists do, we would still see worrying signs in Turkey’s numbers. Especially with
the global economic crises unleashed by the collapse of the US housing markets in 2007,
the growth rate of Turkey is fluctuating wildly, from 0.8 in 2008 to -4.8 in 2009, from 9.2
in 2010 to 8.8 in 2011, and to 2.2 in 2012 (The World Bank, 2013). The optimistic
expectations of the AKP government estimated Turkey’s 2013 growth rate as 4.4 but it
got stuck at 3.7. The projections for the next year shows that it will be 3.2 (PwC, 2014),
the bare minimum of a healthy capitalist economy (Harvey, 2012: 80).
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Serious fluctuations in Turkey’s growth rates in synchrony with the systemic global
capitalist crisis only makes sense, considering the long process of neoliberalization
Turkey has gone through since the early 1980s. However, the permeability of Turkish
economy is still exacerbated by the economic regime the AKP government has built in
the last decade. AKP’s so-called economic success primarily rests on high amounts of
foreign capital flowing into Turkey’s economy. According to economist Mustafa
Sonmez, ten years of AKP rule witnessed an unprecedented 421 billion dollars foreign
capital flowing into the country, 340 billion of it being in the form of unpaid external
debt (Sonmez, 2013a). The economic vulnerability caused by foreign debt is only
aggravated by Turkey’s account deficit as the currently growing private sector debt is
exclusively in foreign currency (Savran, 2013). However, in complete accord with the
neoliberal orthodoxy, foreign capital inflow—even though it mostly comes as debt or
speculative short-term investment—is still lauded as the most important aspect of healthy
and growing Turkish economy. Yet, barely one third of the 421 billion dollars’ worth of
this foreign capital landed in Turkey as foreign direct investment, mostly for purchasing
what already exists, such as state economic enterprises and banks that were put on sale.
The other two third of it came in for short-term speculative gain in Istanbul stock
exchange market (Sonmez, 2013b).

Unpaid foreign debt is only a part of the problem with the debt-infused growth economy
during the last decade. The figures on internal debt are as worrying. The 9.2% growth in
Turkey’s economy in 2010, and 8.8% in 2011, which the AKP government is so proud
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of, and which is constantly applauded in international liberal circles, relied heavily on
household consumption within the domestic market. The share of household consumption
in the total growth of Turkey’s economy in this two-year period was 60% (Sonmez,
2012). According to the “Financial Stability Report,” published in May 2012 by the
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, disposable household income is estimated to be
487.2 billion Turkish Liras. Household debt figures as 51.7% of this amount, around 252
billion Turkish Liras (2012: 25). Only a decade ago in 2003, one should remember, the
share of household debt in disposable household income was 5.5%, which is a staggering
testament to the fact that both much-celebrated economic growth of Turkey and the
ostensible rise in people’s standard of living, has been based on intense “indebtization.”
A recent news-piece in one of the Islamic newspapers in Turkey announced that 1.6
million people are completely unable to pay their credit card debts (Zaman, 2013). Note
that official household debt figures only reflect formal household debt based on credit
card debts and consumer credits obtained from banks. The figures exclude any form of
informal debt from friends and family or from the informal or underground debt
institutions, which are not hard to come by in Turkey. Although the figures that
demonstrate how indebted the citizens of Turkey are do not let us conclude for sure that
the people in the streets during the uprising were primarily made up of the indebted, they
suggest that there were probably many indebted people protesting in the street during the
summer of 2013 in Turkey.

The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey seems to be unconcerned with an 18-fold
increase in formal household debt in the last decade as the same “Financial Stability
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Report” announces in a favorable tone that “the ever increasing use of credit and debit
cards, which plays an important role for the registered economy, and consumption
expenditures of households via credit cards, continue to increase” (Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey, 2012: 24). This is the core reason why I began examining Turkey’s
growth-based “economic miracle” by challenging the analyses that hastily labeled the
agency behind Turkey’s urban uprisings as “middle class” (Keyder, 2013), and the
process as part of “the global middle class revolution” (Fukuyama, 2013). Considering
the indebtedness and precarious working conditions of Turkey’s so-called middle classes,
it is not tenable to argue that two and a half million “newly prosperous and educated”
members of “global middle class” participated in Gezi protests in order to demand the
consumerist advantages of their global counterparts.

At this point let me go back to the issue of foreign debt as it provides a joint that connects
to another pillar of AKP’s so-called economic success. As I mentioned, the 421 billion
dollars foreign capital inflow during the AKP decade was unprecedented in the history of
Turkey’s economy. It is not surprising, then, that such unprecedented foreign capital
inflow was accompanied by an equally unprecedented pace in privatization of public
assets. Although the early attempts of privatization go back to mid-1980s when the
process of neoliberalization started, it was not until the end of 1990s that privatization
shifted from being sporadic to systematical. Turkey privatized its decades-long
accumulated social wealth for 54 billion US dollars in 29 years. More than 40 billion US
dollars of this privatization, that is 78% of it, has taken place during AKP rule in the last
decade. Just in the first half of 2013, the AKP government privatized 8 billion US
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dollars’ worth of public property, which is a testament to the ongoing accelerated
privatization under AKP’s rule (Sonmez, 2013c).

Dovetailed with foreign capital inflow and such rapid and vast privatization of public
wealth, including urban public lands, one of the chief sectors that gained a new
prominence during the AKP decade is the construction sector (Baysal, 2010: 39; INTES,
2013: 1-2). Powered by state driven urban redevelopment schemes that have been chiefly
about privatization of urban public lands and their redevelopment, the construction sector
became one of the driving motors of Turkey’s economy under the AKP rule. Imperative
in this process has been the transformation of “Housing Development Administration of
Turkey” (popularly known as TOKI, its Turkish acronym) from a state institution
established to serve the housing needs of urban working classes into an almost
autonomous institution with extraordinary powers. Directly answering to the Republic of
Turkey Prime Ministry, TOKI is indeed acting as a proper ministry. However, TOKI
became more independent and powerful than any regular ministry in Turkey with the
introduction of new legal adjustments. For instance, even though TOKI is still formally a
state institution, it can work independently with foreign capital and act as an investor
both in construction and finance sectors (Baysal, 2010: 40). Moreover, TOKI can change
land use patterns, without consulting with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism or
conferring with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, or Ministry of Forest and Water
Resources which are allegedly responsible for the protection of cultural and natural
wealth and heritage in Turkey. TOKI has become the absolute authority over public land,
and is able to singlehandedly determine land use patterns, and to make necessary changes
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in zoning plans to expropriate any piece of land that it can valorize (Adanali, 2011: 10;
Deniz, 2013).

“The Law number 5609 was published in the Official Gazette on 8th March 2007
and entered into force. With the amendment made in the Law on ‘gecekondu’
(shanties) number 775 within this framework, authorities and tasks of the
Ministry of Public Works and Settlement have been assigned to TOKİ. With the
same law, the Department of Dwelling Affairs within the Ministry of Public
Works and Settlement has been assigned to TOKİ as well” (TOKI Official
Website)28

Figure 11 Graffiti by an unknown artist in now gentrified Sulukule, historic ROMA neighborhood in Istanbul.
It humorously plays with the popular Turkish proverb that says, “The well-fed will never understand the
hungry.” Well-fed is “tok” in Turkish and by adding the letter “i” at the end, the graffiti says “TOKI will never
understand the hungry.” Photo by unknown photographer taken during the uprising in Istanbul.

28

https://www.toki.gov.tr/
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With such centralization of power, TOKI became the chief institution that has been
orchestrating urban redevelopment of Turkey’s lands. It is a hybrid institution that blurs
the usual categories through which we understand neoliberal urbanism. On the one hand
it is a state institution, and seems to be the chief institutional actor of Turkey’s state-led
urban development. But, on the other hand, it is an autonomous market actor, that
barrows credit from international financial institutions, partners with global construction
companies, and buys and sells land and real estate. If we are to understand neoliberalism,
not as a set of political economic practices that excludes the state in favor of private
market actors, but as a set of political economic practices that aim to raise the share of
capital at the expense of labor, and a set of practices in which the state is specifically
implicated with specific functions, then TOKI and AKP’s urbanism seems to me more
neoliberal than its predecessors, because, the AKP government in general and TOKI in
particular form the vital institutional link between public property and domestic as well
as global capital, transferring former into the latter.

It is within the confines of this specific function, TOKI and AKP transformed Turkey’s
urban spaces literally into a vast construction site. Yet, as we witnessed in other countries
where capital rushed into construction and real estate for accumulation, such as in Spain
from the early 1990s up until 2008, this process does not go without leading to a housing
bubble. And bubbles burst, as we are harshly reminded by the systemic crises that began
in housing markets in the US in 2007. In this context, the flow of capital from the
primary to the secondary circuit, the relative stabilizing effect of urbanization and real

188

estate construction on the economy and its crisis-proneness, which we have discussed in
chapter II as the missing link in Lefebvre’s analysis of the “urban problematic,” appears
to be very important.

It can be argued that the relative growth of the construction sector in Turkey since AKP
came to power in 2002 played a positive role in the overall stability and growth of the
Turkish economy. It opened a new path for capital accumulation in the domestic
economy that had been terribly scarred by the 2001 crisis, which had led to a sharp
depreciation of Turkish Lira and a contraction of GDP by 5.7% in real terms of 2001
(Macovei, 2009: 5). The construction sector also functioned as a site for attracting foreign
capital into the country as well, especially in financing the development thanks to the
aforementioned transformation of TOKI. The construction sector’s stabilizing effect on
the overall economy is visible in the correlation between the growth patterns in the
construction sector and the GDP growth. Between 2002, when the recovery period started
and 2013, every year the GDP grew, the rate of growth rate of the construction sector
scored bigger numbers than the domestic economy. In the same period when the Turkish
economy contracted, the construction sector contracted even more severely than the
overall economy. For instance, in 2006 while Turkey’s growth rate was 6.9%, the
construction sector grew at 18.5%. When the GDP growth was stalled in 2009 and
Turkish economy contracted by -4.8, this was reflected in the construction sector’s 16.3% contraction rate (INTES, 2013: 1-3).
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After relatively high co-growth rates of the GDP and the construction sector in 2010 and
2011, there has been an alarming trend of decline in the growth of construction sector
since 2012. While the construction sector grew only by 0.6% in 2012 (INTES, 2013: 1),
in the first four months of 2014 the unit sales of new apartments decreased by about 8%
(Kenarli, 2014), contributing to a total supply of 1,5 million empty unsold apartments
(400,000 in Istanbul only). It is important to note that the total supply of unsold
apartments was closer to 200,000 in 2006 (Thomas, 2014; Kenarli, 2014).

These numbers indicate that the relative stability provided by capital investment in the
secondary circuit between 2002 and 2007 came to an end, and the sharp decline in real
estate sales, coupled with the staggering supply of unsold empty housing point to an
overinvestment trend in the secondary circuit. Recall David Harvey’s argument,
discussed in chapter two, that the relative stabilizing effect of investment in the secondary
circuit is temporary and it is usually followed by an overinvestment problem. This might
be followed by an overaccumulation of capital in the built environment, which might lead
to the devaluation of capital and a larger economic crisis (Harvey, 2012). The numbers
seem to confirm the theory.

The grim picture of Turkey’s debt-infused growth in general, and relative contraction of
the construction sector in particular notwithstanding, there may still be a few reasons to
believe that Turkey’s economy, motored by urban redevelopment and construction, might
be able to grow and sustain itself for the near future. Aforementioned new legislation,
passed in 2012 ostensibly for earthquake preparedness, probably will breathe fresh life
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into the construction sector. Unless there are serious shifts and transformations in the
global economy, the urban redevelopment and construction sectors of Turkish economy
might be able to grow thanks to the fact that it is now legally possible to demolish and
rebuild any building that is deemed an earthquake risk in Turkey. It is imperative to
remember that 99% of Turkey is considered to be first-degree earthquake zone. The
planned magnitude of urban redevelopment at the national scale is announced by the
Ministry of Environment and Urbanism on its official website. According to the ministry,
there are 19 million buildings in Turkey and 14 million of them require handling,
whereby six to seven million (about 40%) will be demolished and rebuilt within an
average period of 20 years against disaster risk (Ministry of Environment and Urbanism,
ND).29 This means that the process of urban redevelopment and consequent value hikes
in property and living costs that have displaced so many in working class neighborhoods
in Istanbul and other major cities of Turkey will likely be observed even in better off
neighborhoods.

Privatization, debt-infused development, especially of urban land, together with thus far
constant inflow of foreign capital have been the pillars of AKP’s political and economic
power in the last twelve years. In this period, AKP transformed Turkey’s urban spaces
into a construction site, especially through massive and widespread urban redevelopment
projects orchestrated by TOKI. It is no coincidence, then, that the largest spontaneous
social protest in Turkey’s history was mobilized to protect a small public park in the heart
of Istanbul from AKP’s largest urban redevelopment project to transform one of the most
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http://www.csb.gov.tr/gm/altyapi/index.php?Sayfa=sayfa&Tur=webmenu&Id=8291 (Accessed
08 August 2014).
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iconic urban centers in Turkey, Istanbul’s Taksim Square. Just like the accumulation of
capital in one place brings about the accumulation of working class, and hence of the
possibility of resistance as Marx reminds us, the primary engine of capital accumulation,
i.e., the redevelopment of urban land and gentrification led to a massive resistance in
Taksim Square at a scale unlike anything the AKP or any preceding government has ever
seen. The class in formation during the uprising, in other words, had very much to do
with large scale investment in the secondary circuit of capital and the political resistance
occasioned by the threat inhabitants feel on their social spaces.

Figure 12 A very familiar view in Istanbul. High-rise building construction dominates the skyline. Image by
Nazim Serhat Firat.

Many people, including myself (Kuymulu, 2013b), argued early on during Gezi Protests
that if Prime Minister Erdogan had not escalated the tension by denouncing hundreds of
thousands of protesting people across urban Turkey as a few looters and extremists, and
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had he stepped back from his appetite for the urban redevelopment project, the massive
protests would not have escalated into a full-fledged urban uprising. While this may be
true, it is also clear why he did not do so. Stepping back from the largest urban
redevelopment project designed to transform probably the most symbolic and important
urban space in Turkey in the face of resistance would quickly send the right message to
many others who are organized against such schemes in their neighborhoods, in their
cities across Turkey: that urban redevelopment can be stopped. It is precisely to inhibit
this message, I think, we witnessed such a brutal police crackdown on protestors.
However, the resistance sparked by Gezi Protests did succeed in halting the
transformation of Taksim, saving Gezi Park from destruction, and the message did get
out. This message led to an unprecedented sense of political empowerment in Turkey.
One of the most significant ways in which this new sense of empowerment expressed
itself was the constitution of what people call the park forums.

PART III
From Taksim Commune to park forums: Towards a politics of value
It is hard to draw the temporal borders of the uprising. It is more or less apparent that the
peaceful protests that were instigated by the plans to turn Gezi Park into a shopping mall
transformed into an uprising due to excessive police violence, first on the protestors in
Gezi Park, then on others who crowded Taksim Square in solidarity with the protestors
on 30 and 31 May. It is harder to tell when the uprising dwindled because large-scale
spontaneous demonstrations and nighttime clashes with the police went on well into
September in many cities of Turkey, especially in Ankara, Dersim and Antakya.
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Although the beginning and the end of such explosive events are always debatable, a
good argument can be made that one of the most special and crucial periods of the
uprising, at least for Istanbul, took place between 1 June and 15 June.

Figure 13 Taksim Square claimed after heavy clashes with the Police on 1 June. Image taken that night
appeared in Wikipedia.com http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezi_Park

The first of June was the day of the biggest crowd in Istanbul’s Taksim Square. As
mentioned, after heavy clashes with the police for three days and nights over the control
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of Taksim Square, on 1 June the police forces finally had to withdraw and Taksim Square
was claimed by hundreds of thousands of people. Thus began the Taksim Commune.

Figure 14 The building in the background is Ataturk Kultur Merkezi (Ataturk Cultural Center). PM Erdogan
voiced on several occasions his intention to demolish the building as part of Taksim’s transformation. According
to the rumor, this is where AKP desires to build a grand mosque, the highly popular fantasy of Islamist
movement since 1994, when now PM Erdogan became the mayor of Istanbul. Figure 10 is taken from the roof of
this building. During the Taksim Commune the Center was completely covered by flags and banners of leftist
political fractions. Ironically, once the Taksim Commune was dispersed and spaces reclaimed by the State, the
Center was transformed into a riot police headquarter. Image by Nazim Serhat Firat.

The first action of people was to set up barricades on every road that led to Taksim and
Beyoglu area in order to be able to defend the appropriated space against the police
incursion and backlash. For a total of 15 days Taksim Square and Gezi Park were
completely controlled and sustained by the people who appropriated the space and
refused to leave. This was two weeks when the state was almost completely absent in the
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area. The Taksim Commune ended on 15 June with the heaviest police blow until then
and both Taksim Square and Gezi Park were evicted, “cleaned up,” and reclaimed by the
state.

Figure 15 The image by Saygun Gokariksel shows Atuturk Kultur Merkezi at Taksim Square completely
appropriated by protestors and covered with flags and slogans of Leftist fractions.

It was this heavy crackdown by the police in Taksim Square and Gezi Park to push the
Taksim Commune out that ironically turned many smaller neighborhood parks into Gezi
Park. The attempts towards practicing self-management through forming collectives and
volunteer groups were already in place in Gezi Park from day one. Many groups, such as
“Our

Commons”

(Mustereklerimiz),

the

Taksim

Solidarity Platform

(Taksim

Dayanismasi) and many others played significant roles in organizing “a free medical
center, food center and library.” They organized workshops, help centers, and
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information desks “that aimed to produce a database of oral testimonies and visual
records of the protests and police violence” (Gokariksel, 2013).

More significantly, perhaps, the withdrawal of the state and its services from the Taksim
area led to a rapid collectivization of individual protestors and gave way to a spontaneous
experiment with self-management. Along with the police, garbage collectors and street
cleaners were now absent, for instance. Every little errand was run collectively, first very
spontaneously, and then in more organized ways. For instance, every morning began with
the collective garbage collecting. Protestors set up volunteer teams to distribute the food
that was sent in the park by hundreds of anonymous people. Others served food, while
some others set up and ran a free library, namely “the Looter Library” (Capulcu
Kutuphanesi), sustained by book donations from anonymous individuals as well as from
publishing houses.

As Lefebvre observes during the 1968 upheaval in Paris, such experiments with selfmanagement, no matter how temporary they are, can be transformative for its
participants. The errands previously undertaken by the state has to be run by the people
themselves. Decisions have to be made collectively. This opens up great possibilities.
Self-management, for Lefebvre, “makes a breach in the established network of decision –
making centers which manage production and organize consumption without granting
producers and consumers the slightest concrete freedom or participation in making
genuine choices” (Lefebvre, 1969: 85). In Taksim Commune, the experiment with selfmanagement “made a breach,” so to speak, in the established system of practices and
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decisions concerning the reproduction of everyday urban life, albeit for a limited time and
at a smaller scale.

What is more, for over two weeks money did not make any appearance in the park. The
commune set up what they called “the Revolution Market” (Devrim Market) where
various goods, ranging from clothing to gas masks, from snacks to garbage bags were
there to be taken freely by those who were in need. In the absence of money, the market
was not sustained by the infamous supply and demand either. As Lefebvre observed
during the French upheaval of 1968, “events upset the structures which made them
possible.” When such structures as commodified market relations or the demand and
supply mechanism are upset, the new elements of social life suddenly “become briefly
visible in luminous transparency,” to put it in Lefebvre’s words (1969: 7). What became
briefly visible in luminous transparency in Gezi Park was a possibility of organizing
exchange without the hegemony of exchange value. In the absence of money and the
formal market, those who volunteered to undertake required tasks made “list of needs”
and attached them on the tents and desks of organizations and political fractions situated
in the park. These lists were a heavy presence in the social media as well, constantly
circulated and updated according to the flow of goods in the park and their consumption
pace. Protestors set up a kitchen where people cooked and kept it open for over two
weeks. The makeshift hospital, where volunteer doctors treated the wounded early in the
resistance, was kept open for 24 hours, where many homeless received treatment for the
first time in their lives (Turan, 2013: 70). Volunteers even established a firefighter squad,
since many trees and tents had caught fire in the early days of resistance due to countless

198

tear gas canisters launched by the police. That is to say, the organization of solidaritybased self-management was already underway at Gezi Park.

Figure 16 "Revolution Market. Everything is free," reads the banner, followed by “the list of needs.” Image
from (Turan, 2013: 69).

As the police crackdown on 15 June evicted this commune, vandalizing on its way the
library, makeshift hospital, kitchen and other institutions established collectively by the
commune, people retreated to their neighborhoods and quickly set up smaller versions of
Gezi Park in their own neighborhood parks. One major difference was the absence of
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tents to spend the night, as there was no need to guard the trees. Instead, most park
forums gathered around 8pm and dispersed after midnight. The collectivism that rendered
money irrelevant was still effective in park forums to a large extent, sustained by people
who cooked and brought to the park more food than they would need in order to share
with others who did not or could not undertake such a task. For instance, in Abbasaga
Park Forum of Besiktas/Istanbul, where I attended the assembly several nights, cigarettes,
snacks, alcohol as well as other beverages were stashed in the middle of the park and
sustained by the “leave or take freely” logic. The communal solidarity was not confined
to the collective consumption of material goods either. In Abbasaga Park as well as in
others, after the first few days in which people mostly talked about the police violence of
15 June, participants started to set up workgroups and workshops.

Topics and dates decided upon collectively, these workgroups served as platforms where
experience, information, and knowledge of individual participants were circulated and
shared freely, thus they were collectivized. Some of the problems discussed in these
workgroups included “communication and media,” “urban renewal and displacement,”
“agriculture and ecology,” “women and law,” and “animal rights.” As many people
voiced their enthusiasm for learning more and getting organized vis-à-vis specific issues,
certain volunteers who had professional background on such issues stepped up to share
their knowledge and experience. Doctors offered brief first-aid workshops, for instance.
Lawyers explained how to deal with the police in the event of an arrest. Such workgroups
and workshops proved to be functional for connecting different park forums with each
other as those who wanted to do deeper political organizing on similar subjects in
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different forums formed alternative workgroups such as “Inter-forum Workgroup on
Resistance to Urban Renewal” (Forumlar Arası Kentsel Dönüşümle Mücadele Çalışma
Grubu). Therefore, the park forums, like the Taksim Commune in Gezi Park, emerged as
significant spaces of communal solidarity where the famous “another world” was
experienced and practiced daily.

Figure 17 Abbasaga Park Forum announces the specific meeting points of various workgroups in the park and
the topics to be covered. Image by Mehmet Baris Kuymulu.

Equally important, moreover, that practicing alternative ways of organizing social life at
a small spatial scale of the neighborhood park was accompanied by lengthy discussions at
night on how to translate such practices into long-term social transformation at larger
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scales. According to “CommonGround, the forum post” (Hemzemin Forum Postasi),
published by activists to link all park forums together, after the eviction of Gezi Park on
15 June, within five days people established 34 park forums, meeting nightly, across
Istanbul alone. By 25 June, there were more than hundred park forums in 13 cities of
Turkey (Hemzemin, 2013). Therefore, the set-up and organization of forums, as well as
the socio-economic background of its participants varied significantly from one forum to
another. However, each forum functioned as a much-needed space to come together and
discuss concerns raised by the uprising. The main format in which this was organized
was that each person who wanted to talk about an issue lined up to address the crowd for
three to five minutes.

Chief among the topics of discussion was the ways in which alternative political
economies to neoliberalism—which the participants saw freshly in action in Gezi Park—
could be organized. The nature of alternatives and proper ways of realizing them were the
most hotly debated problem since many participants had many ideas that were often in
conflict with one another. For instance, the array of activities and methods proposed by
forum participants in Abbasaga Park in Besiktas/Istanbul ranged from doing electoral
work for the main opposition party that some saw as the best bet of the people to end the
AKP decade, to forming a brand-new political party that would represent the demands of
people in the streets during the uprising. Others objected to such politics around
mainstream institutions and argued that the political value revealed by the uprising could
not be and should not be reduced to formal party politics. While some expressed the need
for initiating dialogue with the conservative voters of the AKP by going into its
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stronghold neighborhoods, others saw such a project as elitist and compared it to the
civilizing mission of the colonial mentality. Still, most participants constantly expressed
the value of solidarity and direct democracy experience unleashed by Gezi protests and
discussed how such practices could be expanded in a decentralized yet coordinated
manner in local neighborhood parks and other public spaces.

Figure 18 A participant addressing the crowd in Abbasaga Park Forum. Image taken from the blog of
ResistTaksim.30

Two very successful campaigns are worth mentioning as examples of decentralized but
coordinated practices of solidarity and alternative economies. Both were brought up,
debated, decided upon and organized in the forums by participants. The first one is the

30

http://resisttaksim.blogspot.co.at/?zx=d839566051220517
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“barter festivals” organized in various parks and the second is “Iftar of the Earth” (fast
breaking dinner) organized during Ramadan in July (Gokariksel, 2013). It was the “AntiCapitalist Muslims” who came up with the idea of the latter and Iftars were organized
daily during Ramadan in park forums by various groups and ordinary citizens. The
success of “Iftar of the earth” (Yeryuzu Sofrasi) lay in its simplicity. People who wanted
to participate did so by simply bringing a piece of newspaper to lay the food they brought
along on the ground (hence Iftar of the “earth”) in public spaces decided and announced
by the forums. Iftars were both organized independently in many small parks as well as
being organized in more coordinated ways in central public spaces of Istanbul, such as
the Istiklal Street, which is the most famous shopping street that leads to Taksim Square.
Whatever food brought in by people was collectively shared with everybody who was
willing to sit down on the ground to eat together. Like in Gezi Park and in ensuing park
forums no money was necessary. The idea of “Iftar of the earth” and its practice proved
to be very strategic and clever for multiple reasons.

First, it was a communal act totally in line with the “Gezi spirit.” It was politically
symbolic as well as practically functional. “Iftar of the earth” was simultaneously a
political statement and a chance for the poor to sit down and eat at the end of the day
without having to pay any money. It brought different people across class borders
together in a common public space. Second, Ramadan began after the violent eviction of
Gezi Park on 15 June and its complete enclosure by the police to any political
demonstration. Many groups that attempted to come together in and around Taksim
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Square faced fierce police opposition and received their fair share of now normalized tear
gas, plastic bullets and arrests.

Figure 19 "Iftar of the earth" in Istiklal Street. Image by Nazim Serhat Firat.

Therefore, “Iftar of the earth” presented a chance for an alternative public political
demonstration, which would not initiate violence from the highly conservative and pious
Turkish police (although at times this proved to be wrong and police did violently
disperse a few Iftars). Third, “Iftar of the earth” disarmed the AKP government and
invalidated its main propaganda, which constantly conveyed to people, mainly by the PM
Erdogan, that those who participated in Gezi protests were exclusively secular militarist
nationalists who were against Islam and hostile to Islamic practices. Finally, as pointed
out by anthropologist Saygun Gokariksel (2013), “Iftar of the Earth” exposed the sheer
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contrast between its communal and civic spirit and the extravagant Iftars organized and
sponsored at five star hotels by big Islamic capital and the AKP government.

The second campaign I would like to mention as an example of decentralized but
coordinated practices of solidarity and alternative economies is the numerous “barter
festivals” organized by various park forums. The idea behind these is not as creative as
“Iftar of the earth,” but in a similar fashion, “barter festivals” were politically symbolic
and practically functional like the Iftars. They were symbolic and political statements
against consumerism and of practical use as they formed alternative markets in which
anything from clothes to household items, from books to food were exchanged, without
the hegemony of exchange value.

Figure 20 Yogurtcu Park Barter Festival. Image by Nazim Serhat Firat.
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Figure 21 Feminist groups in Yogurtcu Park Barter Festival. Two of the banners read, “if I say no, it is a no!”
and “The outfit does not invite sexual harassment.” Image by Nazim Serhat Firat.

The idea of organizing “barter festivals” emerged out of the debates in various park
forums that often revealed how so many people had enough of being passive agents of a
consumer society. People remarked, often in a confessionary tone, that going to shopping
malls and consuming commodities was how they spent most of their leisure time. Many
said that they often ended up with things they did not need, while many other people
could not afford to buy the very same goods. Hence the idea of setting up free exchange
bazaars in parks so that while some “return” the goods they do not need while some
others get the much needed products. Mostly governed by “give or take as you need”
dictum, “barter festivals” simultaneously served as significant spaces for political
organizing, especially for women and socialist feminist collectives. “Women Solidarity
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Desks,” embellished with flags and banners against economic inequality between men
and women, sexual harassment and gendered violence, were very common in such
“barter festivals.”

The bottom up organization and coordination of events such as “barter festivals” and
“Iftar of the earth” where people directly experimented with communal solidarity and
direct democracy in harmony seems to contrast the heterogeneity of concerns voiced and
discussed in park forums. Despite the frictional heterogeneity of political ideals, ideas
and alternatives that were debated every night, park forums still proved to be ideal spaces
of political mobilization when the need surfaced. For example, when an 18-year-old
Kurdish man, Medeni Yildirim, was shot dead by Turkish soldiers during a protest in
Lice, Diyarbakir (the largest and most politicized Kurdish city in Turkey) on 28 June
2013, thousands took it to the streets the same night in Istanbul and other major Turkish
cities for the first time in history (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013b). If the newly found
political solidarity with the Kurds that was mobilized in Turkish cities due to the murder
of a Kurdish man by Turkish soldiers owed to a large extent to the common struggle and
experience during Gezi protests, the rapid and massive mobilization in the majority
Turkish cities owed largely to park forums. People communicated through twitter and
facebook pages of their individual park forums and collectively decided to suspend the
political debate that night, and instead coordinated and participated in massive rallies at
the city centers.
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Conclusion
The Taksim Commune and subsequent park forums took place in appropriated spaces by
means of the transformative participation of countless urban inhabitants in order to
experiment with alternative ways in which urban life can be organized. One of the most
crucial novelties people established, which deeply contrasted their realities before the
uprising was the formation of the alternative ways in which labor and objects it produces
were valued. Neither labor, nor objects were commodities in these spaces. Tasks that
required labor were undertaken collectively by groups of individuals according to their
abilities. Doctors labored for free in makeshift hospitals, set up collectively by people
who were able to build and construct structures. Garbage collection was collectivized, as
well as food distribution and other daily tasks. The information shared by lawyers,
doctors, and other professionals in these appropriated spaces did not find its expression in
monetary terms. That is to say, both objects and labor lost their exchange values and
commodity characters temporarily. However, they were still valued. The fundamental
difference was that the “magnitude of value” of objects and labor was not determined by
the “socially necessary labor time,” the signature of capitalist mode of production (Marx,
1990). Everything that was valued in park was valued because they were of use, hence
embodied use values. Such a political and economic experiment comes closest to what I
have been calling the politics of value, that creatively interlinks use value and value,
without the mediation and hegemony of exchange value.

Now, neither constructing a “temporary autonomous zone,” as one of the banners
proclaimed in Gezi Park during the Taksim Commune, nor appropriating public parks
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and turning them into spaces of intense politics and free exchange do not form an
alternative political economy. Their scale is way too small for putting serious challenges
to capitalist mode of production. What they do, however, is to embody the seeds of a
right to the city claim that makes a successful move from claiming the existing city
towards producing a new one, under a different political economy. The appropriation of
public space—reshaping its spatial qualities, organization, rule of conduct and meaning—
manifest in urban Turkey during and in the immediate aftermath of the uprising vacillated
between appropriation in consumption and appropriation in production. It showed the
qualities of the former, as it was mostly about the appropriation of existing urban spaces.
However, it was a move towards the latter as the appropriation process challenged the
existing ways in which appropriated urban spaces were perceived and lived, to the extent
that these spaces were lived as different spaces, where alternative social relations were
sustained for a limited time.

The right to city claim unfolded in Turkey strikes us as a claim made by the
transformative participation of millions of ordinary urban inhabitants that was against
such generalization of exchange value relations in Turkey’s cities. They responded to
capital’s attempt to appropriate inhabitants’ urban commons, albeit a small park, by
appropriating urban spaces at a scale unforeseen in Turkey. The appropriated spaces of
novel politics and free exchange set up by inhabitants after the uprising encapsulated the
seeds of a creative nexus between use value and value. As such, this right to the city
claim comes closest to a politics of value that would abolish the capitalist law of value.
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The appropriation of urban spaces and the subsequent transformation of them into
different spaces where novel political practices and forms take place began as a process
in Turkey, but did not realize its full potential. The richness of debates in public spaces
concerning how to transform the political potential unleashed by the uprising and park
forums into more durable political and organizational forms notwithstanding, the agents
of the uprising were unable to construct such forms. This curtailed the political potential
released by the successful appropriation of urban space. The right to the city claim made
in urban Turkey was not able to institutionalize the politics that it spawned, largely
because it was relatively unable to construct durable political and organizational forms.

Lefebvre once proclaimed “[a] revolution that does not produce a new space has not
realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has
merely changed ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses” (1991:
54). Although this is certainly true, having examined the right to the city claim made in
urban Turkey, we might be tempted to assert that the reverse also holds true.
Transformation of institutions and political apparatuses are necessary steps towards
keeping alive the potential released by the successful appropriation of space.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: THE DIALECTICS OF CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

In Capital, Karl Marx, while setting up his historically situated critique of capitalist
political economy, makes one trans-historical argument early in his discussion of labor
theory of value in the first chapter. Labor, he argues, “as the creator of use values,” as
useful labor, “is a condition of human existence which is independent of all forms of
society; it is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man
and nature, and therefore human life itself” (1990: 133). The life of every individual as
well as the continuation of life of the society, therefore, absolutely depend on the process
of appropriation (in production) of nature by labor in the process of creating use values.
The capitalist mode of production values this labor expended to produce use values by
the time that is socially necessary for its production. Both socially necessary labor time
(value) and the useful qualities of the object produced (use value) are represented by
exchange value “as the necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance” of both
value and use value (1990: 128). That is to say, exchange value almost completely
dominates both use value and value under capitalism.

Henri Lefebvre’s brilliance in Le Droit à la Ville (The Right to the City) was to capture
and demonstrate how such a generalized domination of exchange value under capitalism
undermines urban life, by turning the potential of the city as oeuvre, the collective
artwork of urban inhabitants, into an actual product. The generalization of exchange
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value relation and subsequent transformation of oeuvre into product, he argued,
necessarily overwhelm the user, the simple inhabitant who relies on use values embedded
in the city. Thus he formulated a right to the city for use value against the domination of
exchange value.

As I tried to demonstrate in chapter II, the exclusion of value from this picture
nevertheless, has a series of consequences. First, as a theorist of dialectics that, according
to him, flow from triads, Lefebvre leaves his dialectical formulation incomplete and
presents us with a simple opposition between use value and exchange value to understand
capitalist urbanism. In general, he remains critical to such oppositions as he argues that
the “relations between two elements boil down to oppositions, contrasts or antagonisms,”
which are “very difficult to get beyond” (Lefebvre, 1991: 39). Second, the importance of
labor as the creator of use values and the city as oeuvre remains underemphasized in his
account. This is unfortunate because it is primarily the labor that experiences the
overwhelming effects of exchange value relations’ generalization in the city that he
brilliantly explains. Third, and intertwined with the second, Lefebvre leaves his
formulation of the right to the city open for a liberal appropriation. Formulating the
politics of use value as the foundation of a right to the city claim, Lefebvre implicitly puts
his version of the right to the city in the domain of final consumption, hence it becomes
possible to absorb his right to the city into a consumerist politics, in which having access
to use values offered by the existing capitalist city becomes the primary concern. As
Marx asserts, use values are only realized in use or in consumption (1990: 126). Under
the dictates of the capitalist mode of production the road to the realization of use values is
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marauded by exchange value. Since Lefebvre leaves his right to the city in the domain of
consumption, his liberal interpreters can absorb his emphasis on use value and turn it into
an emphasis on reforming the barriers to accessing use values in the capitalist city. In
short, Lefebvre’s privileging of use value and his consequent politics of use value opens
the path for a liberal appropriation, to put it in Lefebvre’s language, that “necessarily
overwhelms” “the creator of use value,” i.e., labor.

Rather than a right to the city that is based on privileging use value, I proposed a right to
the city that makes establishing the nexus between use value and value—without the
domination of exchange value—the primary political concern. This would potentially do
three things. First, it would not leave labor as the producer of use value overshadowed by
its product. Second, it would set a booby trap against liberal appropriation. It is much
easier, for instance, for the UN institutions, to talk about the right to the city when it is
about realizing use values in the city, as this politics of use value remains in the domain
of consumption. However it would be much harder for them to talk about the right to the
city when it is formulated as a politics of value, which privileges the labor as the creator
of use value rather than privileging its product. Making the right to the city about labor
should thus be the primary political concern. Third, a politics of value that can creatively
interconnects use value and value by bypassing exchange value would provide a space in
which the crucial debate on the question of what is socially necessary could take place.
After all, if it will not be the socially necessary labor time that would dictate the value of
labor and the objects it produces, what will? This debate would not only open a path for
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debate about alternative forms of social valuation but also would enable us to think about
alternative political economies, which are not guided by the capitalist law of value.

Claiming the Right to the City: Towards the Production of Space from Below examined
diverse political struggles mobilized for realizing the right to the city that crystallized
around the question of value. It attempted to delineate these struggles while dialectically
intertwining them through the glances offered by the three pillars of Marxian labor theory
of value: use value, exchange value and value. The first chapter introduced several
contemporary political projects that aim for a better access to use values in the city. It
argued that although these struggles for use value are extremely important for they are
about the reproduction of social and material life of urban inhabitants, they are in the end
appropriated by the hegemony of exchange value. The second case consisted of an
examination of the ways in which the struggles around the question of use value are
appropriated and absorbed by a right to the city claim made by the UN agencies.
Although the issues that occupy UN agencies, such as poverty, the quality of urban life,
spatial segregation and the urban divide are indeed about accessing use values, I argued
that the fundamental trust of UN agencies in free market for solving the problems
prevalent in the globalized urban world requires them to translate the issues about use
value into exchange value terms.

The underlying argument in these cases was that both the politics of use value and the
politics of exchange value fall short of realizing the transformative potential embedded in
claiming the right to the city. The examination of the last right to the city claim, which
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unfolded during the urban uprising in Turkey, consisted of an argument that the
transformative potential of claiming the right to the city could be realized in a politics of
value, which is about producing and consuming use values without the hegemony of
exchange value. Such politics of value would encompass the questions raised by the
politics of use value and the politics of exchange value. To be sure, the political struggle
that started in Istanbul was initially about use value. The attempted appropriation of an
urban commons—embedded with use values that are realized daily by urban
inhabitants—by the exchange value interests represented by government’s plan to build a
shopping mall in park’s stead, puts the initial struggle at the park squarely within the
politics of use value. As the struggle jumped scale from the park to the city and then to
the rest of the urban Turkey, it became a question of the political regime that has been
increasingly hegemonic in the past 12 years in Turkey. I think the question of regime had
two interrelated aspects. As I discussed in chapter IV, the AKP period is characterized by
an intensified neoliberalization at an unprecedented pace, blended with repressive and
authoritarian qualities.

As the Gezi protests evolved into a countrywide uprising, the struggle against these two
aspects of the political regime in Turkey became salient. On the one hand the uprising
represented a widespread resentment against the economic policies underlined by
unprecedented privatization, expanding urban redevelopment, enclosure of the commons,
and the loss of labor rights. On the other hand, the uprising was against a cultural and
political conservatism, which AKP mobilized to keep any form of resistance under
control by using extremely repressive and violent measures. In other words, the uprising
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exploded against a political regime, which pushed for an amplifying hegemony of
exchange value and social and political control that micromanages people’s lives on such
issues ranging from the number of children women should have to how to behave in
public spaces. The regime attempted to exert a tight social control, so to speak, that aimed
to manage its citizens from the scale of the body all the way to the national scale.

The people responded to this regime by appropriating public spaces and taking control of
their cities where they formed alternative social relations based on solidarity, cooperation
and direct democracy, while experimenting with an alternative political economy in
which exchange value had no purchase. The self-management in Taksim Commune and
the Park Forums was a response of the people to the hegemony of exchange value and the
social and political control it brings along. The uprising brought along a moment, in
which people “glimpsed” the possibility of an alternative politics, a politics of value that
enabled them, if only for a fleeting moment, to collectively produce an urban life, where
the repressive political measures that are necessitated by the hegemony of exchange value
had no place. This makes the social, political and economic experiment enabled by the
urban uprising in Turkey this dissertation’s culmination point of analysis offered based
on the nodal point of value (exchange value/use value-value).

Apart from the dialectical relations that flow from the nodal point of value, Claiming the
Right to the City suggested two other major nodal points to examine contemporary
political struggles for the right to the city. The first nodal point was concerned with
appropriation, which I examined through the dialectical relation between appropriation
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in consumption and appropriation in production. While I argued that the appropriation of
existing urban spaces, which is appropriation in consumption, is a sine qua non aspect of
a successful right to the city claim, it lacks the political potential revealed by
appropriation in production, which is the process of producing a “new space” to “change
life itself” through revolutionary practice, that Lefebvre talk about in The Production of
Space (1991: 54).

The second major nodal point was concerned with political participation. The dialectical
relation that flows from reproductive participation and transformative participation, this
dissertation argued, helps us to understand urban political projects that aim for social
change. While I argued that reproductive participation opens limited channels for social
change, as it aims for the participation of urban inhabitants into existing procedures of
urban governance for the reproduction of the existing city, I also acknowledged that such
struggles over the existing city through current political channels are important as it is not
possible to change the city as it is without engaging with it first. However, I also argued
that the transformative participation, i.e., the political participation of urban inhabitants in
the process of discovering new needs for a new urban society, would bring about a much
deeper social change, the aspects of which would be formulated democratically by urban
inhabitants.

The tight dialectic between the three nodal points (value/appropriation/participation) that
I attempt to establish here in this dissertation should more importantly be established in
practice. The project of formulating and practicing a politics of value that would embody
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an appropriation in production at its core, this dissertation argued, necessitates
autonomously established mechanisms of transformative participation. To put it in more
fluid terms, inasmuch as any urban political project is able to move its political practice
from appropriation in consumption towards appropriation in production, from the
politics of exchange value towards establishing the critical nexus between use value and
value, while discovering mechanisms for political participation that are characterized by a
move from reproductive participation to transformative participation, it comes closer to
realizing the right to the city and the promise of more just urbanism embodied in it.

Among the diverse urban struggles this dissertation examined, the right to the city claim
mobilized by the urban uprising in Turkey comes closest to the kind of politics of value I
tried to establish here. The struggle in Turkey’s cities involved the participation of
massive numbers of people to appropriate urban space. What it lacked, however, was the
evolution of massive transformative participation that enabled urban space
appropriation into more durable organizational and political forms. This was, in part, due
to the overwhelming power of the state and the capital, which looked to crush any
attempt of political organizing after the uprising. However, it was also due to the
unresolved tension between the more organized actors of political society and the newer
political actors that approached more durable organizational forms by a degree of
skepticism. This was the Achilles heel of the political potential unleashed by the uprising.

However, more long term political organizing and production of relatively durable
organizational forms are necessary because of two related reasons. First, the physical
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appropriation of existing urban space—though sine qua non for a right to the city claim—
is “appropriation in consumption,” which, more often than not, can only temporarily
claim what already exists in the city, the existing city. Therefore, it can hardly transform
the city in the long run in significant ways towards a city where the urban justice implied
by the right to the city concept could flourish. Second, the “appropriation in production,”
the process of creating a new space and a new life by establishing the critical nexus
between use value and value without the hegemony of exchange value i.e., the process of
abolishing capitalist law of value, necessitates the political production of the tight
dialectic between spontaneous appropriation of urban space and relatively durable
organizational forms. Only the long term sustained political organizing and activism
might lead the way to producing new needs, new urban spaces, new urbanism, and
revolutionary cities that the notion of the right to the city I attempted to establish here
promises.
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